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ARTICLE 
RUNNING THE GAMUT FROM A TO B:   
FEDERAL TRADEMARK AND  
FALSE ADVERTISING LAW 
REBECCA TUSHNET† 
The Lanham Act bars trademark infringement and false advertising in 
nearly identical and often overlapping language.  In some circumstances, courts 
have interpreted the two provisions in the same way, but in other areas there has 
been significant doctrinal divergence, often to the detriment of the law.  This Ar-
ticle argues that each branch of the Lanham Act offers important lessons for the 
other.  Courts should rationalize their treatment of implied claims, whether of 
sponsorship or of other facts; they should impose a materiality requirement, such 
that the only unlawful trademark and false advertising claims are those that 
actually matter to consumers; and in false advertising cases, they should recog-
nize that competitors have sufficient interests to confer standing when the ad-
vertisers’ false statements are doing harm, rather than imposing increasingly 
elaborate barriers to suit.  The present practice of interpreting the same lan-
guage in substantially different ways lacks justification and has the effect of 
promoting the interests of the most powerful companies, whether they are assert-
ing claims of trademark infringement against smaller entities or defending 
themselves against false advertising claims by competitors. 
 
 
† Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.  Thanks to Graeme Din-
woodie, Mark Lemley, Mark McKenna, Jennifer Rothman, and the George Mason Fa-
culty Workshop, as well as to Mara Gassmann, Portia Roundtree, and Emin Akopyan 
for research assistance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
McDonald’s advertises a Monopoly-themed contest with millions of 
dollars in high-value prizes, as well as millions more in small prizes.1  In 
fact, however, perfidious contractors conspire to allocate the high-value 
prizes to people they choose, meaning that ordinary consumers have no 
chance to win.2  A class of Burger King franchisees, alleging substantial 
lost business as a result of the contest, sues McDonald’s for false adver-
tising but loses a motion to dismiss on the pleadings because the court 
 
1 Phoenix of Broward, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 489 F.3d 1156, 1159-60 (11th Cir. 
2007). 
2 See id. at 1160 (describing an embezzlement scheme by the contracted operator 
of the game and later distribution of the pieces to “winners”). 
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concludes, without hearing any evidence, that it would be too difficult 
for the class to show the precise extent to which it had been harmed.3 
McDonald’s sues a dentist’s office, McDental, for causing confusion 
about whether McDonald’s approved or endorsed the dental office.4  
McDonald’s wins without having to provide evidence that consumers 
cared about any affiliation or evidence that it had been harmed, even 
though the office had been in existence for nearly a decade.5  Now add 
in one more fact:  in both cases, the same federal law was the basis for 
suit.  How can this be? 
The Lanham Act, enacted in 1946 and significantly amended sev-
eral times since, establishes federal trademark law as well as a private 
cause of action for false advertising more generally.6  Along with pro-
hibiting infringement of registered trademarks, the Lanham Act pro-
tects unregistered trademarks and indications of source against con-
duct likely to cause confusion as to source or sponsorship, in a 
provision now known as section 43(a)(1)(A).7  Congress confirmed by 
amendment that the Lanham Act’s false advertising provision, now 
known as section 43(a)(1)(B), bars both false statements about an ad-
vertiser’s own goods or services and false statements about another’s 
goods or services—false boasting and false attacks, respectively.8 
As their designations indicate, these provisions are next to one 
another in the U.S. Code.  Their wording is nearly identical.  Lan-
guage in both provisions bars “any word, term, name, symbol, or de-
vice, . . . or any false designation of origin, false or misleading descrip-
tion of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact” that either is 
likely to cause confusion about the origin or sponsorship of the de-
fendant’s goods or services (trademark) or misrepresents the nature, 
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of anyone’s goods or 
 
3 Id. at 1160-61, 1173. 
4 McDonald’s Corp. v. Druck & Gerner, DDS., P.C., 814 F. Supp. 1127, 1129 
(N.D.N.Y. 1993). 
5 See id. at 1129, 1133-35 (finding a likelihood of confusion between the plaintiff’s 
and the defendant’s marks); see also Quality Inns Int’l, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 695 F. 
Supp. 198, 221-23 (D. Md. 1988) (enjoining the use of the term “McSleep Inn” for motels 
without requiring evidence of materiality, actual harm to reputation, or lost sales); 
McDonald’s Corp. v. McBagel’s, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 1268, 1273-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (finding 
“confusion of any type” sufficient to enjoin McBagel even without finding misleadingness 
or harm from mistakenly associating McBagel, “however fleetingly,” with McDonald’s). 
6 Act of July 5, 1946 (Lanham Act), ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1127 (2006)). 
7 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A). 
8 Id. § 1125(a)(1)(B). 
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services (false advertising).9  For certain issues—mainly preliminary 
relief, remedies, and survey evidence—courts have drawn freely on 
false advertising precedents to decide trademark cases, and vice versa.10  
But in other important areas of the law, doctrine has proceeded as if 
trademark and false advertising were two entirely separate bodies of 
law, despite their common heritage.11 
This Article challenges that separation.  It argues in particular that 
false advertising law, though vastly undertheorized compared to trade-
mark law, has several important lessons for trademark.  Right now, 
trademark doctrine has difficulty defining its proper scope.  Instead of 
reinventing the wheel (and continuing down the wrong track), trade-
 
9 Compare id. (false advertising), with id. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (trademark). 
10 See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Amouri’s Grand Foods, Inc., 453 F.3d 377, 382 
(6th Cir. 2006) (holding that presumption of irreparable injury is the same for both); 
S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Clorox Co., 241 F.3d 232, 238-40 (2d Cir. 2001) (same); 
Abbott Labs. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6, 16 (7th Cir. 1992) (using survey 
precedent interchangeably); Johnson & Johnson * Merck Consumer Pharm. Co. v. 
Smithkline Beecham Corp., 960 F.2d 294, 300 (2d Cir. 1992) (same); Rexall Sundown, 
Inc. v. Perrigo Co., 707 F. Supp. 2d 357, 363 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding that damages 
should be evaluated the same way for both); Bracco Diagnostics, Inc. v. Amersham 
Health, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 2d 384, 479 (D.N.J. 2009) (“Trademark case law applies to 
the remedies sought in this [false advertising] action:  Congress amended the Lanham 
Act to expressly make all trademark remedies available in false advertising cases, and 
numerous courts have since applied trademark precedent to false advertising damages 
claims.” (citation omitted)); 6 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND 
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 32:193 (4th ed. 2010) (discussing equal applicability of survey 
precedent and citing cases).  
11 Pockets of disagreement emerge seemingly at random.  See Balance Dynamics 
Corp. v. Schmitt Indus., Inc., 204 F.3d 683, 695 n.6 (6th Cir. 2000) (distinguishing false 
advertising from trademark infringement, where “one of the trial court’s primary func-
tions is to make violations of the Lanham Act unprofitable to the infringing party” (cit-
ing Wynn Oil Co. v. Am. Way Serv. Corp., 943 F.2d 595, 606-07 (6th Cir. 1991))); 
Campagnolo S.R.L. v. Full Speed Ahead, Inc., No. 08-1372, 2010 WL 2079694, at *4 
(W.D. Wash. May 20, 2010) (“Campagnolo fails to provide any argument as to why the 
doctrines applicable to contributory trademark infringement should apply to false ad-
vertising.”); Pernod Ricard USA LLC v. Bacardi U.S.A., Inc., 702 F. Supp. 2d 238, 248-
50 (D. Del. 2010) (suggesting that the meaning of “geographic origin” might differ as 
between the two provisions); Rocky Brands, Inc. v. Red Wing Shoe Co., No. 06-00275, 
2009 WL 5125475, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 28, 2009) (“In trademark infringement cases, 
it is well-established that for a consumer confusion survey, the universe must consist 
only of potential purchasers, not past purchasers.  Although there is a dearth of case 
law on the subject, it appears the same rule may not always apply in a false advertising 
case.” (citation omitted)); id. at *5 (holding that marketplace conditions didn’t need 
to be replicated with the same precision in false advertising surveys as in trademark 
surveys); Powerhouse Marks LLC v. Chi Hsin Impex, Inc., No. 04-73923, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 4021, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 2, 2006) (“As this is not a false advertising case, the 
Court will adhere to the Sixth Circuit’s holding in Wynn Oil and hold that Power-
house’s lack of evidence of actual confusion does not bar a monetary award.”). 
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mark law should reclaim a few ideas from false advertising law about the 
importance of implications and materiality.  Reciprocally, false advertis-
ing doctrines could benefit from trademark law’s greater flexibility and 
clearer ideas about values that might counterbalance a plaintiff’s claim 
to be acting in the interests of deceived consumers.  Trying to under-
stand the Lanham Act solely through the lens of trademark law is like 
trying to write a story with only half the alphabet.  False advertising 
needs to take an equal role.  This Article suggests steps toward that goal. 
I.  THE LANHAM ACT 
A bit of history is essential to understanding the problem.  The 
Lanham Act was conceived as a federal trademark statute, protecting 
marketplace participants against unfair competition.12  Consumers are 
generally presumed to care about the origin or the brand-specific char-
acteristics of a product.  A Snickers is not just any chocolate-peanut-
nougat confection, and a buyer is entitled to get a genuine Snickers 
bar if she wants one, not a counterfeit.  Thus, trademark infringement 
is a type of false advertising—a false claim of origin, or perhaps a false 
claim about a product’s characteristics. 
From the beginning, the Lanham Act prohibited false claims in 
language that extended beyond trademark.  Some circuits initially  
limited the scope of the Act to cases in which an advertiser made false 
statements about its own products by analogizing to situations in which 
the advertiser used an infringing mark to identify its own products.13  
In those circuits, false statements about a competitor’s product were 
the province of state trade libel and product defamation law,14 which 
were and remain substantially more limited in scope than the Lanham 
 
12 Lee Goldman, The World’s Best Article on Competitor Suits for False Advertising, 45 
FLA. L. REV. 487, 497-98 (1993).  
13 See, e.g., U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 681 F.2d 1159, 1160-61 (9th Cir. 
1982); L’Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649, 650-51 (3d Cir. 1954); 
Skil Corp. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 375 F. Supp. 777, 783-84 (N.D. Ill. 1974). 
14 See, e.g., Bernard Food Indus., Inc. v. Dietene Co., 415 F.2d 1279, 1283 (7th Cir. 
1969) (“False advertising or representations made by a defendant about a plaintiff’s 
product are not covered by section 43(a).”); Samson Crane Co. v. Union Nat’l Sales, 
Inc., 87 F. Supp. 218, 222 (D. Mass. 1949) (“[Section 43(a)] should be construed to 
include only such false descriptions or representations as are of substantially the same 
economic nature as those which involve infringement or other improper use of trade-
marks.”), aff’d per curiam, 180 F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1950) (mem.). 
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Act because of their scienter requirements.15  In 1988, Congress 
amended the Lanham Act to make clear that false statements about 
anyone’s products or services were actionable.16 
While courts limited the false advertising provisions of the Lanham 
Act, they simultaneously interpreted trademark law expansively by treat-
ing infringement as a strict liability cause of action, among other things.  
Courts generally construed the Lanham Act to follow common law con-
cepts of infringement, and so it was with intent.  Intent to confuse could 
justify an inference that consumer confusion was likely, but even inno-
cent intent would not save a defendant whose use was likely to cause 
confusion.17  When courts then confronted nontrademark Lanham Act 
claims, they imposed strict liability for false advertising as well.18 
Gilbert Weil, “an early advocate of expansive recovery for false ad-
vertising under § 43(a),” predicted that the standards for evaluating 
 
15 See, e.g., Verizon Directories Corp. v. Yellow Book USA, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 
401, 406 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (reciting the standard elements for product disparagement, 
including malice). 
16 Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935 (codi-
fied as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1127 (2006)).  For evidence of Congress’s in-
tent, see S. REP. NO. 100-515, at 40 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5603.  
[Some] courts have held that Section 43(a) applies only to misrepresentations 
about one’s own products or services. . . . The committee agrees that this ef-
fect is illogical on both practical and public policy levels and that the public 
policy of deterring acts of unfair competition will be served if Section 43(a) is 
amended to make clear that misrepresentations about another’s products are 
as actionable as misrepresentations about one’s own. 
Id. (citation omitted).  
17 See, e.g., Tisch Hotels, Inc. v. Americana Inn, Inc., 350 F.2d 609, 613 (7th Cir. 
1965) (“A finding of fraudulent intent or bad faith is not essential to the award of an 
injunction for trademark infringement where likelihood of confusion exists.”); 
Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 314 F.2d 149, 157-58 (9th Cir. 
1963) (inferring intent to confuse from deliberate adoption of another’s name); Safe-
way Stores, Inc. v. Rudner, 246 F.2d 826, 829 (9th Cir. 1957) (concluding that intent to 
confuse was “immaterial”); Lane Bryant, Inc. v. Maternity Lane, Ltd., 173 F.2d 559, 564 
(9th Cir. 1949) (“It does not appear that an evil intent is necessary to relief.”); J.S. Ty-
ree, Chemist, Inc., v. Thymo Borine Lab., 151 F.2d 621, 623 (7th Cir. 1945) (stating 
that the defendant’s emphasis on findings showing it avoided “piratical methods” were 
immaterial); United Drug Co. v. Obear-Nester Glass Co., 111 F.2d 997, 999 (8th Cir. 
1940) (“Good faith may have an effect upon the measure of damages[,] . . . but it has 
no bearing upon the question of infringement.”).  But cf. Barton Beebe, An Empirical 
Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1581, 1608, 
1626-31 (2006) (finding that, while good intent is not dispositive, there is heavy re-
liance on findings of bad intent in practice). 
18 See, e.g., POM Wonderful LLC v. Purely Juice, Inc., 362 F. App’x 577, 579 (9th 
Cir. 2009) (“It is settled that intent is not an element of a Lanham Act false advertising 
claim.” (citing 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 27:51)). 
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false advertisers and trademark infringers would converge.19  Weil 
wrote that once falsity was established, courts would use the same tools 
to assess materiality and likely injury that they used to evaluate likely 
confusion in a trademark case.20  For example, courts could determine 
that an advertiser wouldn’t spend money making a claim unless it 
thought the claim would affect sales, thus presuming materiality.21  
Likewise, once a plaintiff showed that an ad was literally false, the plain-
tiff wouldn’t need to provide evidence that consumers were actually de-
ceived, just as a trademark plaintiff wouldn’t need to show actual confu-
sion to prevail.22  As Weil anticipated, unlike the common law,23 success 
today under section 43(a) does not require evidence of specific harm to 
obtain injunctive relief—a “mere likelihood of deception will suffice.”24 
Lillian BeVier, writing nearly twenty years ago, criticized these de-
velopments as unwarranted expansions of the common law with respect 
to false advertising.25  I think BeVier understated the importance of 
 
19 Lillian R. BeVier, Competitor Suits for False Advertising Under Section 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act:  A Puzzle in the Law of Deception, 78 VA. L. REV. 1, 40 n.118 (1992) (citing 
Gilbert H. Weil, Protectability of Trademark Values Against False Competitive Advertising, 44 
CALIF. L. REV. 527, 537 (1956)). 
20 Weil, supra note 19, at 537. 
21 Id. 
22 See, e.g., Balance Dynamics Corp. v. Schmitt Indus., Inc., 204 F.3d 683, 693-94 
(6th Cir. 2000) (citing, in a false advertising case, the trademark case Lindy Pen Co. v. 
Bic Pen Corp., 982 F.2d 1400, 1407 (9th Cir. 1993), which held that proof of actual con-
fusion can be difficult to obtain and thus is not required); Am. Brands, Inc. v. R.J. Rey-
nolds Tobacco Co., 413 F. Supp. 1352, 1356 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (“[A] court can grant re-
lief on its own findings without recourse to a survey of consumer reaction.”).  
Currently, courts often confine themselves to citing false advertising precedents with-
out explicit mention of trademark precedents.  See, e.g., Pizza Hut, Inc. v. Papa John’s 
Int’l, Inc., 227 F.3d 489, 497 (5th Cir. 2000) (“[W]hen the statements of fact at issue 
are shown to be literally false, the plaintiff need not introduce evidence on the issue of 
the impact the statements had on consumers.”). 
23 See Stuart P. Green, Lying, Misleading, and Falsely Denying:  How Moral Concepts In-
form the Law of Perjury, Fraud, and False Statements, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 157, 182-87 (2001) 
(tracing the legal remedies for fraud at common law to the beginning of the eighteenth 
century, when claims involving deception were limited to a narrow set of circumstances). 
24 1A LOUIS ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, 
TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 5.5 (4th ed. 2009); see also 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 
10, § 27:36 (“When plaintiff seeks only an injunction, there is no requirement that it 
be proven that purchasers were actually deceived, only that the advertisement has a 
tendency to deceive.”).  
25 As BeVier stated, 
when courts began entertaining competitor suits for false advertising under 
section 43(a), they decided instead [of analogizing to the tort of deceit] to in-
corporate trademark law’s standard of strict liability.  In doing so, however, 
they neither built upon nor eschewed a consciously made choice of the com-
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nearly identical statutory language because such language reinforced 
the relationship between trademark infringement and other types of 
false advertising under federal law.  The Lanham Act targeted consum-
er deception resulting in harm to competitors, not classical fraud.  
Once one accepts that the Lanham Act provides a cause of action for 
more than trademark infringement, we have left the common law—in 
which competitors, as opposed to consumers, rarely had fraud claims 
against lying advertisers—behind.  This development was also consistent 
with the modern experience of large-scale consumer advertising, which 
was in many ways unlike the traditional one-off fraud involving a single 
seller’s deliberate misrepresentation to a single consumer.  Mass mar-
kets both require and justify a probabilistic examination of the overall 
effect on consumers (that is, likely confusion) rather than a case-by-case 
examination of precisely who a misrepresentation of source or of some 
other fact fooled. 
Treating trademark infringement as a specialized type of false ad-
vertising makes sense, not only because of the statutory language, but 
also because of the logical affinity between the concepts.  The drafters 
of the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition observed that infringe-
ment claims fell within the literal scope of deceptive marketing, 
though they recommended that plaintiffs bring their claims under the 
section more specifically dealing with trademark infringement.26  Still, 
the common foundation largely justified common treatment.  Roger 
Schechter summarized the situation at the end of the twentieth century: 
The current judicial approach to false advertising cases under the Lan-
ham Act largely parallels the trademark rules.  The advertising plaintiff 
need not show that the defendant promulgated the false ad deliberately.  
Similarly, like the trademark plaintiff, the advertising plaintiff need not 
show any actual harm flowing from the advertisement, unless seeking 
money damages.  To obtain an injunction, the plaintiff must demon-
strate only that the defendant’s ad is false and that the plaintiff is “likely” 
to be injured by the defendant’s conduct.
27
 
As the following sections will explore, this summary is incomplete.  
Among other things, trademark uses a context-specific multifactor test 
 
mon law.  Instead, their choice seems to have been a product of serendipitous 
statutory drafting coupled with their own failure to recognize the important 
differences between the two kinds of cases.  
BeVier, supra note 19, at 40.  
26 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 4 cmt. b (1995). 
27 Roger E. Schechter, Commentary, Additional Pieces of the Deception Puzzle:  Some 
Reactions to Professor BeVier, 78 VA. L. REV. 57, 58-59 (1992) (footnote omitted). 
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for evaluating infringement claims, while false advertising has a more 
rigid yes-or-no structure.  Moreover, trademark decisions have become 
increasingly indifferent to whether consumers actually care about 
trademarks, whereas false advertising doctrine is quite attentive to ma-
teriality.  Yet the areas of divergence have not developed as the result 
of any particular theory of trademark and false advertising.  This Ar-
ticle proposes that the two bodies of law should be reunited because 
of their fundamental similarities as regulations of how advertisers 
communicate messages to consumers. 
II.  WHAT DOES THAT MEAN?  IMPLICATION AND THE LANHAM ACT 
A.  Trademark’s Overexpansiveness 
In trademark, likely confusion is generally assessed by a multifactor 
test that covers the strength of the plaintiff’s mark, the proximity of 
the parties’ goods and services, the similarity of the parties’ marks, the 
channels in which the goods and services travel, the defendant’s good 
faith, consumer sophistication, and evidence of actual confusion, 
among other things.28  Courts have interpreted the Lanham Act broad-
ly, concluding that almost any association between a trademark owner 
and a defendant may sow confusion.  Courts are willing to enjoin uses 
that they conclude indicate a trademark owner’s mere approval of a 
defendant’s product or service. 
For example, a district court enjoined the use of the movie title 
Dairy Queens (later changed to Drop Dead Gorgeous) for fear that it 
would be associated with the Dairy Queen restaurant chain.29  Another 
court affirmed an injunction against a parody T-shirt for “Mutant of 
Omaha,” which bore the tagline “Nuclear Holocaust Insurance,” be-
cause consumers might believe that the insurer Mutual of Omaha 
“goes along” with the antiwar message on the shirts.30  Given the num-
ber of lucrative and highly visible product placement deals, such as 
Coca-Cola’s relationship with American Idol,31 trademark owners can 
 
28 See, e.g., SquirtCo v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 1090-91 (8th Cir. 1980) (dis-
cussing the “numerous factors” used to determine a likelihood of confusion); AMF Inc. 
v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979) (identifying the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s eight factors relevant to the likelihood-of-confusion analysis). 
29 See Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prods., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727, 729, 
735 (D. Minn. 1998). 
30 Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir. 1987). 
31 Ford, Coca-Cola and AT&T Return as Official Sponsors, AM. IDOL ( Jan. 19, 2011, 
3:04 PM), http://www.americanidol.com/news/view/pid/4251. 
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argue that consumers see a brand’s presence practically anywhere as 
an indication of endorsement. 
In recent years, expansive trademark claims, often in situations  
implicating anticompetitive conduct or free speech values, have led 
courts and commentators to propose rules that will end cases quickly.32  
In certain recurring situations, a defendant should not be required to 
engage in an expensive battle to defend the use of its mark.  The critical 
move, then, is to find a way to avoid a factual inquiry into whether a 
particular use of a trademark is likely to confuse reasonable consumers. 
One frequently litigated situation involves factual statements about 
a trademark owner used to communicate an expressive or competitive 
message.  In a case about whether USA Today could run a for-profit 
phone poll about the music group New Kids on the Block without the 
group’s permission, the Ninth Circuit generalized a class of cases cate-
gorically outside the scope of trademark law, which it called “nomina-
tive fair use.”33  A nominative fair use is a usage that is necessary to 
identify the subject (you can’t discuss the New Kids on the Block with-
out using their name), uses no more of the mark than necessary to 
identify the product or service, and does nothing else to suggest source 
or sponsorship.34  If a defendant establishes these elements, the Ninth 
Circuit held, its use is not confusing as a matter of law.35 
 
32 See, e.g., Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that the 
Lanham Act does not apply to the use of a celebrity’s name in the title of an artistic 
work unless the title has no relevance to the work or the use of the name is explicitly 
misleading about the source of the work).  See generally Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. 
Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law Through Trademark Use, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1669, 1671-
73 (2007) (discussing the trademark use doctrine as a way to limit expansive trademark 
claims in the Internet age); Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 
STAN. L. REV. 413, 444-46 (2010) (proposing a materiality requirement to rein in 
trademark claims); William McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L. REV. 
49, 115-21 (2008) (arguing for the creation of simple affirmative defenses to trademark 
claims because complex fair use doctrines deter legitimate uses).  
33 New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 304, 307-08 (9th 
Cir. 1992). 
34 Id. at 308.  The Third Circuit has devised its own approach to nominative fair 
use cases.  Its two-step method requires the plaintiff to demonstrate likely confusion as 
an initial matter.  If the plaintiff is successful, the burden shifts to the defendant to 
show the necessity of using the plaintiff’s mark, that no more was used than required, 
and that the defendant accurately represented the relationship between the plaintiff’s 
and defendant’s goods.  See Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 
211, 222 (3d Cir. 2005). 
35 See New Kids, 971 F.2d at 308; see also Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 
1150-51 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that nominative fair use replaces the traditional con-
fusion analysis and is available even when the standard multifactor test would find a 
likelihood of confusion); cf. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999 (holding that the Lanham Act does 
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At the same time as it treated nominative fair use as a legal con-
clusion, the Ninth Circuit also made an empirical claim:  consumers 
can’t be confused by a truthful statement.36  Courts commonly make 
this move in nominative fair use and other speech-protective cases,37 
and understandably so.  Such a rationale conveniently denies the exis-
tence of a possible harm (confusion) that the court might otherwise 
need to balance against the defendant’s claim of free speech. 
Nominative fair use attempts to operationalize a vital insight:  
trademark owners shouldn’t be able to control all discussion of them-
selves or of their products.  Absent some rule both reflecting and shap-
ing the reality that people are generally free to talk about trademarks 
without permission, and routinely do so, trademark owners would have 
virtually unlimited power to suppress speech.  We do not live, and we 
do not want to live, in a world where all mentions of trademarks—even 
in commercial publications—need authorization, nor do we believe 
that consumers actually expect that permission is always required.  Fur-
thermore, we want the law to discourage trademark owners from  
attempting to convince consumers that there is a general permission 
requirement.  Even if trademark owners were to succeed empirically in 
persuading consumers that permission is always required, we would 
still, as a normative matter, refuse to enforce any such overreaching 
control; this rule discourages trademark owners from making the  
attempt.  As a result, I think dismissal before any factual inquiry is of-
ten the right result, but that doesn’t mean that truthful statements 
can’t be confusing.  The real problem, as I take up below, is that any 
such confusion is almost certainly immaterial to consumers. 
 
not generally apply to titles of expressive works, except when “the title has no artistic 
relevance to the underlying work” or “explicitly misleads as to source or content of the 
work,” a test that apparently replaces the multifactor confusion analysis). 
36 See New Kids, 971 F.2d at 307-08 (“‘When the mark is used in a way that does not 
deceive the public we see no such sanctity in the word as to prevent its being used to 
tell the truth.’” (quoting Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924))). 
37 See, e.g., Hensley Mfg. v. ProPride, Inc., 579 F.3d 603, 610-11 (6th Cir. 2009) 
(noting that the plaintiff could not establish likelihood of confusion as a matter of law 
where the defendant did not use the mark “‘in a way that identifies the source’” of the 
goods (quoting Interactive Prods. Corp. v. a2z Mobile Office Solutions, Inc., 326 F.3d 
687, 695 (6th Cir. 2003))); Cairns, 292 F.3d at 1155 & n.12 (stating that there was no 
likelihood of confusion where the use of a mark was nominative); Pebble Beach Co. v. 
Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 545-46 (5th Cir. 1998) (explaining that a nominative fair 
use claim “is in actuality a claim that the use is noninfringing and thus creates no like-
lihood of confusion” and disallowing the nominative fair use defense where the defen-
dant used the trademark as a source identifier for its own services because of a likeli-
hood of confusion (emphasis added)), abrogated on other grounds by TrafFix Devices, 
Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001). 
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The empirical claim about the unlikelihood of confusion makes a 
conceptual mistake—it neglects implicature, a fundamental part of 
human communication.38  Here’s an example Richard Craswell used39:  
You ask me for the nearest gas station.  I give you an address.  Because 
the default assumption is that I’m being truthful, complete, and help-
ful, my answer implies that I believe, and have some reason to believe, 
that the station is actually open.  If I know the station is closed, I am 
speaking in bad faith when I provide its address, and you would have a 
legitimate grievance against me when you ran out of gas while looking 
for another place to fill up. 
More generally, reasonable audiences presume that information 
provided to them is relevant and useful, in the absence of reason to 
believe otherwise.40  If a prospectus advertises that a piece of property 
is five miles from the waterfront, readers will have good cause to cry 
foul if in fact there are no roads between the property and the water-
 
38 See PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS 24-40 (1989) (positing the co-
operative principle that listeners generally presume that a speaker is speaking truth-
fully, informatively (saying no more and no less than necessary), and relevantly, and 
that listeners will interpret statements to make them intelligible).  Implicature is some-
times identified as a function of the speaker’s intent, but especially in the context of 
advertising, where the advertiser is communicating to many consumers in a fixed 
manner, intent should not be taken to mean anything subjective.  Cf. Kent Bach, The 
Top 10 Misconceptions About Implicature (arguing that when the knowledge required to 
decode the implicature is more generally shared, we don’t need to talk about the 
speaker’s intention), in DRAWING THE BOUNDARIES OF MEANING:  NEO-GRICEAN STU-
DIES IN PRAGMATICS AND SEMANTICS IN HONOR OF LAURENCE R. HORN 23 (Betty J. 
Birner & Gregory Ward eds., 2006).  For example, in uttering “Bill is meeting a woman 
this evening,” you would normally (in the absence of special circumstances) be implicat-
ing that the woman in question is not Bill’s wife, because of the general assumption that 
the speaker is saying no less than is appropriate.  So it makes sense, without considering 
actual speakers’ intentions, to talk about a certain sentence’s likely implications.  Decep-
tion by implication does not require any intent to deceive, only deceptive effect. 
39 Richard Craswell, Taking Information Seriously:  Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure 
in Contract Law and Elsewhere, 92 VA. L. REV. 565, 601-02 (2006). 
40 As Bach writes, 
[Gricean maxims] are better construed as presumptions about utterances, 
presumptions that we as listeners rely on and as speakers exploit.  As listeners, 
we presume that the speaker is being cooperative (at least insofar as he is try-
ing to make his communicative intention evident) and is speaking truthfully, 
informatively, relevantly, and otherwise appropriately.  If an utterance superfi-
cially appears not to conform to any of these presumptions, the listener looks 
for a way of taking it so that it does conform.  He does so partly on the suppo-
sition that he is intended to.  As speakers, in trying to choose words to make 
our communicative intentions evident, we exploit the fact that our listeners 
presume these things. 
Bach, supra note 38, at 24. 
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front and any roads to be built in the future would take a path far 
longer than five miles.41  In the absence of further disclosure, the 
statement “five miles from the waterfront” implies that humans could 
reach the water by traveling that distance, because otherwise the in-
formation would be irrelevant and unhelpful.  Similarly, if Kraft adver-
tises that its cheese slices are made with five ounces of milk, an ordi-
nary consumer will assume that the benefits of those five ounces—
especially the calcium, milk’s best-known nutrient—are retained in 
the slices, not dissipated in the processing.42  Otherwise, the informa-
tion about the number of ounces involved is irrelevant to an ordinary 
purchasing decision.  Although there are good reasons to deny the re-
levance of some implications, it is analytically insufficient to stop at the 
dictionary meanings of a string of words. 
In fact, the Ninth Circuit quickly retreated from the logical results 
of its nominative fair use test when confronted with a traditional thirty-
second television ad that formally satisfied the elements of New Kids.  
In the ad, General Motors (GM) compared its vehicles with college 
basketball records set by Lew Alcindor, who used the name Kareem 
Abdul-Jabbar when he reached national prominence.43  The use of Al-
cindor’s name was necessary to identify him; GM did no more than ne-
cessary to identify him, even opting to use his birth name, rather than 
the name under which he was famous.44  GM did nothing else to suggest 
sponsorship or affiliation except put the reference in a conventional 
advertising format.  Unlike a telephone poll, the court concluded, a 
conventional ad featuring a celebrity is likely to lead consumers to con-
clude that the celebrity is an endorser.45  As a result of this empirical re-
ality, GM was not entitled to summary judgment on its nominative fair 
use defense.46  “Nothing else” turns out to be something more than a 
negative requirement; it is a contextual inquiry using background 
knowledge to determine what counts as nominative use.47 
 
41 See Lustiger v. United States, 386 F.2d 132, 136 (9th Cir. 1967) (finding ads were 
“fraudulently misleading and deceptive” for representing that a subdivision was five 
miles from Lake Mead when it was between fifteen and forty miles by road). 
42 See Kraft, Inc. v. FTC, 970 F.2d 311, 313-16 (7th Cir. 1992) (affirming the deci-
sion that Kraft’s ads made a misleading and material claim); see also Craswell, supra 
note 39, at 602-03 (discussing the Kraft case). 
43 Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 409 (9th Cir. 1996). 
44 Id. at 413. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Cf. New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 309 (9th Cir. 
1992) (finding that the survey at issue said “nothing that expressly or by fair implication 
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Further reinforcing the necessity of considering context—not just 
express claims about source—is that even the average trademark use is 
not an explicit claim in the conventional sense.  It indicates source 
not by a full syllogistic statement, but by implication, relying on con-
sumers’ knowledge about how source and sponsorship get communi-
cated.  That is, vanishingly few products say, “This is a bottle of Coca-
Cola,” or something similar.  The presence of the name itself, in a dis-
tinctive font in the most prominent position on the label, necessarily 
implies the source claim to a culturally competent modern consum-
er.48  Necessary implication is a recognized doctrine in false advertis-
ing law, as I will discuss in the next Section, and makes sense in the 
core example of “Coca-Cola” used on a bottle of soda.  But trademark 
law has also been willing to find an implication of source to exist in 
some unlikely places, such as being the subject of a newspaper poll or 
the title of a film, which is why it has seemed necessary to create new 
doctrines like nominative fair use to protect expression and competi-
tion.  Without making their use of implicature explicit, and explaining 
its relation to empirical and normative concepts of confusion, courts will 
likely continue to struggle with awkward results from the existing tests. 
B.  Implication in False Advertising Cases:  
Pragmatics and Doctrinal Categories 
While courts have granted trademark law greater flexibility, false 
advertising law often seems to flounder in rigid doctrinal categories—
 
connotes endorsement or joint sponsorship” (emphasis added)).  One could debate 
whether GM’s use of Abdul-Jabbar’s name really approximated a conventional celebrity 
endorsement, which would usually involve at least an image of the celebrity, not to 
mention the use of her current name.  The fact that the court limited the reach of New 
Kids when the celebrity appeared in a sufficiently ad-like context has led to uncertainty 
that will likely increase as new forms of promotion outside the conventional thirty-
second ad spot become more common.  See, e.g., Yeager v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 673 
F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1103 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (“Where a celebrity’s name is used in a com-
mercial, there are triable issues of fact regarding whether such use implies endorse-
ment.”); Yeager v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 627 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1173, 1178-79 (E.D. 
Cal. 2008) (denying motion to dismiss Chuck Yeager’s claim that the use of his name 
in a press release promoting Cingular’s new service might confuse consumers as to his 
sponsorship or endorsement). 
48 See Thomas R. Lee et al., An Empirical and Consumer Psychology Analysis of Trade-
mark Distinctiveness, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1033, 1078 (2009) (finding that, empirically, con-
sumers perceive even descriptive terms as source identifiers if they are presented in the 
ways marks typically appear on packaging); cf. Reckitt Benckiser Inc. v. Motomco Ltd., 
No. 10-6228, 2011 WL 180779, at *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2011) (finding that the defen-
dant’s use of government agency names at the top and bottom of messages constituted 
literally false claims that the messages originated from the agencies). 
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such as explicit falsity, implicit falsity, and puffery—without gaining 
greater predictability.  False advertising doctrine has even occasionally 
flirted with the idea that truthful claims simply can’t be misleading.  
In Mead Johnson & Co. v. Abbott Laboratories, the Seventh Circuit al-
lowed a manufacturer to claim its infant formula was the “1st Choice 
of Doctors,” even though the claim was true with respect only to the 
subset of doctors who had such a preference, and a substantial num-
ber of doctors didn’t.49  Consumer surveys, however, established that 
consumers received a message that most doctors preferred the defen-
dant’s product.50  Nonetheless, because the “1st Choice” claim was lit-
erally true, the court reasoned that it couldn’t mislead, even if many 
consumers didn’t understand the math.51  Notably, although Mead 
Johnson attracted a fair amount of attention52—relative to other false 
advertising cases—most subsequent false advertising cases have not 
applied its holding,53 sometimes with fairly transparent evasions.54 
 
49 201 F.3d 883, 884 (7th Cir.), amended on denial of reh’g, 209 F.3d 1032, 1034 (7th 
Cir. 2000) (per curiam). 
50 Id. at 885. 
51 Id. at 886. 
52 See, e.g., Richard J. Leighton, Making Puffery Determinations in Lanham Act False 
Advertising Cases:  Surveys, Dictionaries, Judicial Edicts and Materiality Tests, 95 TRADEMARK 
REP. 615, 620-22 (2005) (discussing Mead Johnson’s preference for dictionaries over 
consumer surveys when deciding whether a claim is misleading); Thomas W. Edman, 
Note, Lies, Damn Lies, and Misleading Advertising:  The Role of Consumer Surveys in the Wake 
of Mead Johnson v. Abbott Labs, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 417, 420 (2001) (applauding 
Mead Johnson’s “common sense” approach to limiting use of consumer surveys in mis-
leading advertising claims). 
53 But see Pernod Ricard USA LLC v. Bacardi U.S.A., Inc., 702 F. Supp. 2d 238, 
250-51 (D. Del. 2010) (relying on Mead Johnson to hold that Havana Club rum could 
not be deceptive as to its geographic origin because the label also stated that the rum 
was made in Puerto Rico). 
54 In Clorox Co. Puerto Rico v. Proctor & Gamble Commercial Co., for example, the de-
fendant argued that its message—that its detergent did a better job of whitening 
clothes—limited its comparison to other detergents, so that even if consumers actually 
believed that its detergent outperformed chlorine bleach, Mead Johnson protected it 
from liability.  228 F.3d 24, 37-38 (1st Cir. 2000).  The First Circuit disagreed, distin-
guishing the short, printed slogan at issue in Mead Johnson with the television commer-
cial launched by defendants in Clorox, which “communicates its message to consumers 
through a combination of audio-visual and textual media.”  Id. at 38.  As usual, bad law 
breeds bad distinctions:  there is no conceptual difference between packaging and tele-
vision advertising, and the Mead Johnson court certainly would have reached the same 
result if the “1st Choice of Doctors” slogan had appeared at the end of a television 
commercial, rather than on a baby-formula label.  The First Circuit, unlike the Seventh, 
recognized that consumers could interpret a supposedly objective claim as conveying a 
broader false message, and the court correctly looked to consumer reaction to gauge 
the deceptiveness of the claim.  See id. at 33; see also McNeil-PPC, Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 351 
F. Supp. 2d 226, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (distinguishing Mead Johnson because the claim at 
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The vast majority of false advertising cases have instead recognized 
that literally true statements can mislead.  In false advertising law, an 
oft-cited formulation is that, if only false statements were actionable, 
“clever use of innuendo, indirect intimations, and ambiguous sugges-
tions could shield the advertisement from scrutiny precisely when pro-
tection against such sophisticated deception is most needed.”55  For 
example, an ad may be misleading if it makes unqualified claims of 
advantages present only in extreme or unusual circumstances, because 
consumers may believe that the advantages are often or usually 
present.  One court thus ruled that ads claiming natural gas was more 
economical and efficient than oil for heating could be misleading 
since the ads failed to disclose that this was true only when comparing 
modern gas equipment with older oil equipment.56 
Unfortunately, however, section 43(a)(1)(B) false advertising cases 
have created an artificially rigid distinction between false statements 
and misleading statements when it comes to the necessary evidentiary 
showing.  False statements violate the Lanham Act without further 
proof of consumer deception:  courts presume that consumers receive 
the false messages.  Literally true statements must be shown to mislead 
consumers with extrinsic evidence.57  The concern is that consumers 
 
issue was “less nebulous” and the survey at issue was not used “to determine the mean-
ing of words” (quoting Mead Johnson, 201 F.3d at 886)); Healthpoint, Ltd. v. Ethex 
Corp., No. 01-0646, 2004 WL 2359420, at *16 (W.D. Tex. July 14, 2004) (suggesting that 
Mead Johnson was limited to its facts and noting that the present plaintiff, like the one in 
Mead Johnson, had a survey purportedly showing consumer confusion).   
 Courts that cite Mead Johnson tend to rely on other, more persuasive grounds for 
their ultimate holdings.  See, e.g., Am. Italian Pasta Co. v. New World Pasta Co., 371 
F.3d 387, 393-94 (8th Cir. 2004) (using Mead Johnson to uphold finding that “America’s 
Favorite Pasta” was neither true nor false but merely puffery); Haymond v. Lundy, No. 
99-5048, 2001 WL 15956, at *4-5 & n.4 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 5, 2001) (citing Mead Johnson to 
support its holding that no reasonable consumer could have been misled by a state-
ment that a named lawyer “supervised” cases to believe that the lawyer was himself tak-
ing depositions, trying cases, signing pleadings, or making court appearances, and not-
ing that only one client among many suggested any possible misunderstanding), 
subsequent determination sub nom. Haymond v. Haymond, No. 99-5048, 2001 WL 74630 
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2001), aff’d sub nom. Lundy v. Hochberg, 79 F. App’x 503 (3d Cir. 
2003); First Health Grp. Corp. v. United Payors & United Providers, Inc., 95 F. Supp. 
2d 845, 849, 851 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (citing Mead Johnson in the course of determining that 
the allegedly false term was true in light of industry practice, that highly sophisticated 
hospitals could not reasonably have been misled, and that confusion was minimal). 
55 Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 577 F.2d 160, 165 (2d Cir. 1978). 
56 Oil Heat Inst. of Or. v. Nw. Natural Gas, 708 F. Supp. 1118, 1125-26 (D. Or. 1988). 
57 See, e.g., BASF Corp. v. Old World Trading Co., 41 F.3d 1081, 1088-89 (7th Cir. 
1994) (requiring demonstration of “actual customer confusion” (citing Abbott Labs. v. 
Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6, 13 (7th Cir. 1992))); Johnson & Johnson * Merck 
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might not be receiving the same implication from the ad that the chal-
lenger does, so the challenger must first show that a substantial num-
ber of consumers receive a false message.  This requires a consumer 
survey, which usually adds hundreds of thousands of dollars to the 
cost of a false advertising case, imposing a significant practical barrier 
to suit.  An explicit claim, in other words, is much easier to challenge 
than an implicit claim, even when both are the same claim from the 
consumer’s standpoint. 
This result is troubling because there are numerous cases in which 
a claim, though technically or denotationally implicit, is as clearly 
stated as if it were explicit.  This too is a feature of ordinary human 
communication, which regularly relies on implicature, as in the gas 
station example in the previous Section.58  But we need not rely on 
common knowledge alone; research has confirmed the power of im-
plication in ads.59  Implication is especially useful for advertisers be-
 
Consumer Pharm. Co. v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 960 F.2d 294, 297 (2d Cir. 1992) 
(“Where, as here, a plaintiff’s theory of recovery is premised upon a claim of implied 
falsehood, a plaintiff must demonstrate, by extrinsic evidence, that the challenged 
commercials tend to mislead or confuse consumers.”); Malaco Leaf, AB v. Promotion 
in Motion, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 2d 355, 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“When an advertisement is 
not literally false, but rather is ambiguous or implicitly false, a plaintiff can only estab-
lish a claim of false advertising through a survey.”).  Some courts recognize direct evi-
dence of intentional efforts to deceive as a substitute for consumer reaction evidence, 
but this avenue to victory is rarely successful.  See, e.g., Johnson & Johnson Vision Care, 
Inc. v. CIBA Vision Corp., 348 F. Supp. 2d 165, 184 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (granting a Rule 
52(c) motion for judgment on the implicit falsity claim because there was no “extrinsic 
evidence of consumer reaction” and no evidence of an intentional attempt to deceive 
in an “egregious fashion”).  
58 See supra text accompanying note 39. 
59 Even the ad context itself carries important implications.  See Debra Trampe et 
al., The Self-Activation Effect of Advertisements:  Ads Can Affect Whether and How Consumers 
Think About the Self, 37 J. CONSUMER RES. 1030, 1042 (2011) (showing that people  
responded differently to images of beauty-enhancing products when they saw brand 
information or were told that the products had appeared in an ad campaign than 
when they were not given ad cues).  “[A]n advertisement itself may constitute an  
implicature[,] . . . which . . . may cause dramatic changes in the effects these products 
exert on their perceivers.”  Id.  at 1031; see also Barbara J. Phillips, Thinking into It:  Con-
sumer Interpretation of Complex Advertising Images, J. ADVERTISING, Summer 1997, at 77, 82 
(“[I]nformants used advertising knowledge to determine the meanings of the ads.  Con-
sistent with the belief that consumers know advertisers make only positive statements 
about their brands, informants were clearly inclined to draw only positive implicatures.”); 
cf. Valerie S. Folkes, Presidential Address, Is Consumer Behavior Different?, 29 ADVANCES 
CONSUMER RES. 1, 1 (2002) (“[W]hen situational cues lead people to perceive themselves 
as customers, they then interpret the world differently than when they do not perceive 
themselves as customers . . . .”). 
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cause consumers develop stronger beliefs when they persuade them-
selves by following implications to their natural conclusions.60 
Even without that extra persuasive power, consumers routinely 
and automatically draw inferences from ads because they expect ads—
like all forms of communication—to contain implicit information.61  
Consumers even remember clear implicit claims as if they’d been ex-
plicitly presented.62  Overall, there is a “robust” tendency for consum-
 
60 See, e.g., Alan G. Sawyer, Can There Be Effective Advertising Without Explicit Conclu-
sions?  Decide for Yourself (arguing that ads that don’t directly tell consumers what to 
think can be more effective), in NONVERBAL COMMUNICATION IN ADVERTISING 159, 
160-61 (Sidney Hecker & David W. Stewart eds., 1988); see also FRANK STAJANO & PAUL 
WILSON, UNDERSTANDING SCAM VICTIMS:  SEVEN PRINCIPLES FOR SYSTEMS SECURITY 15 
(Univ. of Cambridge Computer Lab., Technical Report No. 754, 2009), available at 
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/techreports/UCAM-CL-TR-754.pdf (“[P]eople accept their 
own ideas and thoughts more readily than ideas presented to them by others.  Through 
scams [inducing the victim’s inference that he stands to profit greatly from an offer], we 
understand how hustlers can lead a mark to a conclusion.”); Frank R. Kardes, Spontane-
ous Inference Processes in Advertising:  The Effects of Conclusion Omission and Involvement on 
Persuasion, 15 J. CONSUMER RES. 225, 226, 231-32 (1988) (explaining that a “hard sell” 
can backfire but that “[t]his boomerang effect is much less likely to occur . . . when sub-
tle soft sell tactics are employed” and presenting empirical evidence that omission was 
an effective persuasion technique).  Invited inference doesn’t always work, but it can be 
a very powerful technique for persuading consumers.   
[R]elatively simple manipulations performed within the text of an ad can in-
fluence the processing objectives of consumers.  Highlighting the personal re-
levance of the message and emphasizing that the brands within a product cat-
egory vary on an important dimension can induce effortful information 
processing.  If consumers can be induced to form brand attitudes through an 
effortful process, they will spontaneously draw inferences about omitted atti-
tude-relevant information and form strong, accessible attitudes. 
Kardes, supra, at 231-32; see also Sawyer, supra, at 161-62, 165-66 (arguing that in situa-
tions of higher involvement, when viewers are capable of and interested in drawing 
conclusions, implicit arguments are more persuasive than explicit ones and summariz-
ing research that ads leaving something to the viewer’s imagination can be more effec-
tive than explicit statements). 
61 See Julie A. Edell, Nonverbal Effects in Ads: A Review and Synthesis (finding that, 
“when asked to form beliefs about a brand, subjects take whatever data they have been 
given and make inferences about what those data could mean for that brand”—thus, tis-
sue advertised with a picture of a kitten gets high ratings for softness, even higher than 
tissue advertised with the words “Brand I Facial Tissues Are Soft”), in NONVERBAL COM-
MUNICATION IN ADVERTISING, supra note 60, at 11, 13. 
62 See, e.g., Richard J. Harris, Comprehension of Pragmatic Implications in Advertising, 
62 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 603, 607 (1977) (“[S]ubjects process and remember pragmatic 
implications very much like direct assertions.  This failure to discriminate is also re-
flected in the purchase decision data.” (citation omitted)); Richard J. Harris et al., 
Memory for Implied Versus Directly Stated Advertising Claims, 6 PSYCHOL. & MARKETING 87, 88 
(1989) (“People tend to go beyond what is directly stated in an advertisement to infer 
stronger interpretations from relatively weaker claims that merely imply some attribute 
about the product. . . . [S]tudies have found this effect using both real world and im-
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ers to remember implied claims in stronger forms than they were deli-
vered.63  Terence Shimp, for example, tested incomplete comparatives 
such as “Mennen E goes on warmer and drier.”64  Warmer and drier 
than what?  It could be warmer and drier than yogurt, but high per-
centages of respondents interpreted the claim to mean that Mennen 
E goes on warmer and drier “than any other deodorant on the mar-
ket.”65  When Shimp asked whether such implications were “Directly 
Stated” or “Intended but Not Stated,” subjects often picked “Directly 
Stated,” even though as a matter of formal logic they were not.66 
The conceptual basis for the implicit/explicit divide is unsound,67 
and advertisers can arbitrage the doctrine, making implicit claims that 
 
aginary product names and with both a written text of the advertisement and an oral 
presentation.”); Richard J. Harris & Gregory E. Monaco, Psychology of Pragmatic Implica-
tion:  Information Processing Between the Lines, 107 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL:  GEN. 1, 18 
(1978) (reporting that studies “have shown[] [that] people remember implied materi-
al as asserted” and that in tests of memory and comprehension of radio ads, “subjects 
did not distinguish between asserted and pragmatically implied claims”). 
63 Harris et al., supra note 62, at 93. 
64 See Terence A. Shimp, Do Incomplete Comparisons Mislead?, J. ADVERTISING RES., 
Dec. 1978, at 21, 22. 
65 Id. at 26. 
66 See id. (listing fifty-five percent as responding “Directly Stated” and thirty-eight 
percent as “Intended but Not Stated”). 
67 As Charlotte Taylor wrote in the context of First Amendment law,  
there is no easy generalizable connection between expressness and the other 
central concerns that are implicated in the regulation of speech:  primarily the 
value of the speech, as well as the potential harm it might cause to the commu-
nity and the culpability of the speaker.  It is not the case that when we focus on 
the express meaning of speech we protect the most valuable speech while pu-
nishing the most harmful utterances made by the most culpable speakers. 
Charlotte Taylor, Free Expression and Expressness, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 375, 
381 (2009).  Taylor notes that one of the strongest arguments for an implicit/explicit 
distinction is to constrain enforcers’ discretion and avoid chilling effects.  Id. at 383.  
However, Lanham Act doctrine cannot provide those potential benefits for two main 
reasons.  First, other regulators, including the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and 
the National Advertising Division of the Better Business Bureau (which engages in pri-
vate regulation of national advertising) don’t adhere to an implicit/explicit distinc-
tion.  They use their own judgment to figure out what claims an ad is making, so adver-
tisers cannot reliably protect themselves against challenge by only making implicit 
claims.  See, e.g., Kraft, Inc. v. FTC, 970 F.2d 311, 319 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[T]he Commis-
sion may rely on its own reasoned analysis to determine what claims, including implied 
ones, are conveyed in a challenged advertisement, so long as those claims are reasona-
bly clear from the face of an advertisement.”); see also infra note 135 and accompanying 
text (discussing how these two regulators normally act without survey evidence to com-
bat deception).  Second, as noted, implicit claims can be challenged under the Lan-
ham Act with survey evidence in hand, so advertisers can’t even gain certainty from the 
Lanham Act.  See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
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they could not make explicitly, while still producing the same, or 
greater, effect on consumers.68  “Warmer and drier,” for example, 
might well be dismissed by a court as mere puffery because the compar-
ison is incomplete, without understanding that consumers are likely to 
use ordinary rules of communication to complete the claim and turn 
it into a testable, falsifiable empirical claim.69 
In recent years, courts have reacted to the doctrinal rigidity of the 
explicit/implicit divide by accepting that some misleading implications 
are better treated as literally false claims.  The resulting doctrine is 
known as “falsity by necessary implication.”  The standard is as follows:  
“A claim is conveyed by necessary implication when, considering the 
advertisement in its entirety, the audience would recognize the claim as 
readily as if it had been explicitly stated.”70  Thus, an advertisement 
claiming “longer engine life and better engine protection,” without ex-
plicitly mentioning what competitors it was “longer” and “better” than, 
made a comparison to major competitors by necessary implication.71 
 
68 See Harris et al., supra note 62, at 94 (“[A]dvertising may mislead the public with 
minimal legal vulnerability to the advertiser.  A claim may be stated in weak (implied) 
form but may be remembered then in the stronger (asserted) fashion.  Thus, a con-
sumer may falsely infer . . . that [the product] does more than the ad even said it 
did.”); Edward F. McQuarrie & Barbara J. Phillips, Indirect Persuasion in Advertising:  
How Consumers Process Metaphors Presented in Pictures and Words, J. ADVERTISING, Summer 
2005, at 7, 17 (“If advertisers wish consumers to generate multiple positive inferences, 
to some degree spontaneously, then it is obvious why they might rely more and more 
on indirect persuasion, especially in pictures.”).  Alan Sawyer also argues in favor of 
indirect claims in advertising. 
 Research also offers strong evidence that audience members will sponta-
neously strive to make inferences and conclusions under certain condi-
tions. . . . [A]dvertising audiences are also very likely to “complete” ambiguous 
advertising statements or claims.  Under conditions resembling low involve-
ment, . . . subjects tended to make false conclusions . . . which, if the advertiser 
could or should be considered as the cause of the incorrect conclusion, would 
be judged deceptive. 
Sawyer, supra note 60, at 170. 
69 See Ivan L. Preston, Puffery and Other “Loophole” Claims:  How the Law’s “Don’t Ask, 
Don’t Tell” Policy Condones Fraudulent Falsity in Advertising, 18 J.L. & COM. 49, 81-82 
(1998) (documenting studies in which consumers given “incomplete comparatives” 
would imply completions). 
70 Clorox Co. P.R. v. Proctor & Gamble Commercial Co., 228 F.3d 24, 35 (1st Cir. 
2000); cf. FTC v. Medlab, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1078 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (“[E]ven if 
the representations were implied, these advertisements are capable of only one inter-
pretation.  The FTC does not need to present consumer survey data in order to prove 
what is obvious to any rational reader . . . .”). 
71 Castrol Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 987 F.2d 939, 941, 946-47 (3d Cir. 1993). 
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Courts have found falsity by necessary implication where an ad’s 
explicit claims would make no sense without the necessarily implied 
claim.  In Cuisinarts, Inc. v. Robot-Coupe International Corp., the defen-
dant claimed that professional kitchens in France used its mixer, not 
the plaintiff’s.72  The necessary implication was that the plaintiff made 
a professional-strength mixer.73  Otherwise, if the plaintiff had not 
made a product that the kitchens could have rejected, there would 
not have been a comparison.  Because the plaintiff did not, in fact, 
make a professional-strength mixer, the necessary implication was 
false.74  This reasoning accords with the rules of implicature; the ad 
exploited reasonable consumers’ beliefs that information is only pro-
vided when relevant. 
Research has confirmed the effectiveness of exploiting the expecta-
tion of relevance.  Some ads focus on irrelevant product attributes, such 
as the statement “our instant coffee has flaked crystals,” when flaking 
does not affect the final brewed product.75  Consumers showed greater 
preference for those products shown in ads touting both relevant and 
irrelevant attributes as opposed to ads touting only relevant attributes.76  
Preference ratings increased even when consumers were told that the 
irrelevant attribute was irrelevant.77  The general rules of conversational 
implicature took precedence over more specific information.78  Richard 
Craswell identified the same dynamic at work in Gillette Co. v. Wilkinson 
Sword, Inc., in which the advertiser claimed that the metal strip on its 
razor was six times smoother than the competition’s; while this was 
true, there was no evidence that the smoothness of the strip bore any 
relation to the smoothness of the shave.79  The court found that con-
sumers would nonetheless receive a claim about the smoothness of 
the shave, a conclusion that again depends on consumers’ expecta-
tions that information in ads is meaningful to them.80 
The Second Circuit adopted the doctrine of necessary implication 
in Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. DirecTV, Inc., allowing liability without evi-
 
72 No. 81-0731, 1982 WL 121559, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 1982). 
73 Id. at *2. 
74 Id. 
75 Gregory S. Carpenter et al., Meaningful Brands from Meaningless Differentiation:  
The Dependence on Irrelevant Attributes, 31 J. MARKETING RES. 339, 339-40 (1994). 
76 Id. at 343-44.  
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 344. 
79 No. 89-3586, 1989 WL 82453, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 1989). 
80 See Richard Craswell, “Compared to What?”:  The Use of Control Ads in Deceptive Ad-
vertising Litigation, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 757, 786-87 (1997). 
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dence of consumer reaction and without an explicitly false assertion 
“if the words or images, considered in context, necessarily imply a 
false message.”81  DirecTV ran an ad featuring William Shatner as Cap-
tain Kirk, who praised the “amazing picture clarity” of DirecTV and 
told viewers, “With what Starfleet just ponied up for this big screen TV, 
settling for cable would be illogical.”82  Though there was no explicit 
claim that cable’s high-definition (HD) picture quality was worse, in 
the context of the ad, “illogical” had to be referring to picture quality.  
Because cable’s HD picture quality was in fact identical, the court held 
that the ads violated the Lanham Act.83 
In Southland Sod Farms v. Stover Seed Co., an ad claimed superiority 
for a certain breed of grass through “less mowing,” “reduced costs,” 
“less clippings,” and “slower growth,” basing its claims and charts on a 
study of grass growth in the spring.84  According to a competitor, how-
ever, there was no superiority if one took the entire year into account; 
the defendant’s product lost its advantages in a year-round assessment.85  
Although the advertisements always stated that they were based on a 
study conducted in the spring, the Ninth Circuit found that a jury 
could conclude that the ads were literally false in context because the 
claim that the grass saved time and money “would be nonsensical if 
the bar chart were only intended to represent the turf’s growth cha-
racteristics during the spring months.”86 
Necessary implication is fundamentally social.  It depends on gen-
eral expectations, not necessarily on what is within the four corners of 
an ad.  In Playskool, Inc. v. Product Development Group, Inc., a toy manu-
facturer argued that a competitor’s claim that its components for play 
structures “attache[d]” to the manufacturer’s components was false 
because a structure made of elements from both parties’ products 
would be unstable and unsafe.87  The court found that the claim might 
be “literally true” in the sense that “defendant’s pieces can in fact be 
joined or connected to plaintiff’s pieces.”88  Nonetheless, the “clear 
implication” of the claim was that the components would attach safely.89  
 
81 497 F.3d 144, 148, 158 (2d Cir. 2007). 
82 Id. at 150. 
83 Id. at 158. 
84 108 F.3d 1134, 1137, 1144 (9th Cir. 1997). 
85 Id. at 1138. 
86 Id. at 1144. 
87 699 F. Supp. 1056, 1058-60 (E.D.N.Y. 1988). 
88 Id. at 1060. 
89 Id. 
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“On a box of toys for preschool children the statement can have no 
other reasonable meaning.”90  Background assumptions thus structure 
interpretation, even when they remain unstated.91 
Falsity by necessary implication is a way for courts to relieve plain-
tiffs of the burden of an expensive (and likely extensively litigated) 
consumer survey when a false message in an ad is obvious, even if not 
stated in full syllogistic form.  The doctrine alleviates some of the 
pressure caused by a rigid explicit/implicit division and brings false 
advertising slightly closer to trademark, which generally does not re-
quire a consumer survey from a plaintiff to prove likely confusion.  In 
the absence of explicit falsity or necessary implication, however, false 
advertising currently requires evidence of actual consumer percep-
tion, even though an ad’s implications may be obvious.  As the next 
Section will argue, courts should pay less attention to labels in this 
area and more to pragmatics. 
C.  A More Persuasive Role for Implications in Trademark 
1.  Similar Treatment for All Lanham Act Claims 
False advertising is too rigid and trademark is too flexible with re-
spect to implications because neither have fully accepted the role im-
plications play in human communication.  We draw ordinary implica-
tions, but not extraordinary ones, unless we are signaled to do so.  An 
example of such signaling would be responding to the question, “Is he 
 
90 Id.; see also S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Clorox Co., 930 F. Supp. 753, 781 
(E.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing Playskool as example of falsity by necessary implication); cf. Let-
ter from James C. Miller III, Chairman, FTC, to John D. Dingell, Chairman, Comm. on 
Energy & Commerce, House of Representatives (Oct. 14, 1983) [hereinafter FTC Poli-
cy Statement on Deception] (stating that all advertisements implicitly claim their ad-
vertised goods are fit for their intended purpose), reprinted in In re Cliffdale Assocs., 
Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110 app. at 177 (1984). 
91 The social construction of implied meaning creates challenges in certain areas, 
such as prescription drugs and supplements.  Does the presence of a drug on the mar-
ket imply that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has found it safe and effec-
tive?  See Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Watson Pharm., Inc., No. 09-5421, 2010 WL 446132, at *5 
(D.N.J. Feb. 8, 2010) (denying a motion to dismiss based on this question).  Studies 
show that consumers expect the FDA to look out for them, approving only ads for the 
safest and most effective drugs, even though a number of drugs are grandfathered out 
of current safety and efficacy requirements.  See, e.g., Sidney M. Wolfe, Editorial, Direct-
to-Consumer Advertising—Education or Emotion Promotion?, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 524, 525 
(2002) (“According to one study, a substantial proportion of people incorrectly be-
lieved that only the safest and most effective drugs could be advertised directly to con-
sumers and that the FDA required that it be allowed to review advertisements before 
they were published.”).  
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a nice guy?” with, “He’s very tall.”  Blatantly refusing to answer the 
question is a violation of the ordinary cooperative rules of communi-
cation and provides an implied answer:  No, he’s not a nice guy.  Con-
text is vital in implication—the question gives the response its prag-
matic meaning, over and above its semantic meaning.92 
Trademark’s multifactor test for likelihood of confusion has led 
courts to discount too heavily the need for evidence about actual con-
sumers, especially in marginal cases.  When a plaintiff doesn’t make a 
very strong showing on other factors, such as the similarity of the par-
ties’ marks or the similarity of their products or services, the absence 
of actual-confusion evidence should weigh heavily against a finding of 
likely confusion.93  Courts have at times held the absence of a survey 
against wealthy plaintiffs,94 and they have also held the absence of con-
fusion evidence against plaintiffs whose products have coexisted with 
defendants’ for a long time.95  When a trademark owner is stretching 
 
92 See Bach, supra note 38, at 22 (“[I]n different situations one can utter a given 
unambiguous sentence and implicate different things.  For example, you could say 
‘John’s command of English is excellent’ to implicate, depending on the situation, that 
John is a mediocre student, that he would make a fine translator, that he understood 
something he heard, or that he had no excuse for the sloppy paper he wrote.”). 
93 Occasionally the Second Circuit does weigh failure to provide a survey against 
the plaintiff, though it makes clear that the absence of a survey is only one factor.  See, 
e.g., Star Indus., Inc. v. Bacardi & Co. Ltd., 412 F.3d 373, 388 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Star’s 
failure to present its own consumer survey [to counter the defendant’s survey that 
found no confusion,] weighs against a finding of consumer confusion.”); Braun Inc. v. 
Dynamics Corp. of Am., 975 F.2d 815, 828 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (applying Second Circuit 
law to hold that failure to provide actual confusion evidence “suggests that the public 
is not likely to be confused”); Medici Classics Prods. LLC v. Medici Grp. LLC, 590 F. 
Supp. 2d 548, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“[T]he ‘absence of surveys is evidence that actual 
confusion cannot be shown,’ and while anecdotal evidence may in some cases be suffi-
cient, the evidence must be more than de [minimis].” (citation omitted) (quoting Sports 
Auth., Inc. v. Prime Hospitality Corp., 89 F.3d 955, 964 (2d Cir. 1996))). 
94 See, e.g., Charles Jacquin et Cie, Inc. v. Destileria Serralles, Inc., 921 F.2d 467, 
475 (3d Cir. 1990) (finding that a financially able plaintiff’s failure to conduct a confu-
sion survey justified an inference “that the plaintiff believes the results of the survey 
will be unfavorable”).  This sentiment was reiterated in Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co:  
Survey evidence is not required to establish likelihood of confusion, but it is 
often the most persuasive evidence.  Consequently, a plaintiff’s failure to con-
duct a consumer survey, assuming it has the financial resources to do so, may 
lead to an inference that the results of such a survey would be unfavorable.  
Here, plaintiffs had ample opportunity to conduct their own survey, and their 
failure to do so undermines their position that the advertisements at issue are 
likely to confuse consumers as to plaintiffs’ endorsement. 
24 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1041-42 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (citations omitted). 
95 See, e.g., Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 228 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding 
that lapse of time is a “powerful indication” of no “meaningful likelihood of confusion”), 
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its rights in terms of marks that are only somewhat similar or products 
that are not highly related, courts should likewise require more in the 
way of real-world evidence of confusion, instead of the regular prac-
tice of allowing plaintiffs to prevail without evidence from actual con-
fused consumers or from surveys.96 
More broadly, once we deconstruct the trademark/false advertising 
dichotomy, it should be clear that not all litigation involves the kinds of 
inferences consumers are likely to make, particularly regarding trade-
marks.  Thus, when the presence of a trademark is not the primary 
identifier of the defendant’s product or service, judges should be hesi-
tant to find infringement without evidence of consumer perceptions.  
For example, when the trademark appears as the trade dress of a prod-
uct bearing its own word mark, as part of an expressive work, or as an 
ingredient (e.g., the local scoop shop’s homemade Oreo ice cream), 
consumers have a prominent source identifier distinct from the plain-
tiff’s mark, and so extra evidence of confusion should be required. 
Likewise, other factual claims may be unclear on the face of an ad.  
Sometimes a court should require evidence of actual confusion before 
a plaintiff can win its false advertising claim.  False endorsement 
claims, which often draw from both trademark and false advertising 
concepts, provide an example of the difficulty with implications.  
Some celebrity references are clearly endorsements—a picture of a 
smiling celebrity using the product in a traditional advertising for-
mat97—but others aren’t.  How should courts decide such cases? 
 
abrogated on other grounds by Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003); 
Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1050 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(“We cannot think of more persuasive evidence that there is no likelihood of confusion 
between these two marks than the fact that they have been simultaneously used for five 
years without causing any consumers to be confused as to who makes what.” (emphasis 
omitted)); Versa Prods. Co. v. Bifold Co. (Mfg.) Ltd., 50 F.3d 189, 205 (3d Cir. 1995) (“If 
a defendant’s product has been sold for an appreciable period of time without evidence 
of actual confusion, one can infer that continued marketing will not lead to consumer 
confusion in the future.  The longer the challenged product has been in use, the strong-
er this inference will be.”); Keebler Co. v. Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366, 377 (1st Cir. 
1980) (holding that, where parties’ marks coexisted for three-and-a-half years, plaintiff 
was “required to show proof of actual consumer confusion” to prevail), overruled on other 
grounds by Miller Brewing Co. v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 655 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 1981); Barre-
Nat’l, Inc. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 773 F. Supp. 735, 744 (D.N.J. 1991) (“Use of similar marks 
for a substantial period of time with no confusion among consumers may create a pre-
sumption that there is little likelihood of confusion.”). 
96 See Beebe, supra note 17, at 1641-42 (finding that surveys are rare in reported 
trademark cases). 
97 Even in those typical situations, uncertainty is possible.  Recently, a coatmaker 
used a Times Square billboard showing President Obama wearing its jacket, contend-
TUSHNET REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/13/2011  1:30 PM 
1330 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 159: 1305 
In Seale v. Gramercy Pictures, Bobby Seale sued the producers of a 
movie about his participation in the Black Panthers, arguing that con-
sumers would be confused about his relationship to and endorsement 
of the resulting film.98  The court rejected his claim, distinguishing be-
tween obvious endorsements and less clear situations. 
“If the defendant’s use does not on its face contain a clear message of 
endorsement, [the] plaintiff must produce evidence, usually in the form 
of market research or consumer surveys, showing exactly what message 
customers received from [the] defendant’s ad.  Once that message is as-
certained, plaintiff must then prove the second element, that [the] mes-
sage is false or misleading.”
99
 
Because Seale couldn’t provide evidence that consumers perceived an 
endorsement message, as opposed to the truthful message that he was 
the subject of the film, he lost.100 
More recently, however, the Third Circuit rejected this approach 
in false endorsement cases, holding that the explicit/implicit distinc-
tion only applies to section 43(a)(1)(B).101  The result is that celebrity 
plaintiffs alleging a false implicit endorsement need not show that 
consumers perceive an endorsement.  By contrast, plaintiffs alleging 
any other false implicit message must show evidence demonstrating 
that consumers received that message.  The court reached this result 
because the statutory language “likely to cause confusion” is only part 
of section 43(a)(1)(A).102  But this is an error in logic; “likely to cause 
confusion” says nothing about implicit versus explicit any more than 
 
ing that people would not perceive it as an endorsement—a sitting president is just so 
unlikely to serve as an endorser.  See Stephanie Clifford, Unauthorized Times Square Ob-
ama Ad Draws Attention, NYTIMES.COM MEDIA DECODER BLOG (Jan. 6, 2010, 2:56 PM), 
http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/06/unauthorized-times-square-
obama-ad-draws-attention (“We’re not saying President Obama endorses Weatherproof 
apparel.”). 
98 964 F. Supp. 918, 919 (E.D. Pa. 1997), aff’d, 156 F.3d 1225 (3d Cir. 1998) (unpub-
lished table decision). 
99 Id. at 930 (alterations in original) (quoting 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE 
RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 5.4[B][2] (1998)). 
100 Id. at 931; see also 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRI-
VACY § 3:12 (2d ed. 2010) (“In the context of an unpermitted use of a person’s identity 
to draw attention to an advertisement or commercial use, this requires that plaintiff 
prove that the context contains a message of the plaintiff’s endorsement of defendant’s 
product and that this message is false.”). 
101 See Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1021 (3d Cir. 2008) (“We de-
cline the NFL’s invitation to muddle the two separate bodies of law that have devel-
oped under the separate subsections of § 43(a).”). 
102 Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2006). 
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section 43(a)(1)(B)’s reference to “misrepresent[ation]” does.103  The 
disparate treatment of similar language in the two provisions forced 
the court to make artificial distinctions.  It would have been better to 
recognize that one can interpret both section 43(a)(1)(A) and section 
43(a)(1)(B) flexibly, so that consumer survey evidence would be per-
suasive but not necessarily required simply because of the semantic 
form in which a claim appears. 
2.  The Explicit/Implicit Divide as a Pragmatic  
Error-Avoidance Rule 
Currently, courts have not given a fully articulated justification for 
either a rigid explicit/implicit division or an abandonment of any re-
quirement of consumer perception evidence.  As noted above, the  
explicit/implicit division has proven attractive to limit seemingly infi-
nite expansions of trademark law, especially in cases raising free 
speech concerns.  In Rogers v. Grimaldi, for example, Ginger Rogers 
argued that the Fellini movie, Ginger and Fred, violated her trademark 
rights in her name.104  The Second Circuit held that there is no Lan-
ham Act liability for an artistically relevant title unless the title is expli-
citly misleading, such as a false claim to be an “authorized” biogra-
phy.105  Nominative fair use reasons similarly that there can be no 
liability without an express misrepresentation. 
Trademark owners increasingly make claims that their mark’s 
presence in expressive works, such as movies, implies an affiliation be-
tween the movie maker and the trademark owner.  After all, the rea-
soning goes, product placement is so common these days that con-
sumers may well assume that products appear as a result of a deal.  So 
the makers of the Slip ‘N Slide sued the studio behind Dickie Roberts:  
Former Child Star over a scene in which the protagonist suffers greatly 
from misusing a Slip ‘N Slide,106 and the makers of Caterpillar tractors 
sued Disney over a scene in George of the Jungle in which the villains use 
Caterpillar tractors to threaten the existence of the jungle.107  A firmly 
enforced explicit/implicit line makes clear that courts ought to  toss 
 
103 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B). 
104 875 F.2d 994, 996 (2d Cir. 1989). 
105 Id. at 999. 
106 Wham-O, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 286 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1257-58 
(N.D. Cal. 2003). 
107 Caterpillar Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 287 F. Supp. 2d 913, 916-17 (C.D. Ill. 2003). 
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out these cases immediately on a motion to dismiss, which ideally 
would deter plaintiffs from bringing such cases in the first place. 
But if courts are going to use explicit claims about affiliation as a 
dividing line, they need to recognize the conceptual weakness behind 
the distinction and defend the line on pragmatic grounds.  Otherwise, 
defendants will always be vulnerable to the trademark owner’s argu-
ment that the rule at issue depends on the (presumed) absence of 
confusion, and that if the trademark owner can convince the court 
that confusion is likely in some particular case, the rule must not ap-
ply.108  Such circumstances occurred in the Abdul-Jabbar case discussed 
in Section II.A. 
As a result of this empirical wobbliness, the Ninth Circuit has 
demonstrated substantial incoherence in applying nominative fair use, 
at times apparently putting the burden on defendants to show  
absence of confusion—surely a perverse result given the doctrine’s  
expression-protecting origins.  One panel has said, for example, that 
“whereas plaintiff carries the burden of persuasion in a trademark in-
fringement claim to show likelihood of confusion, the nominative fair 
use defense shifts to the defendant the burden of proving no likeli-
hood of confusion.”109 
Given that plaintiffs always have the burden of showing likely 
confusion,110 a burden-shifting rule makes the nominative fair use 
defense worse than useless unless read carefully:  the nominative fair 
use test has three elements, none of which appear in the traditional 
multifactor confusion test.  It could reasonably be the defendant’s bur-
den to satisfy each element, including the final element that the defen-
dant must do nothing else that explicitly misleads as to source.  Once the 
defendant satisfies each element, the defendant has shown that confu-
sion is unlikely as a matter of law.  This interpretation preserves the 
 
108 Cf. Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 801 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(noting that, in a copyright case, Mattel offered a survey into evidence that purported 
to show that the majority of the public did not perceive a parodic message in the de-
fendant’s depictions of Barbie).  The Mattel court rejected reliance on a survey for 
purposes of determining a fair use defense to copyright infringement, id., but courts 
are less likely to do so in trademark cases.  See, e.g., Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 
648 F. Supp. 905, 911 (D. Neb. 1986) (“[T]he Court finds the survey to be credible 
evidence of a likelihood of confusion . . . .”). 
109 Brother Records, Inc. v. Jardine, 318 F.3d 900, 909 n.5 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation 
omitted); see also Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 412-13 (9th Cir. 
1996) (noting the difficulty of applying nominative fair use to a traditional thirty-
second television ad that mentions a celebrity’s name). 
110 See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 
118-21 (2004). 
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force of New Kids.111  Because of the test’s continued references to con-
fusion, however, not all courts have understood how it should work.112  
Judge Kozinski has recently tried again, concluding that under recent 
Supreme Court precedent, a defendant “need only show that it used 
the mark to refer to the trademarked good,” after which the burden 
“reverts” to the plaintiff to show that the use was not nominative.113 
One can trace this back and forth in the analysis to the insistence 
that nominative uses are not and never will be confusing as a matter of 
empirical reality, which persists in Judge Kozinski’s current reasoning 
and leads him to some convoluted formulations.114  Conflating the 
normative (this is not the kind of confusion worth stopping, even if it 
exists) and the descriptive (this is not confusing) makes nominative 
 
111 See supra Section II.A for further discussion of this case. 
112 See, e.g., Chambers v. Time Warner, No. 00-2839, 2003 WL 749422, at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2003) (asserting that the third element of the nominative fair use de-
fense requires that the use of the trademark not create a likelihood of confusion as to 
the markholder’s sponsorship, endorsement, or affiliation); cf. Century 21 Real Estate 
Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 222-31 (3d Cir. 2005) (revising nominative 
fair use because of this conceptual lack of clarity); Health Grades, Inc. v. Robert Wood 
Johnson Univ. Hosp., Inc., 634 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1241 (D. Colo. 2009) (criticizing the 
Ninth Circuit’s test for putting the burden on the defendant). 
113 Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1183 (9th Cir. 2010). 
114 Among these formulations was equating the burden of showing that a use was 
not nominative with the burden of showing that the use was confusing.  See id. at 1182-
83.  This equation creates a tension with the decision’s statement that the nominative 
use test replaces the standard multifactor confusion test and cannot be used with it se-
quentially.  See id. at 1182.  Apparently a trademark plaintiff must show that the use is 
likely to confuse by showing that the use, while nominative, uses more of the mark 
than necessary or suggests source or sponsorship.  This raises two significant questions.  
First, why should we believe that using more of a mark than necessary is likely to cause 
confusion?  Notably, Judge Kozinski stated that doing so “might” cause confusion, a 
lower standard than “likely” confusion, and yet he still seemingly presumed that flunk-
ing the nominative fair use test made confusion likely.  See id. at 1181 (“[U]se of the 
stylized Lexus mark and ‘Lexus L’ logo was more use of the mark than necessary and 
suggested sponsorship or endorsement by Toyota . . . . [T]hose visual cues might lead 
some consumers to believe they were dealing with an authorized Toyota affiliate.”).  
Second, if the nominative fair use test replaces the standard multifactor confusion test, 
how is a court supposed to analyze whether a nominative use suggests source or spon-
sorship?  The Tabari court made clear that something less than explicit claims of offi-
cialness would satisfy the third factor.  With respect to domain names, the court ex-
plained that “naked” use of a trademark, or a trademark plus a geographic indicator, 
as a domain name would not be nominative fair use.  Id. at 1177-79.  Though the opi-
nion didn’t use the term, the reasoning is apparently that the necessary implication of 
domain names such as trademark.com, e-trademark.com, and trademark-usa.com is that 
the site comes from the trademark owner, whereas no such necessary implication comes 
from more contextually ambiguous domain names such as trademarkdealer.com.  See id. 
(“Because the official Lexus site is almost certain to be found at lexus.com . . . it’s far less 
likely to be found at other sites containing the word Lexus.”).  
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fair use difficult to navigate.  We would be better off abandoning the 
descriptive basis in favor of error-cost and free speech grounds. 
In fact, a rule that limits trademark suits against expressive works 
to explicit misrepresentations is fully defensible on such grounds,  
especially given the chilling effect of threats and the expense of judi-
cial determinations.115  If implicit messages are usually not deceptive, 
then even if courts decide individual cases correctly most of the time, 
there will be too many false positives and judicial intervention will on 
balance be bad for the overall level of truth in the system. 
The Supreme Court relied on this cost-benefit reasoning in Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., a trademark case holding that 
product design could only be protected under trademark law upon a 
showing of secondary meaning.116  In other words, plaintiffs could not 
produce a striking design and then immediately claim trademark pro-
tection, on the theory that consumers would automatically assume 
that two similar striking designs came from the same source.  Word 
marks do allow such immediate protection.  For example, consumers 
would automatically assume that two products branded “Zyrtec” come 
from the same source, even if they were otherwise unfamiliar with the 
term.  This phenomenon—immediate communication of source-
identifying significance even for a consumer who has never encoun-
tered the mark before—is called “inherent distinctiveness.”117 
Although some product designs might be inherently distinctive, 
the Court thought that this was highly unlikely and that the average 
case would not involve an inherently distinctive design.118  To under-
stand the underlying rationale, consider why universal screening for 
rare conditions may not be cost-justified even with a very good test: 
Bayes’ Theorem explains problems that trip up the uninitiated, such as 
whether to trust the result of a Human Immunodeficiency Virus (“HIV”) 
test that correctly detects the virus in 98% of infected people while pro-
ducing false-positives for only 0.2% of uninfected people.  The HIV test 
is said to have a sensitivity of 98% and a specificity of 99.8%, far better 
than most medical tests.  Juries convict defendants beyond a reasonable 
doubt on weaker evidence.  Yet no doctor should rely on this test to de-
termine that a patient has HIV. 
 
115 See Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L. REV. 2099, 
2123-43 (2004) (exploring the structuring role of enforcement costs in trademark law). 
116 529 U.S. 205, 216 (2000).  
117 Id. at 210-11. 
118 Id. at 214. 
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 Why?  Because, as Bayes’ Theorem explains, the reliability of any ob-
servation depends on both the accuracy of the test itself and the rate at 
which the measured event occurs in the world. . . . [V]ery few Americans, 
about one in 3000, are infected with the HIV virus.  Therefore, even if 
only 0.2% of the uninfected people register as false positives, those false 
positives will far outnumber the true positives; of the people who test 
positive for HIV, only 14.8% actually have the disease. . . . [T]he test is 
both very accurate and very unreliable.
119
 
Product designs, according to the Court, are unlikely to be inhe-
rently distinctive.120  Were it possible for a plaintiff to allege that its de-
sign was one of the few that are inherently distinctive without facing 
the more difficult and expensive hurdle of showing secondary mean-
ing, the threat of suit would deter competitors from copying designs 
that were in fact available to use.  This is so even if courts are skilled at 
sorting designs that are inherently distinctive from designs that aren’t 
and even if defendants are rational risk-takers who predict outcomes 
successfully.  Like the HIV test discussed above, the judicial system can 
be “very accurate and very unreliable.”  The low base rate of inherent 
distinctiveness in the relevant population means that there will be more 
false positives than true positives, such that the average plaintiff’s victo-
ry will be erroneous.  Allowing lawsuits in this circumstance would harm 
 
119 Brent S. Mitchell, Book Note, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 269, 272 (1997) (reviewing 
KENNETH R. FOSTER & PETER W. HUBER, JUDGING SCIENCE:  SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 
AND THE FEDERAL COURTS (1997)) (citations and footnote omitted); see also Edward M. 
Chen et al., Common Law Privacy:  A Limit on an Employer’s Power to Test for Drugs, 12 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 651, 688-89 (1990) (“Accepted statistical theory (Bayes’ Theorem) 
holds that the proportion of false positives will be high when the prevalence of drug 
use in the tested population is low. . . . When applied to a population in which only five 
percent use drugs, the predictive value [of a ninety-five percent accurate drug test] 
drops to fifty percent—i.e., fully half of the positive tests reported will be false.”); Boaz 
Sangero & Mordechai Halpert, Why a Conviction Should Not Be Based on a Single Piece of 
Evidence:  A Proposal for Reform, 48 JURIMETRICS J. 43, 50 (2007) (“Our initial—very mis-
taken—intuition that, since the [example] test’s accuracy is 99.9%, there is only a 0.1% 
probability that Mr. Smith is not a carrier . . . derives from what is referred to in psy-
chological literature as the ‘base rate fallacy’ or ‘base rate neglect.’”). 
120 Underlying the Court’s reasoning may have been the intuition that, as word 
marks are generally available to indicate source, consumers turn to word marks first 
when trying to find a source identifier on a product.  Empirical research supports this 
premise.  See, e.g., Lee et al., supra note 48, at 1075-78 (finding that consumers tend to 
perceive words prominently placed on products as trademarks).  The availability of 
word marks also decreases the cost of error:  if the Court is wrong and product designs 
routinely do serve as inherently distinctive indicators of source, the word marks on the 
products will help correct consumers’ misimpressions. 
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competition without adding significant protections against deception.  
The game, the Supreme Court concluded, “wasn’t worth the candle.”121 
The same base-rate analysis also provides a justification for refus-
ing to entertain claims that certain statements are implicitly mislead-
ing or confusing.  If statements about a trademark are on their face 
true or nonfalsifiable—it was neither true nor false that Caterpillar 
tractors menaced the fictional jungle—and we believe consumers are 
unlikely to read more into them, then individualized confusion inqui-
ries will produce more mistaken decisions than a blanket rule denying 
trademark owners the possibility of relief.122 
3.  Other Costs of Protecting Consumers 
A related reason to choose an explicit/implicit line for trademark 
references is that a statement may be informative to enough people, 
and difficult to express in a less misleading way, such that the informa-
tional benefits outweigh the costs of any confusion.123  Consider  
nominative fair use again:  it would be difficult to talk about the Chi-
cago Bulls truthfully without using the word “Bulls.”  The explicit/ 
implicit divide preserves the ability to make truthful statements about 
trademarked products and services without awkward and unnatural 
workarounds.  By contrast, a statement about one’s food processor can 
almost certainly be reworded in a variety of nonmisleading ways. 
This consideration of the benefits of a message to those noncon-
fused consumers is an instance of a larger point:  other policies com-
pete with protecting consumers against deception.  These policies in-
clude free competition, preservation of the freedom to copy uncopy-
righted and unpatented articles guaranteed by the copyright and pa-
 
121 Wal-mart, 529 U.S. at 214; see also Bone, supra note 115, at 2130-33 (suggesting 
that a presumption of secondary meaning with respect to inherently distinctive marks 
can be justified by its cost-reducing effect on litigation). 
122 See Pharmacia Corp. v. Alcon Labs., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d 335, 358-59 (D.N.J. 
2002) (rejecting a statistical model with ninety-three percent accuracy as a means of 
predicting trademark confusion because low base rates meant that predicted confusion 
would be a false positive over ninety-nine percent of the time); McGeveran, supra note 
32, at 114 (“[W]e can identify certain recurring types of expressive uses where a find-
ing of no confusion is very likely overall . . . . An occasional false negative—that is, an 
erroneous finding of no liability for an expressive use that did cause some amount of 
consumer confusion—would be tolerable if it happened fairly infrequently and the 
degree of confusion were acceptably small.”). 
123 See Craswell, supra note 39, at 594 (discussing the “subtle costs” of “eliminating 
misrepresentation,” namely, the loss of truthful and useful information). 
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patent laws, and free expression.124  Because of these policies, not all 
types of consumer confusion are worth guarding against.125  Graeme 
Austin argues that nominative fair use simply removes potentially con-
fused consumers from the analysis in the service of other policy 
goals.126  In a slightly different fashion, the same can be said of  
descriptive fair use, which allows sellers to use trademarked terms for 
their dictionary meaning; for example, “sweet-tart” can be used to  
describe the taste of a cranberry drink, despite the existence of trade-
marked SweeTarts candy.127  The Supreme Court held in KP Permanent 
that the policy of promoting free competition required the law to  
tolerate a higher level of consumer confusion from descriptive fair use 
than the law would otherwise allow.128 
Once these considerations are in the open, we can formulate a 
better account of why trademark law should refuse to consider alleged 
consumer confusion in particular circumstances.  Pretending that ex-
plicit falsity is the only kind of falsity that can mislead consumers, by 
contrast, is dishonest and vulnerable to empirical disproof by clever 
trademark owners.  Giving more attention to policies that compete 
with the desire to protect consumers from all kinds of confusion also 
invites us to examine more carefully trademark owners’ confusion 
claims:  Confusion over what?  And with what harm?  This Article takes 
up these questions below, after discussing how false advertising doc-
trine should deal with implications. 
D.  A More Persuasive Role for Implications in False Advertising 
As explained in Section II.B, in cases of implicit falsity, a false ad-
vertising plaintiff must prove consumer deception with consumer per-
ception evidence, which almost necessarily means an expensive, hotly 
contested survey.129  In cases of explicit falsity, deception is presumed.  
 
124 See, e.g., Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33 
(2003). 
125 See, e.g., Bos. Duck Tours, LP v. Super Duck Tours, LLC, 531 F.3d 1, 25 (1st Cir. 
2008) (holding that confusion stemming from use of a generic term isn’t the type of 
confusion against which trademark law should protect). 
126 See Graeme W. Austin, Tolerating Confusion About Confusion:  Trademark Policies and 
Fair Use, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 157, 175 (2008). 
127 See Sunmark, Inc. v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 64 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (7th 
Cir. 1995). 
128 KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 119, 
121-22 (2004). 
129 See cases cited supra note 57; see also Oscar Mayer Foods Corp. v. Bryan Foods, 
Inc., No. 89-0364, 1989 WL 164358, at *2 (N.D. Ga. July 20, 1989) (finding that sales 
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False advertising’s rigid distinction is mitigated somewhat by the doc-
trines of puffery and falsity by necessary implication, the former of 
which allows courts to dismiss explicit falsity claims when the adver-
tisement at issue is too unbelievable,130 and the latter of which allows 
courts to treat implicit claims as if they were explicit.131  Although 
these doctrines have moderating effects, because they are not part of a 
coherent understanding of implication, they add unpredictability and 
occasionally lead courts to ignore actual confusion evidence. 
It would be more coherent to adopt the trademark rule that sur-
veys are helpful, but not required, when other factors strongly favor a 
finding of likely confusion.132  Given that communication is routinely 
 
representatives’ testimony was “of little significance in a false advertising case” because 
confusion “must be proven by relevant market research and consumer surveys”).  Non-
survey evidence of actual deception can be hard to find because consumers are unlikely 
to complain in a way that leaves discoverable records.  Cf. Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. 
W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1050 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[D]ifficulties in gather-
ing evidence of actual confusion make its absence generally unnoteworthy.”).  
130 See, e.g., Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. DirectTV, Inc., 497 F.3d 144, 160-61 (2d Cir. 
2007) (finding that DirecTV’s commercial depiction of its competitors’ cable television 
service qualified as puffery because, although it was “inaccurate,” it was “not even remote-
ly realistic”); Pizza Hut, Inc. v. Papa John’s Int’l, Inc., 227 F.3d 489, 497 (5th Cir. 2000) 
(“[N]on-actionable ‘puffery’ comes in at least two possible forms:  (1) an exaggerated, 
blustering, and boasting statement upon which no reasonable buyer would be justified 
in relying; or (2) a general claim of superiority over comparable products that is so va-
gue that it can be understood as nothing more than a mere expression of opinion.”); 
Tylka v. Gerber Prods. Co., No. 96-1647, 1999 WL 495126, at *8 (N.D. Ill. July 1, 1999) 
(holding that claims that Gerber’s baby food was the “most nutritious” available were 
“meaningless sales patter” because they were general, vague, and all-encompassing); 
Gillette Co. v. Norelco Consumer Prods. Co., 946 F. Supp. 115, 131 (D. Mass. 1996) 
(finding that exaggerations about pain from using competitor’s razor were puffery); 
Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co. v. MasterCard Int’l Inc., 776 F. Supp. 787, 790 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding that exaggerations about difficulty of finding an ATM machine 
that accepted competitor’s bank card were puffery). 
131 See supra text accompanying note 70. 
132 Lee Goldman bases his support for this view in the expertise of judges. 
The unwillingness to allow judges to interpret advertisements for themselves 
demeans judicial expertise and experience.  Courts are well-trained in inter-
preting language and its effects.  Contract interpretation and statutory con-
struction regularly require judges to finely parse language.  In the field of  
libel, “trial courts have a significant role in establishing the meaning of chal-
lenged communications.”  In trademark cases under section 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act, courts routinely find a likelihood of confusion without consider-
ing survey evidence. 
Goldman, supra note 12, at 521-22 (footnote omitted) (quoting Arthur Best, Controlling 
False Advertising:  A Comparative Study of Public Regulation, Industry Self-Policing, and Pri-
vate Litigation, 20 GA. L. REV. 1, 43 (1985)).   
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implicit, and that—as advertisers well know—consumers draw predict-
able inferences from nonexplicit statements, we should reconceive the 
implicit/explicit dichotomy as a continuum.133  In other areas of the 
law, factfinders can look at context, including expert testimony or any 
other relevant evidence that would help establish the meaning of a 
claim or term.134  When a consumer is likely to receive a false message, a 
court should be able to act even without a survey in hand, just as the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the National Advertising Divi-
sion of the Better Business Bureau do in evaluating challenged ads.135  If 
cell phone ads consistently use white space on a map to denote areas of 
 
 Gregory Klass, as part of a taxonomy of the law of information, argues that inter-
pretive methods using ordinary rules of communication and implicature can be used 
to determine whether claims are false.  Gregory Klass, Meaning, Purpose and Cause in the 
Law of Information, 100 GEO. L. J. (forthcoming Jan. 2012) (manuscript at 28), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1756831.  By contrast, empirical techniques examining 
probabalistic responses among large groups are suited to regulations where consum-
ers’ reactions are counter- or nonintuitive.  Id. (manuscript at 37-38).  Klass suggests 
that courts’ endorsement of survey requirements in Lanham Act cases represents an 
acknowledgement that the latter, “causal-predictive” empiricist approaches can be ap-
propriate in the Lanham Act context, id. (manuscript at 50), but does not argue that 
the explicit/implicit divide is the best way to operationalize a balance between inter-
pretive and causal-predictive methods, id. (manuscript at 54). 
133 Charlotte Taylor explains a similar dilemma in the context of the expressness 
requirement in First Amendment incitement doctrine. 
 Once an expressness requirement no longer tracks the distinction between 
high- and low-value speech in even a crude manner, it comes to seem distur-
bingly arbitrary. 
 . . . If we cease to believe that an expressness requirement tracks value or al-
lows us to prevent a reasonable portion of the relevant harm, we may find our-
selves unwilling to make the compromises it entails, no matter how much we 
care about constraining government discretion and providing adequate notice 
to speakers. 
Taylor, supra note 67, at 399-400. 
134 See, e.g., United States v. Farinella, 558 F.3d 695, 700 (7th Cir. 2009) (conclud-
ing that to prove fraudulent misrepresentation for the purposes of establishing mi-
sbranding under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 301(a), 21 U.S.C. 
§ 331(a) (2006), amended by Pub. L. No. 111-353, § 102, 124 Stat. 3885, 3888 (2010), “a 
jury must be given evidence about the meaning (unless obvious) of the representation 
claimed to be fraudulent”). 
135 See, e.g., In re Kraft, Inc., 114 F.T.C. 40, 105 (1991) (“Whether implied 
claims . . . are deceptive may be determined by the Commission relying on its own ex-
pertise. . . . If the Commission is confident that the language of an ad contains an im-
plied claim, it will rely upon its own interpretation, and it has often done so; otherwise, 
it looks to extrinsic evidence to confirm that its reading of the ad is reasonable . . . .”); 
Best, supra note 132, at 15 & n.55 (comparing enforcement standards under the Lan-
ham Act with those of the FTC and the Better Business Bureau); see also supra note 67 
(discussing the discretionary judgment of these regulators). 
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no coverage, and an advertiser colors large areas of its competitor’s 
coverage area white, for example, a court should be able to find decep-
tion in context even without a consumer survey and even if the adver-
tiser notes what it means in fine print.136  Likewise, if a beverage maker 
advertises as a central product benefit that its drink has added calcium 
and magnesium and its competitor’s doesn’t, and if the amounts added 
are actually so small as to have no effect, then a court should be able to 
find likely deception rather than holding that the ad is literally true,  
albeit “meaningless,” and can’t be enjoined without a survey.137 
The empirical failings of the explicit/implicit divide are com-
pounded by the problems it creates for litigators.  Surveys are not an 
ideal way of ensuring accuracy in false advertising cases.  As trademark 
cases recognize, consumer surveys are expensive,138 putting relief from 
truly misleading claims out of the reach of smaller businesses.  When 
surveys are present, courts often disparage them as imperfect and  
biased.139  Jennifer Mnookin has pointed out that abstract reverence 
 
136 See Transcript of Temporary Restraining Order Proceedings at 36-40, AT&T 
Mobility, LLC v. Cellco P’ship, No. 09-3057 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 18, 2009), ECF No. 27 (ex-
plaining confusion caused by white space in mobile-phone ads and arguing that the 
ads should be enjoined). 
137 See Stokely-Van Camp, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 646 F. Supp. 2d 510, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009) (holding that the plaintiff must show evidence that the defendant’s sports drink 
ads were misleading consumers). 
138 See, e.g., Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 224 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(“[C]onsumer surveys[] . . . are expensive, time-consuming and not immune to mani-
pulation.”), abrogated on other grounds by Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 
418 (2003); Johnson v. Revenue Mgmt. Corp., 169 F.3d 1057, 1063 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(Eschbach, J., concurring) (“[S]urvey evidence in trademark and trade dress cases can 
be very costly.”); Lon Tai Shing Co. v. Koch + Lowy, No. 90-4464, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
19123, at *58 n.15 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (stating that the 1990 cost of conducting a proper 
consumer survey in a trademark dispute could reach $65,000); Robert C. Bird, The Im-
pact of the Moseley Decision on Trademark Dilution Law, 26 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 
102, 104 (2007) (noting that surveys can cost as much as $100,000 to administer); Jane 
Shay Wald, Look Before You Leap:  Some Considerations Before Filing a Trademark Suit 
(“Trademark litigation is expensive and getting more so.  Costs of survey experts alone 
can approach six figures, depending on the scope of the survey.”), in UNDERSTANDING 
TRADEMARK LAW 2010, at 297, 299 (PLI Intellectual Prop., Course Handbook Series 
No. G-1009, 2010); cf. Castrol Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 987 F.2d 939, 951 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(noting, in the course of holding that literal falsity obviates the need for a survey, that 
obtaining surveys is a “time consuming and expensive task”). 
139 See, e.g., Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metro. Balt. Football Club Ltd. P’ship, 34 
F.3d 410, 416 (7th Cir. 1994) (disparaging the “survey researcher’s black arts”); Facen-
da v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 2d 491, 513 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (“[P]utting together 
and executing a survey is an expensive and dubious proposition. . . . Further, just 
as . . . anecdotal evidence of confusion is ‘frequently discounted as unclear or insubs-
tantial,’ the same is true for surveys.  The expense that a survey entails will go all for 
nothing if the court will not accept its methodology. . . . Because it would have been 
TUSHNET REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/13/2011  1:30 PM 
2011] Running the Gamut from A to B 1341 
for the scientific method often leads courts to discount actual science, 
which is inevitably messier and more imperfect than the ideal, even 
though such methods may meet scientific standards for reliability.140  
In advertising law, courts’ abstract reverence for survey evidence cuts 
off factfinding when surveys are absent but savages those surveys when 
they’re present.  Even, and perhaps especially, if the latter reaction is 
correct, refusing to assess likely deception using nonsurvey contextual 
factors makes little sense.  Requiring or heavily weighting surveys 
makes sense when there is good reason to fear overreaching by plain-
tiffs; a survey requirement is in many ways a deterrent to bringing a 
claim in the first place.  Now, however, we require surveys in false ad-
vertising cases even though the explicit/implicit divide isn’t a helpful 
guide to anticompetitive or otherwise unwarranted claims, given the 
role of implication in communicating meaning generally. 
Abandoning a bright-line survey requirement would also improve 
consistency in the law.  As noted above, false endorsement cases under 
the Lanham Act, which involve claims by a celebrity that she has falsely 
been made to appear to endorse a particular product, straddle the line 
between false designations of sponsorship or affiliation (trademark) 
and false representations of fact (false advertising).141  The flexible use 
 
difficult, cost-preclusive, and risky for Facenda to have obtained evidence of actual 
confusion, I cannot weigh the lack of this evidence too heavily against him.” (quoting 
R.L. Polk & Co. v. InfoUSA, Inc., 230 F. Supp. 2d 780, 791 (E.D. Mich. 2002))), aff’d in 
part, 542 F.3d 1007 (3d Cir. 2008); L & F Prods. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 845 F. Supp. 
984, 995 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (noting that survey experts “possess technical and linguistic 
skills that can . . . structure the language and methodology of a survey to produce the 
most favorable possible results for a client”), aff’d, 45 F.3d 709 (2d Cir. 1995); Am. 
Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 654 F. Supp. 568, 582 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (“It is 
difficult to believe that it was a mere coincidence that when each party retained a sup-
posedly independent and objective survey organization, it ended up with survey ques-
tions which were virtually certain to produce the particular results it sought.  This 
strongly suggests that those who drafted the survey questions were more likely knaves 
than fools.”); cf. Bandag, Inc. v. Al Bolser’s Tire Stores, Inc., 750 F.2d 903, 914 (Fed. 
Cir. 1984) (“[B]ecause evidence of actual confusion is difficult to produce and fre-
quently discounted as unclear or insubstantial, ‘this factor is weighed heavily only 
when there is evidence of past confusion, or perhaps, when the particular circums-
tances indicate such evidence should have been available.’” (citation omitted) (quot-
ing AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 353 (9th Cir. 1979))). 
140 See Jennifer L. Mnookin, Idealizing Science and Demonizing Experts:  An Intellectual 
History of Expert Evidence, 52 VILL. L. REV. 763, 767 (2007) (“Our desire to idealize 
science runs, I fear, rather deep; we do not actually want science to be muddy, com-
plex, pragmatic, methodologically imperfect and messy.  When the science offered in 
court is all of these things, as it so often is, we therefore tend to blame the science it-
self, rather than our own unrealistic desires.”). 
141 Compare Miramax Films Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Entm’t, Inc., 996 F. Supp. 
294, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (applying the literally false/misleading distinction to a sec-
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of survey evidence would harmonize the two sections of the Lanham 
Act.  A celebrity shown using a product in a standard advertising format 
presumably communicates an endorsement message, while other, more 
ambiguous situations should require consumer deception evidence be-
fore liability could be imposed. 
Lanham Act precedent accepts different types of evidence to prove 
a contested point in other areas.142  Most significantly, descriptive marks, 
such as “American” for airlines, signal some characteristic of the prod-
uct or service; in order to promote competition, they are protected as 
trademarks only upon proof that consumers perceive them as indica-
tions of source, rather than as product information.  This source-
identification function is known as secondary meaning.143  Proof of sec-
ondary meaning can come from surveys, but it need not.  Other types 
of circumstantial evidence are well established as sufficient in appro-
priate cases.144  Marks deemed inherently distinctive don’t require evi-
dence of secondary meaning at all.145  Falling into the categories of sug-
 
tion 43(a)(1)(A) claim) (order vacated on June 18, 1998), with Allen v. Nat’l Video, 
Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 619 n.3, 628 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (applying the trademark rule and 
citing prior cases doing the same). 
142 See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 224 (“Plaintiffs are ordinarily free to make their case 
through circumstantial evidence that will justify an ultimate inference of injury.  
‘[C]ontextual factors’ have long been used to establish infringement.  We see no rea-
son why they should not be used to prove dilution.” (alteration in original)).  The spe-
cific holding in Nabisco that the federal dilution law did not require a showing of actual 
dilution was rejected by the Supreme Court in Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 
U.S. 418 (2003), and subsequently restored by congressional amendment in the 
Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, § 2(1), 120 Stat. 1730, 
1730-32 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006)).  However, this case still illustrates 
that circumstantial evidence is well accepted in other areas of the Lanham Act. 
143 See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9-11 (2d Cir. 
1976) (setting out the now-standard distinctiveness spectrum of marks from generic to 
arbitrary and fanciful). 
144 The Eighth Circuit in Frosty Treats, Inc. v. Sony Computer Entertainment America, 
Inc. succinctly captured the ways in which secondary meaning could be shown. 
 Although direct evidence such as consumer testimony or surveys are most 
probative of secondary meaning, it can also be proven by circumstantial evi-
dence.  Circumstantial evidence such as the exclusivity, length and manner of 
use of the mark; the amount and manner of advertising; the amount of sales 
and number of customers; the plaintiff’s established place in the market; and 
the existence of intentional copying could also establish secondary meaning. 
426 F.3d 1001, 1005-06 (8th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). 
145 See, e.g., Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 776 (1992) (hold-
ing that a finding of inherent distinctiveness of trade dress removes any need to show 
secondary meaning); Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prods., Inc., 930 F.2d 277, 291 
(3d Cir. 1991) (“Where a mark has not been federally registered or has not achieved 
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gestive (only related to the underlying good or service at issue with the 
exercise of some imagination, like Venus for beauty salons), arbitrary 
(unrelated to the good or service at issue, like Apple for computers), or 
fanciful (made up, like Viagra) is equivalent to unrebuttable evidence 
that consumers are likely to perceive a symbol as a mark.  In a way, these 
semantic categories are the ultimate in circumstantial evidence. 
Even with pure false advertising, text, structure, or history hardly 
dictate the survey requirement.  Older cases didn’t divide so rigidly be-
tween false and misleading claims.146  Courts should be more willing to 
use common sense in finding deceptiveness, as they were in the past.147  
In 1982, before doctrinal rigidity set in, the Third Circuit recognized 
that the real task before a court in a false advertising case was to use 
“pragmatic analysis,” which “aims to explain ‘how it is that speakers of 
any language can use the sentences of that language to convey messages 
which do not bear any necessary relation to the linguistic content of the 
sentence used.’”148  In performing this task, many sources of evidence, 
from expert testimony to consumer surveys, can provide guidance. 
The existing false/misleading divide has been a frustrating, ex-
pensive, and not particularly productive doctrinal development.  False 
 
incontestability, validity depends on proof of secondary meaning, unless the unregis-
tered or contestable mark is inherently distinctive.”). 
146 The Southern District of New York case of McNeilab, Inc. v. American Home Prod-
ucts Corp. typifies this lack of rigidity. 
Though the court’s own reaction to the advertisements is not determinative, as 
finder of fact it is obliged to judge for itself whether the evidence of record es-
tablishes that others are likely to be misled or confused.  In doing so, the court 
must, of course, rely on its own experience and understanding of human na-
ture in drawing reasonable inferences about the reactions of consumers to the 
challenged advertising. 
501 F. Supp. 517, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); see also Ragold, Inc. v. Ferrero, U.S.A., Inc., 506 F. 
Supp. 117, 125 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (“[I]t is the reaction of the group to which the advertise-
ment is directed that is dispositive. . . . [T]his does not mean that the trial judge is bound 
by the conclusions of market analysts or other expert witnesses . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
147 A nice example of a court reasoning more pragmatically is Pacheco Ross Archi-
tects, P.C. v. Mitchell Associates Architects, in which the court held that plaintiffs could 
prove deceptiveness with survey evidence, evidence of actual confusion, or “argument 
based on an inference arising from a judicial comparison of the claims and the context 
of their use in the marketplace.”  No. 08-0466, 2009 WL 1606066, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. June 
8, 2009); see also Energy Four, Inc. v. Dornier Med. Sys., Inc., 765 F. Supp. 724, 729-30 
(N.D. Ga. 1991) (accepting testimony from experts in the field about the meaning that 
medical professionals attached to “catastrophic failure” and finding that the advertis-
er’s claim that the competitor’s product had suffered “catastrophic failure” was literally 
false even though a technical engineering definition of the phrase was literally true).   
148 Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. FTC, 695 F.2d 681, 689 n.13 (3d Cir. 1982) (quoting 
RUTH M. KEMPSON, SEMANTIC THEORY 68 (1977)). 
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advertising law could benefit from trademark’s stance towards direct 
evidence of confusion:  a recognition that this evidence is helpful but 
not dispositive. 
III.  WHAT TRADEMARK SHOULD LEARN FROM  
FALSE ADVERTISING:  MATERIALITY 
The previous Part criticized some shortcuts found in trademark 
law, but ultimately concluded that they could be justified on different 
grounds.  To the extent that this Article might have been taken to 
support trademark expansionism by arguing that implicit messages 
can lead to confusion in the right circumstances, I will now vigorously 
reject any such implication.  Regardless of what message consumers 
receive from the words and images in an ad, a far more important is-
sue is what messages affect their decisions in identifiable ways.  While 
false advertising recognizes this distinction, trademark law largely does 
not, to the great detriment of the latter. 
A.  False Advertising Precedents 
To be actionable under section 43(a)(1)(B), a falsehood must be 
“material”:  it must be likely to affect a reasonable consumer’s pur-
chasing decision.149  “The materiality requirement is based on the 
premise that not all deceptions affect consumer decisions.”150  Mate-
riality, among other concepts, allows courts to bless certain ad claims 
on their face as nonactionable puffery.151  As an empirical matter, puff-
 
149 See, e.g., N. Am. Med. Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d 1211, 1226 
(11th Cir. 2008) (holding that plaintiffs met their burden of showing that deception 
influenced their decision to purchase medical equipment, because the manufacturer’s 
claims, if they had been true, could have been used to attract patients); William H. 
Morris Co. v. Grp. W, Inc., 66 F.3d 255, 258 (9th Cir.) (holding that a letter from the 
distributor of a dietary supplement did not affect purchasing decisions because only 
three percent of pharmacists interviewed interpreted the letter as referring to plain-
tiff’s product), supplemented by 67 F.3d 310 (9th Cir. 1995) (unpublished table deci-
sion); U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Phila., 898 F.2d 914, 922 (3d Cir. 
1990) (requiring that misrepresentations in ads be “‘likely to influence the purchasing 
decision[s]’” of the public to satisfy the materiality requirement (quoting Toro Co. v. 
Textron, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 241, 251 (D. Del. 1980))). 
150 N. Am. Med. Corp., 522 F.3d at 1226 (quoting Johnson & Johnson Vision Care, 
Inc. v. 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 299 F.3d 1242, 1250 (11th Cir. 2002)). 
151 See, e.g., Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. DirecTV, Inc., 497 F.3d 144, 159-60 (2d 
Cir. 2007) (discussing acceptable puffery, which includes statements of an advertised 
product’s superiority that are too vague to prove). 
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ing works,152 but it is the law that consumers are irrebuttably presumed 
not to rely on sufficiently vague or exaggerated claims. 
The materiality requirement seems to have been obvious to courts 
applying the false advertising component of the Lanham Act, even be-
fore section 43(a) was amended to separate it into subsections 
(a)(1)(A) and (a)(1)(B).153  The older test for false advertising was 
much simpler than the current doctrine:  a plaintiff only needed to 
show falsity plus harm to prevail.154  Materiality is an intuitive part of 
harm, because harm only comes when there is a causal link between 
the falsehood and consumers’ behavior.155  Materiality is now generally 
enumerated as a separate requirement in the more elaborate modern 
multifactor test for false advertising.156  Some courts applying the Lan-
 
152 See IVAN L. PRESTON, THE GREAT AMERICAN BLOW-UP:  PUFFERY IN ADVERTISING 
AND SELLING 26, 181-84 (rev ed. 1996).  
153 In 1984, for example, a district court found a five-part test for false advertising, 
which included materiality as a factor, to be “well established” in the law.  Borden, Inc. 
v. Kraft, Inc., No. 84-5295, 1984 WL 1458, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 1984). 
154 See, e.g., Ames Publ’g Co. v. Walker-Davis Publ’ns, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 1, 10-13 
(E.D. Pa. 1974) (requiring plaintiff to show only falsity and likely damage). 
155 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 3 (1995) (stating that a 
misrepresentation will be “to the likely commercial detriment of” the plaintiff if it is 
material (i.e., if “it is likely to affect the conduct of prospective purchasers”) and if a 
reasonable basis exists for believing that the misrepresentation would likely divert 
trade from the plaintiff or harm its reputation or good will).  The European Union has 
also recognized the relationship between materiality and consumer protection.  In Pall 
Corp. v. P.J. Dahlhausen & Co., the Court of Justice of the European Communities (now 
of the European Union) applied a version of materiality in holding that policies of 
protecting consumers against confusion couldn’t justify a ban on the use of the “®” 
symbol where the trademark at issue was not registered in the country in which the 
product was sold.  See Case C-238/89, Pall Corp. v. P.J. Dahlhausen & Co., 1990 E.C.R. 
I-4827, I-4849 (“[E]ven assuming that consumers, or some of them, might be misled on 
that point, such a risk cannot justify so considerable an obstacle to the free movement 
of goods, since consumers are more interested in the qualities of a product than in the 
place of registration of the trade mark.”). 
156 See, e.g., B. Sanfield, Inc. v. Finlay Fine Jewelry Corp., 168 F.3d 967, 971 (7th 
Cir. 1999) (“[T]he plaintiff must show that the defendant (1) made a false or mislead-
ing statement, (2) that actually deceives or is likely to deceive a substantial segment of 
the advertisement’s audience, (3) on a subject material to the decision to purchase the 
goods, (4) touting goods entering interstate commerce, (5) and that results in actual 
or probable injury to the plaintiff.”), aff’d, 258 F.3d 578 (7th Cir. 2001).  At one point, 
materiality was only a separate element when a claim was misleading, as opposed to 
false, in the formulations some courts used.  See Sandoz Pharm. Corp. v. Richardson-
Vicks, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 597, 600 (D. Del. 1989) (“If the challenged claim is literally 
true, to prove that it is therefore deceptive or misleading . . . , plaintiff must prove the 
following:  1) that the statement is material because it is likely to influence purchasing 
decisions and 2) that the misrepresentation has a tendency to deceive the consumer.”), 
aff’d, 902 F.2d 222 (3d Cir. 1990). 
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ham Act, including the Second Circuit, demand a showing that an ad-
vertiser “misrepresented an ‘inherent quality or characteristic’” of a 
product or service,157 which is equivalent to materiality.158 
Given the variety of products and services on the market, the num-
ber of possible material claims is almost infinite.  A few litigated exam-
ples include a stand mixer’s speed and efficiency,159 a tax preparer’s 
claim to offer instant “refunds” rather than instant loans against antic-
ipated refunds,160 and a representation that a product was EPA-
approved.161  Still, not every divergence between claim and reality is 
material.  Courts have denied false advertising claims that were not 
central to an ad’s impact.  Examples include overstatements of the 
number of the defendant’s real estate transactions by four percent;162 
statements about technical aspects of a product where those aspects 
were not generally understood by, nor were a significant concern of, 
purchasers;163 statements that sports scores were updated “from the 
 
157 Nat’l Ass’n of Pharm. Mfrs., Inc. v. Ayerst Labs., 850 F.2d 904, 917 (2d Cir. 1988) 
(quoting Vidal Sassoon, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Co., 661 F.2d 272, 278 (2d Cir. 1981)). 
158 See Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 855 (2d Cir. 1997). 
159 Hobart Corp. v. Welbilt Corp., No. 89-1726, 1989 WL 449696, at *11 (N.D. 
Ohio Oct. 4, 1989). 
160 JTH Tax, Inc. v. H&R Block E. Tax Servs., Inc., 128 F. Supp. 2d 926, 940 (E.D. 
Va. 2001), vacated in part on other grounds, 28 F. App’x 207 (4th Cir. 2002). 
161 Performance Indus. Inc. v. Koos Inc., No. 90-6435, 1990 WL 161253, at *3 (E.D. 
Pa. Oct. 17, 1990). 
162 In re Century 21-RE/MAX Real Estate Adver. Claims Litig., 882 F. Supp. 915, 928 
(C.D. Cal. 1994); see also Black & Decker (U.S.) Inc. v. Pro-Tech Power Inc., 26 F. Supp. 
2d 834, 863 (E.D. Va. 1998) (finding that a claim that a miter saw operated at “4,000 
RPM” was not false because, although a test clocked the actual speed at 3650 RPM, this 
was “an acceptable variance speed”); Borden, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., No. 84-5295, 1984 WL 
1458, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 1984) (finding immaterial the difference between the ac-
tual 4.6 ounces of milk used to make some cheese food slices and the advertised 5.0 
ounces where the majority of the defendant’s slices were made with 5.0 ounces of milk). 
163 See Allen Organ Co. v. Galanti Organ Builders Inc., 798 F. Supp. 1162, 1168-70 
(E.D. Pa. 1992) (electronic church-organ manufacturers), aff’d, 995 F.2d 215 (3d Cir. 
1993) (unpublished table decision); see also Lasermaster Corp. v. Sentinel Imaging, 931 
F. Supp. 628, 634 (D. Minn. 1996) (holding that a claim that the defendant’s inks pro-
vided “perfect color matching” to the plaintiff’s inks was not false because a normal 
person could not tell the difference from ten feet away, even though there might be 
differences if the images were examined very closely); Compaq Computer Corp. v. 
Procom Tech., Inc., 908 F. Supp. 1409, 1427 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (finding that claims that 
a product was “100% compatible” and “fully compatible” with the plaintiff’s products 
were not false, even though the advertiser’s products were slightly different, because 
the core claim of functionality between the products was true); Weight Watchers Int’l, 
Inc. v. Stouffer Corp., 744 F. Supp. 1259, 1278 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (ruling that Stouffer’s 
claim that its frozen meals “fit into” the Weight Watchers dieting system of counting 
“food exchanges” was not false because the system was not exact and “minor discre-
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arena” when they actually were taken from simultaneous broadcasts;164 
and a letter that warned of three lawsuits against a competitor’s prod-
uct when there were only two lawsuits.165 
Materiality can also be used more indirectly to evaluate the relev-
ance of survey evidence that allegedly shows a likelihood of consumer 
confusion.  When a survey question is sufficiently distant from the 
types of questions consumers are likely to ask themselves in real mar-
ketplace contexts, a court may decide that the meaninglessness of the 
question renders the answers unreliable and thus disregard the sur-
vey.166  Likewise, statements can be of such marginal value to consum-
ers that they are not false.  One court found that an idiosyncratic 
“formula” that a vacuum cleaner manufacturer concocted to measure 
the cleaning power of its vacuums was completely unhelpful to con-
sumers, but not false.167 
In general, courts have evaluated materiality by inquiring whether, 
as a matter of common sense and the intended uses of the product or 
service, a claim is likely to be relevant to a purchasing decision.168  
 
pancies” did not “materially affect” consumers’ abilities to fit Stouffer’s products into a 
Weight Watchers regimen). 
164 Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Sports Team Analysis & Tracking Sys., Inc., 939 F. 
Supp. 1071, 1110 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d in part sub nom. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Moto-
rola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997). 
165 William H. Morris Co. v. Grp. W, Inc., 66 F.3d 255, 257 (9th Cir. 1995), supple-
mented by 66 F.3d 310 (9th Cir. 1995). 
166 See, e.g., Procter & Gamble Co. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 569 F. Supp. 2d 796, 
804-05 (E.D. Wis. 2008) (concluding that a survey asking which of the parties’ diapers 
had a more “natural fit” posed an epistemological question that survey evidence could 
not satisfactorily answer). 
167 Royal Appliance Mfg. Co. v. Hoover Co., 845 F. Supp. 469, 480-83 (N.D. Ohio 
1994). 
168 The Southern District of New York, for instance, displayed this commonsensical 
approach to materiality in its National Basketball Ass’n decision. 
 The statements as to the particular origin of game updates constitute noth-
ing more than minutiae about SportsTrax, a reality demonstrated by their lack 
of prominence in the advertisements. 
 . . . The insignificance of the statement “from the arena” is illustrated fur-
ther by omitting it entirely from the clause in which it is found.  If that clause 
simply stated, “Nationwide game updates,” I find it difficult to envision (and 
NBA has not shown otherwise) that consumers suddenly would reassess their 
decisions to purchase SportsTrax. 
939 F. Supp. at 1110, aff’d in relevant part sub nom. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, 
Inc., 105 F.3d at 855.   
 The FTC also has a developed law of materiality.  A material claim is “important to a 
consumer’s decision to buy or use the product.”  Advertising Frequently Asked Questions:  
Answers for Small Business, FTC, 3 (Apr. 2001), http://business.ftc.gov/sites/default/ 
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Courts have often taken materiality for granted, especially when a claim 
is central to an advertising campaign or relates to health or safety.  They 
have also developed various doctrines allowing them to presume ma-
teriality in cases of outright falsity or bad intent.169 
In rare cases, courts have used materiality to express uncertainty 
about the effects of advertising writ large:  one court thought that a 
cough syrup’s claim to work instantly was not likely to be material  
because “[p]arents buy what their pediatrician or their own experience 
tells them is most effective.”170  More common, however, is the use of 
materiality to uphold requirements of truthtelling even when consum-
ers might apply a general discount to factual claims.  In a case involving 
prepaid phone cards—an industry fraught with misleading advertis-
ing—a court rejected survey evidence that most respondents didn’t pay 
attention to ad claims about the number of minutes available on a card, 
presumably because they’d been burned many times before.171  Despite 
the fraud-saturated market, the court ruled, factual statements about 
the number of minutes available went “so clearly to the purpose of the 
product” that they were material as a matter of law.172 
Materiality can also help explain an otherwise puzzling and mis-
guided line of cases, which began in the “1st Choice of Doctors” case, 
Mead Johnson, when the Seventh Circuit distinguished between claims 
that are “misleading” and claims that are merely “misunderstood” by 
consumers.173  Only the former, the court ruled, can be found to violate 
the Lanham Act.174  One way to read this holding is that the Lanham 
Act requires intentional falsity; “misleading” can imply a knowing 
 
files/pdf/bus35-advertising-faqs-guide-small-business.pdf.  “Examples of material claims 
are representations about a product’s performance, features, safety, price, or effective-
ness.”  Id. at 5. 
169 See, e.g., Southland Sod Farms v. Stover Seed Co., 108 F.3d 1134, 1146 (9th Cir. 
1997) (“‘[P]ublication of deliberately false comparative claims gives rise to a presump-
tion of actual deception and reliance.’” (quoting U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 793 
F.2d 1034, 1040-41 (9th Cir. 1986))); Johnson & Johnson v. GAC Int’l, Inc., 862 F.2d 
975, 977 (2d Cir. 1988) (presuming materiality for literally false statements); U-Haul 
Int’l, 793 F.2d at 1040-41 (presuming material deception because an advertiser ex-
pended “substantial funds in an effort to deceive consumers and influence their pur-
chasing decisions”); cf. FTC Policy Statement on Deception, supra note 90, at 175 n.5. 
170 Sandoz Pharm. Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 597, 601 (D. Del. 
1989). 
171 IDT Telecom, Inc. v. CVT Prepaid Solutions, Inc., No. 07-1076, 2009 WL 
5205968, at *9 (D.N.J. Dec. 28, 2009). 
172 Id. 
173 Mead Johnson & Co. v. Abbott Labs., 201 F.3d 883, 886-87 (7th Cir.), amended 
on denial of reh’g, 209 F.3d 1032 (7th Cir. 2000) (per curiam). 
174 Id. 
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misstatement, whereas a consumer might misunderstand an innocent, 
well-meant claim.  This distinction would be consistent with Mead John-
son’s initial use of the language of intent,175 though the court later 
amended the opinion to remove that language.176  The amended opi-
nion simply stated that “‘[m]isleading’ is not a synonym for ‘misunders-
tood,’”177 without offering guidance on how to distinguish the two. 
A better way to think about the difference between “misunders-
tood” and “misleading” claims is to focus on materiality.  One may  
misunderstand a fact in the abstract:  I could be wrong about the size of 
a computer’s hard drive.  If I am misled, however, I am being led:  in-
duced, or at least potentially induced, to change my position based on 
my misunderstanding, as when I am more likely to buy the computer 
because of my belief about the size of its hard drive.  It is the combina-
tion of misunderstanding and likelihood of action—materiality—that 
produces misleadingness.  Understood in that way, Mead Johnson’s dis-
tinction makes perfect sense (though one would still want to ask wheth-
er consumers cared about the difference between an infant formula 
preferred by a majority of doctors and an infant formula preferred by a 
majority of doctors who had a preference, since the difference might 
depend on the size of the cohort that had no preference).  Without  
materiality, by contrast, there are only falsehoods a court is willing to 
enjoin and falsehoods it isn’t, leading to unpredictable and unprin-
cipled results based on what a particular judge thinks is reasonable.178 
 
175 See id. at 886 (“A ‘misunderstood’ statement is not the same as one designed to 
mislead.”); see also Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 442 (2d Cir. 2004) (“To 
be actionable, Verio’s solicitations must have included misleading descriptions or repre-
sentations of fact that are ‘calculated to be misunderstood’ in a manner that causes a like-
lihood of confusion . . . .” (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1015 (7th ed. 1999))). 
176 209 F.3d at 1034.  Not all later courts noticed the amendment; several courts 
have cited the omitted language.  See, e.g., Pernod Ricard USA LLC v. Bacardi U.S.A., 
Inc., 702 F. Supp. 2d 238, 251 (D. Del. 2010); Merisant Co. v. McNeil Nutritionals, 
LLC, 515 F. Supp. 2d 509, 527-28 (E.D. Pa. 2007); McNeil-PPC, Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 351 
F. Supp. 2d 226, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Hill’s Pet Nutrition, Inc. v. Nutro Prods., Inc., 
258 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1210 (D. Kan. 2003).  
177 Mead Johnson, 209 F.3d at 1034. 
178 In AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Cellco Partnership, the court denied an injunction 
against an ad that provided a false message about the cell coverage AT&T offered, even 
though coverage was a key product feature, because the court had “[no] doubt that a 
lot of people who have watched these ads have misunderstood.”  Transcript of Tempo-
rary Restraining Order Proceedings, supra note 136, at 69-70.  In contrast, the court in 
McNeil-PPC, Inc. v. Pfizer Inc. rejected Mead Johnson’s distinction as inapplicable on the 
basis of consumer confusion surveys showing the same type of consumer miscompre-
hension as in AT&T.  McNeil-PPC, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 226, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
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The Seventh Circuit’s attempt to focus on materiality in this 
somewhat confusing way is consistent with a general judicial trend of 
greater attention to materiality, albeit without a standardized vocabu-
lary.  The Fifth Circuit suggested that survey evidence of materiality 
was required in a false advertising case over the Papa John’s slogan 
“Better Ingredients.  Better Pizza.”179  The court confused material and 
misleading claims and mangled the implicit/explicit distinction that 
facially ambiguous claims require evidence that consumers actually re-
ceive the false implied message, whereas literally false claims are pre-
sumed to have been received.180 
Though survey evidence of materiality is unlikely to be required in 
other cases,181 Pizza Hut and cases like it show an increased attention 
to particularized evidence of materiality, such as statements from con-
sumers that they care about a specific product claim.182  Thus, in a case 
involving “100% pomegranate juice” that was in fact made mostly of 
other juices and added coloring, the court carefully went through evi-
dence that consumers cared that a product whose name was “100% 
pomegranate juice” actually contained pomegranate juice.183  Currently, 
clothes dryer manufacturers Whirlpool and LG are fighting a resource-
intensive battle over whether consumers care about the difference be-
tween hot vapor injected into a dryer drum (steam) and cold water in-
jected into a hot dryer drum (possibly steam or possibly something 
else).184  The common sense that consumers care about health, safety, 
and prominent product claims in advertising is no longer enough to 
guarantee a victory for a plaintiff, though it will often suffice.185 
 
179 Pizza Hut, Inc. v. Papa John’s Int’l, Inc., 227 F.3d 489, 503-04 (5th Cir. 2000). 
180 See id. at 502-03 & n.13 (citing numerous cases about misleading claims as sup-
port for conclusions about materiality).  
181 See LG Elecs. U.S.A., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., No. 08-0242, 2010 WL 3397358, at 
*13 n.2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 24, 2010) (citing cases showing that courts have not required 
expert testimony, much less survey evidence, on materiality); JTH Tax, Inc. v. H&R 
Block E. Tax Servs., Inc., 128 F. Supp. 2d 926, 939 n.8 (E.D. Va. 2001) (noting that Piz-
za Hut conflated deceptiveness and materiality, declining to adopt a requirement of 
survey evidence to prove materiality, and reasoning that Pizza Hut ultimately required 
only “probative” evidence of materiality, rather than survey evidence), vacated in part on 
other grounds, 28 F. App’x 207 (4th Cir. 2002).  
182 See LG Elecs. U.S.A., 2010 WL 2921633, at *4-5 (allowing a materiality survey to 
contest a falsity survey). 
183 POM Wonderful LLC v. Purely Juice, Inc., No. 07-02633, 2008 WL 4222045, at 
*9, *11-12 (C.D. Cal. July 17, 2008), aff’d, 362 F. App’x 577 (9th Cir. 2009). 
184 LG Elecs. U.S.A., 2010 WL 3397358, at *1. 
185 See, e.g., Osmose, Inc. v. Viance, LLC, 612 F.3d 1298, 1319 (11th Cir. 2010) (af-
firming the district court’s conclusion that the materiality of claims about safety and 
efficacy of construction materials, as well as claims that a well-regarded independent 
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Despite this demand for greater particularity, materiality remains a 
matter of subjective consumer preference.186  “[T]he public is entitled 
to get what it chooses, though the choice may be dictated by caprice or 
by fashion or perhaps by ignorance.”187  Trademark law uses similar rea-
soning.  Confusion over the source of goods, even if the defendant’s 
goods are of high quality and there is no objective difference between 
the products, interferes with consumers’ ability to make decisions based 
on experience with the trademark and to get their goods from a partic-
ular source of their choosing.188  The Second Circuit has stated that 
people like to get what they think they are getting, and courts have stead-
fastly refused in this class of cases to demand justification for their prefe-
rences.  Shoddy and petty motives may control those preferences; but if 
the buyers wish to be snobs, the law will protect them in their snobbery.
189
 
The Supreme Court, in a 1965 case brought by the FTC, explicitly 
linked trademark law to false advertising through the concept of sub-
jective materiality. 
In each [case] the seller has used a misrepresentation to break down what 
he regards to be an annoying or irrational habit of the buying public—
 
testing agency had verified those claims, was “self-evident”); Aristotle Int’l, Inc. v. NGP 
Software, Inc., 714 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9-10 (D.D.C. 2010) (finding a material issue of fact as 
to materiality with regard to claims about partisanship due to testimony that political 
partisanship was important to customers of a political software firm, even though no 
customers identified partisanship as key). 
186 See AT&T Co. v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1428 n.9 (3d 
Cir. 1994) (holding that materiality should be assessed from the consumer’s perspec-
tive); Fed. Express Corp. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 40 F. Supp. 2d 943, 952-53 (W.D. Tenn. 
1999) (finding that the questions of whether claims to be a “company” and to offer deli-
very service “around the world” were material and required further factual development 
regarding consumer perceptions); Oil Heat Inst. v. Nw. Natural Gas, 708 F. Supp. 1118, 
1123 (D. Or. 1988) (holding that a jury could reasonably conclude that claims regard-
ing the amount of maintenance required by natural gas equipment were material). 
187 FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 78 (1934).  But see Int’l Dairy Foods 
Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 73 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that, as applied to commercial 
speech, mere consumer interest was not a substantial government interest justifying 
mandatory disclosure without a tie to health, safety, or a similar concern). 
188 See, e.g., N.Y. Style Bagel Chip Co. v. That’s Entm’t, Inc., No. 90-7759, 1992 WL 
46854, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 9, 1992) (“[Q]uality generally is not an issue in a trademark 
infringement case.  Even if the allegedly infringing product is far superior in quality and 
other desirable characteristics, the holder of a mark is entitled to stop the infringing ac-
tion in order to protect consumer interests, that is, to protect consumers from confu-
sion.”); Gemveto Jewelry Co. v. Jeff Cooper, Inc., 613 F. Supp. 1052, 1064 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) 
(finding that, under New York law, the public has the right to accurate information as to 
a good’s source), vacated on other grounds, 800 F.2d 256 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
189 Benton Announcements, Inc. v. FTC, 130 F.2d 254, 255 (2d Cir. 1942) (per cu-
riam). 
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the preference for particular manufacturers or known brands regardless 
of a product’s actual qualities, the prejudice against reprocessed goods, 
and the desire for verification of a product claim.  In each case the seller 
reasons that when the habit is broken the buyer will be satisfied with the 
performance of the product he receives.  Yet, a misrepresentation has 
been used to break the habit and[] . . . a misrepresentation for such an 
end is not permitted.
190
 
B.  Materiality in Trademark 
Forty-five years ago, the Supreme Court was confident that an in-
fringing use of a mark would actually change consumer behavior by 
breaking consumers’ ingrained habits.  Infringement was, by defini-
tion, material.  Courts occasionally made this connection between ma-
teriality and entitlement to relief explicit.191  Unfortunately, this is no 
longer the case.  Now, a likelihood of confusion about source, spon-
sorship, affiliation, or distant relationship between a plaintiff and a 
defendant regularly results in injunctive relief without any evidence 
that consumers care one whit about the relationship between the par-
ties.192  It’s hard to imagine that consumers mistaken about Dairy 
Queen’s involvement with a movie about midwestern beauty queens 
would consider that involvement a reason either to see the movie or to 
choose a different restaurant. 
 
190 FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 389 (1965); see also Mishawaka 
Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942) (“A trade-mark 
is a merchandising short-cut which induces a purchaser to select what he wants, or 
what he has been led to believe he wants.”), superseded by statute in part on other grounds, 
Act of July 5, 1946 (Lanham Act), ch. 540, § 35, 60 Stat. 427, 439-40 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (2006)); FTC v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212, 216 
(1933) (“[I]f consumers or dealers prefer to purchase a given article because it was 
made by a particular manufacturer . . . they have a right to do so, and this right cannot 
be satisfied by imposing upon them an exactly similar article, or one equally as good, 
but having a different origin.”). 
191 See, e.g., Univ. of Pittsburgh v. Champion Prods., Inc., 566 F. Supp. 711, 721 
(W.D. Pa. 1983) (“There is no evidence that the consumer cares who has made the soft 
goods or whether they were made under license.”).  As James Gibson explains, courts 
stopped considering materiality in part because it was conflated with other concepts, 
particularly functionality.  “When the Supreme Court later linked functionality to prac-
tical utility, the materiality principle lost its place in formal trademark analysis.”  James 
Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 
950 n.260 (2007) (citation omitted) (citing Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 724 
F.2d 327, 330-33 (2d Cir. 1983)). 
192 See, e.g., Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prods., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727, 
732 (D. Minn. 1998) (requiring no evidence of actual consumer confusion before 
granting an injunction). 
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The basic problem is that likely confusion, in the abstract, is a ter-
rible measure of how far trademark rights should extend, because it 
does not address whether the confusion is over anything that mat-
ters.193  Confusion over whether a trademark owner allowed or ap-
proved a particular use, for example, too readily leads to a finding of 
infringement even though there is no reason to think that such confu-
sion would ever change consumer behavior with respect to either the 
plaintiff or the defendant.194  So, for example, a court enjoined an ad 
parody showing cans of “Michelob Oily,” with the theme that pollu-
tion had contaminated water supplies, because of the “distinct possi-
bility, accepted by the district court, ‘that a superficial observer might 
believe that the ad parody was approved by Anheuser-Busch.’”195  Not-
ably, the court required no showing of the effect that such perceived 
approval would have on consumers’ decisions to buy Michelob beer.  
One might argue that the ad would have a subconscious impact on 
consumers who would feel a vague unease with the brand, but under 
false advertising law, courts would squarely categorize that kind of 
emotional effect as unbelievable and exaggerated puffery since no 
reasonable consumer would believe that Michelob was advertising that 
its beer contained oil.  Any persuasive effects of such nonfactual 
claims should be actionable, if at all, only as trademark dilution. 
What is worse, the abandonment of materiality has had feedback ef-
fects on the expansion of infringement liability.  Courts have generally 
reasoned that consumers are more careful, and thus less likely to be 
confused, when they are making decisions that are important to them.  
But remove the role of the decision (as opposed to a consumer ab-
stractly contemplating whether two entities have any link), and matters 
 
193 See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 481 (1999) 
(arguing that courts shouldn’t “foreclose careful consideration of whether the confu-
sion present is a type of confusion that . . . justif[ies] a legal prohibition”). 
194 See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 32, at 429-32, 436-37 (reporting that pro-
ducers are often unharmed when consumers mistakenly associate them with unrelated 
products); Mark P. McKenna, Testing Modern Trademark Law’s Theory of Harm, 95 IOWA 
L. REV. 63, 70-71 (2009) (arguing that uses of a mark by noncompeting goods don’t 
warrant a presumption of harm); Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds:  Trade-
mark Law and Cognitive Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507, 543 (2008) (“[B]rand-extension 
research suggests that dilution by tarnishment through the use of a similar mark on a 
shoddy product is unlikely in the absence of source confusion because consumers have 
robust mental concepts of strong brands.”). 
195 Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769, 771, 775 (8th Cir. 1994) 
(quoting Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 814 F. Supp. 791, 797 (E.D. Mo. 
1993)). 
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change.196  People aren’t careful when they don’t care—that is, when 
the existence or nonexistence of a relationship is immaterial to them.  
Trademark doctrine tells us that less careful consumers are more likely 
to be confused.  The consequence is that the standard multifactor test 
is automatically more likely to find confusion over sponsorship or affil-
iation precisely because consumers are less likely to care about it.197  
Likewise, other elements of the standard confusion test are sensible as 
applied to confusion over source or responsibility for quality, but they 
are incapable of providing rational limits when applied to find any type 
of confusion whatsoever.198 
The doctrine of initial interest confusion, which holds that trade-
mark infringement can occur when use of a confusingly similar mark 
catches consumers’ attention, is another example of expansion of 
rights unconnected to identifiable harms.  Some courts have found 
liability even if there is no confusion beyond a moment of uncertainty, 
and some have gone even further, holding defendants liable apparently 
 
196 Motivation comes from having a reason to care.  See Daniel J. Howard et al., The 
Effects of Brand Name Similarity on Brand Source Confusion:  Implications for Trademark In-
fringement, 19 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 250, 261 (2000) (finding that in situations of 
high involvement, as when a purchase actually turns on a decision, consumers process 
more brand-related information than when they are just looking at ads); Thomas R. Lee 
et al., Trademarks, Consumer Psychology, and the Sophisticated Consumer, 57 EMORY L.J. 575, 
587 (2008) (“[I]f an individual lacks either motivation or ability to expend cognitive 
effort while making the source-identification judgment, she will perform the task in a 
haphazard and offhand manner, resulting in an increased likelihood of confusion.”). 
197 See King of the Mountain Sports, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 185 F.3d 1084, 1092 
(10th Cir. 1999) (remarking that consumer care “rarely reduces the risk of sponsor-
ship confusion,” given that “[t]he care with which consumers select a product does not 
impact the association they may make regarding the sponsorship of an event”); see also 
Therma-Scan, Inc. v. Thermoscan, Inc., 295 F.3d 623, 638 (6th Cir. 2002) (deeming 
consumer care of “minimal” value in avoiding confusion about affiliation or sponsor-
ship (citing Daddy’s Junky Music Stores, Inc. v. Big Daddy’s Family Music Ctr., 109 F.3d 
275, 285-86 (6th Cir. 1997))); cf. Ohio State Univ. v. Thomas, 738 F. Supp. 2d 743, 754-
55 (S.D. Ohio 2010) (holding that consumers are more likely to be confused about the 
source of free online news about college sports because they won’t exercise much 
source-related care in searching for that news). 
198 See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 32, at 440-41 (“[S]ponsorship and affiliation 
cases may be more likely to reach the wrong result than other types of trademark in-
fringement cases. . . . [Multifactor likelihood-of-confusion] tests were designed to deal 
with cases . . . in which consumers might believe that the plaintiff is responsible for 
quality, and few of the factors make much sense when the issue is confusion about 
some unspecified sponsorship or affiliation relationship.”); Mark P. McKenna, Trade-
mark Use and the Problem of Source, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 773, 823-24 (“‘Sponsorship’ and 
‘affiliation’ are broad enough concepts to encompass virtually any imaginable relation-
ship between entities . . . . And because modern trademark law regards confusion itself 
as the relevant harm, it has no principled way to distinguish confusion regarding dif-
ferent relationships.”). 
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for using another’s mark to gain attention.199  The doctrine’s roots in 
the prohibition on bait-and-switch advertising make sense—there are 
reasons that a consumer, once drawn into a decisionmaking process, 
might not back out even when the offered product or service turns out 
not to be what she expected—but courts have gone well beyond that 
core understanding.200  Materiality should be something more than 
but-for causation; if all uses of others’ marks to get attention were 
deemed to cause initial interest confusion, then standard practices 
such as comparative advertising and selling used goods would be 
banned.  Merely getting a consumer to contemplate entering into a 
transaction should not be equated to actionable confusion, especially 
online, where backing out of a bait-and-switch is much easier. 
Even without initial interest confusion, sad stories of overclaiming 
by trademark owners abound.201  One example from the false endorse-
ment context encapsulates the perverse effects of trademark’s aban-
donment of materiality.  In Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., the estate of 
John Facenda, a legendary sportscaster, sued NFL Films over a cable 
TV show, The Making of Madden NFL 06, which promoted the video 
game Madden NFL 06.202  The show used thirteen seconds of Facen-
da’s voice reading the following statements:  “Pro Football, the game 
for the ear and the eye”; “This sport is more than spectacle, it is a 
 
199 See, e.g., Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 
1062-63 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding the defendant liable for creating “initial interest con-
fusion” by using the plaintiff’s website in its metatag terms and by diverting people to 
its website through confusion about the domain name). 
200 See, e.g., Ross D. Petty, Initial Interest Confusion Versus Consumer Sovereignty:  A Con-
sumer Protection Perspective on Trademark Infringement, 98 TRADEMARK REP. 757, 786-87 
(2008) (defending an initial interest confusion doctrine limited to cases in which decep-
tion is costly to avoid or bait-and-switch takes place but critiquing its use in other, increa-
singly common situations); Jennifer E. Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion:  Standing at the 
Crossroads of Trademark Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 105, 121-22 (2005) (critiquing courts’ 
expansive use of initial interest confusion where there’s no likely confusion); Priya Singh, 
Note, Abolish Trademark Law’s Initial Interest Confusion and Permit Manipulative Internet 
Search Practices, 3 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 15, 16 (2009) (“Initial interest confu-
sion is a doctrine that is flawed because it does not require a showing of likelihood of 
confusion, it is superfluous and inefficient, and it is also unnecessary in the Internet con-
text; thus, courts should not utilize it in evaluating trademark infringement.”).  
201 See, e.g., Lemley & McKenna, supra note 32, at 416-18 (describing Little League 
teams, among others, as recipients of cease and desist letters); McGeveran, supra note 
32, at 63-66, 70-71 (providing examples showing how current trademark law makes 
markholders aggressive even with frivolous claims, encourages platforms for expression 
such as Google and Second Life to be risk averse, and saddles defendants with enorm-
ous speech-deterring litigation costs). 
202 542 F.3d 1007, 1011 (3d Cir. 2008). 
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game for all seasons”; and “X’s and O’s on the blackboard are trans-
lated into aggression on the field.”203 
The Third Circuit, where the estate brought its claim, treats false 
endorsement as a violation of section 43(a)(1)(A).204  The problem is 
that false endorsement claims are a terrible fit with the usual multi-
factor likelihood-of-confusion test, which prioritizes considerations 
such as the relatedness of the parties’ goods and services.  An endorser 
can endorse just about anything—as Tiger Woods and many other ce-
lebrities have demonstrated.205  Rather than use section 43(a)(1)(B) 
analysis, which would have included materiality, the Facenda court de-
cided to “tailor[]” a new false endorsement test focusing on the plain-
tiff’s fame, the relatedness of the fame to the defendant’s product, 
and the similarity of the defendant’s use to the plaintiff’s likeness, 
among other factors.206 
Treating false endorsement as a variation of trademark infringe-
ment also meant that the estate wasn’t required to show evidence of 
likely confusion.  The court noted that survey evidence is “expensive 
and difficult to obtain” and didn’t want to penalize plaintiffs for its ab-
sence.207  Thus, without any evidence of actual confusion over whether 
Facenda (who was, of course, dead) endorsed the TV show—much 
less the video game—and without any evidence that Facenda’s (es-
tate’s) endorsement would matter to consumers, the plaintiff was able 
to extract a payment from the National Football League (NFL) based 
on the NFL’s use of recordings to which it held the copyright.  The 
absence of a materiality inquiry snowballed into a finding of likely 
confusion over endorsement. 
Only occasionally do traces of materiality resurface in trademark 
cases.  In Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., involving a de-
fendant that copied a film series in the public domain and put its own 
name on the series, the Supreme Court provided a foundation for res-
toring materiality when it pronounced that “[t]he words of the Lan-
ham Act should not be stretched to cover matters that are typically of 
 
203 Id. at 1012. 
204 Id. at 1014. 
205 See id. at 1019 (“Rather than protecting its mark with respect to a particular prod-
uct, the Estate seeks to reserve the exclusive right to grant or deny permission to those 
who wish to use Facenda’s voice to promote unspecified products in the future.”). 
206 Id. at 1019-20. 
207 Id. at 1020.  By contrast, courts apparently do want to penalize false advertising 
plaintiffs in cases of misleading advertising for a lack of survey data.  See supra note 129 
and accompanying text.  
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no consequence to purchasers.”208  In that case, the Court considered 
the definition of “origin” in the statute and reasoned that consumers 
typically do not care about the source of the idea or formula under-
lying a product, treating materiality at a very high level of generality.209  
In more exotic cases, especially those involving expressive works, courts 
also sometimes use lack of materiality as an extra reason to justify a 
decision.  In a case finding abandonment of the Amos ‘n’ Andy marks, 
for example, the court reasoned that patrons of Broadway shows 
based on Amos ‘n’ Andy were unlikely to care about who produced the 
original radio plays.210  Any confusion over source or sponsorship in a 
situation where consumers just want the expressive product would 
thus be immaterial.211 
In early 2011, the Ninth Circuit revitalized an earlier case, Interna-
tional Order of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., which found that 
trademarks were not being used as marks, but were aesthetically func-
tional, in instances where consumers wanted to display the marks as 
 
208 539 U.S. 23, 26-27, 32-33 (2003). 
209 Id. at 31-32. 
210 Silverman v. CBS, Inc., 870 F.2d 40, 48-49 (2d Cir. 1989).  The court further 
explained, 
 The interest of CBS, and the public, in avoiding public confusion . . . [is] al-
so somewhat diminished in the context of this case. . . . [M]ost theater-goers 
have sufficient awareness that the quality of a musical depends so heavily on a 
combination of circumstances, including script, score, lyrics, cast, and direc-
tion, that they are not likely to be significantly influenced in their ticket-
purchasing decision by an erroneous belief that the musical emanated from 
the same production source as the underlying work. 
Id. 
211 See, e.g., King v. Ames, 179 F.3d 370, 372, 374-75 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that 
false identification of the defendant as a producer on the back of blues CDs was not 
actionable because it was not material to consumers); WCVB-TV v. Bos. Athletic Ass’n, 
926 F.2d 42, 45-46 (1st Cir. 1991) (rejecting the Boston Marathon’s false endorsement 
claim based on a television station’s broadcast of the marathon because “one would 
ordinarily believe that television viewers (unlike sports fans who might want to buy an 
official t-shirt with the name of a favorite event, team or player) wish to see the event 
and do not particularly care about the relation of station to event-promoter”); Univ. of 
Ala. Bd. of Trs. v. New Life Art Inc., 677 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1246, 1250 (N.D. Ala. 2009) 
(concluding that the artist’s talent and reputation, rather than University of Alabama’s 
trade dress in its football uniforms, drove sales of the artist’s paintings of football 
games); Caterpillar Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 287 F. Supp. 2d 913, 920 (C.D. Ill. 2003) 
(finding it unlikely that consumers are more apt to watch or buy a movie because of a 
mistaken belief as to sponsorship); cf. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1000 (2d Cir. 
1989) (holding that consumers “do not regard titles of artistic works in the same way as 
the names of ordinary commercial products,” so that confusion engendered by a title is 
less weighty than confusion engendered by an ordinary product name). 
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signs of allegiance rather than as indicators of source.212  The new 
case, Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., reached the same conclu-
sion with respect to T-shirts and similar items featuring the image of 
Betty Boop.213  The court in Job’s Daughters determined that a product 
feature is functional when the feature is what consumers want to pur-
chase, regardless of its source.214  One way of thinking about aesthetic 
functionality is thus that, for functional features, the source is not ma-
terial to a reasonable consumer as a matter of law.215  In Fleischer, im-
ages of Betty Boop incorporated into the products were functional giv-
en that the products sold because they featured images of Betty Boop, 
regardless of source.216  Notably, the court cited Dastar, with its mate-
riality reasoning, in support of its conclusion.217 
Other than that, materiality is a sport, popping up almost randomly 
to bolster noninfringement findings.  In one trade dress case, the 
plaintiff argued that it was error to ignore testimony from a consumer 
who testified that she was confused about the source of the defen-
dant’s products.218  But that consumer also testified that she usually 
didn’t pay attention to brands.219  Relying on a treatise, rather than on 
any marketplace evidence, the court held that such brand-indifferent 
consumers are “few” and unrepresentative.220  As a matter of law, their 
 
212 633 F.2d 912, 920 (9th Cir. 1980). 
213 No. 09-56317, 2011 WL 631449, at *7 (9th Cir. Feb. 23, 2011). 
214 See Job’s Daughters, 633 F.2d at 917 (“Trademark law does not prevent a person 
from copying so-called ‘functional’ features of a product which constitute the actual 
benefit that the consumer wishes to purchase, as distinguished from an assurance that 
a particular entity made, sponsored, or endorsed a product.”). 
215 The court explained that the jewelry was being sold for its innate value rather 
than as a source designator. 
We commonly identify ourselves by displaying emblems expressing allegiances.  
Our jewelry, clothing, and cars are emblazoned with inscriptions showing the 
organizations we belong to, the schools we attend, the landmarks we have  
visited, the sports teams we support, the beverages we imbibe.  Although these 
inscriptions frequently include names and emblems that are also used as collec-
tive marks or trademarks, it would be naive to conclude that the name or emb-
lem is desired because consumers believe that the product somehow originated 
with or was sponsored by the organization the name or emblem signifies.  
Id. at 918 (emphasis added). 
216 2011 WL 631449, at *7. 
217 Id. at *7-8. 
218 McNeil Nutritionals, LLC v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 511 F.3d 350, 366 (3d 
Cir. 2007). 
219 Id. 
220 Id. 
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responses don’t count in the likelihood-of-confusion inquiry, since 
they won’t act on their confusion.221 
In one respect, materiality retains some force when it comes to 
products or services with limited customer bases.  Courts routinely de-
mand a showing of confusion among “relevant” consumers.222  People 
who are simply unlikely to make any purchasing decision at all about a 
product or service may be confused, but their confusion has no impact, 
and therefore courts disregard their opinions.223  This is a sub rosa ap-
plication of materiality concepts224 and the extent of the attention paid 
to materiality outside of cases involving expressive works. 
As a final irony, materiality does matter when the Patent and 
Trademark Office (PTO) assesses whether to register a trademark.  
Even if the trademark makes a false factual claim, that will only bar 
registration if the falsity is material.225  This result is consistent with 
false advertising law and makes registration—which provides trade-
mark owners with a number of benefits—easier.  As part of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) amendments, Congress 
attempted to remove materiality in one particular respect, making it 
impossible to register marks containing nonmaterial but nonetheless 
 
221 Id.; cf. Lee et al., supra note 196, at 584 (“[A] consumer who believes that ‘all 
ketchup is the same’ is unlikely to bother making a source-identification judgment 
when purchasing ketchup.  Furthermore, if the consumer believes that product quality 
can be fully and easily judged, a shortcut for product evaluation is not useful to the 
consumer, so she is unlikely to perform the source-identification judgment.”). 
222 See, e.g., Havana Club Holding, S.A. v. Galleon S.A., 203 F.3d 116, 131-32 (2d 
Cir. 2000); Weight Watchers Int’l, Inc. v. Stouffer Corp., 744 F. Supp. 1259, 1272-73 
(S.D.N.Y. 1990); Frisch’s Rest., Inc. v. Elby’s Big Boy of Steubenville, Inc., 661 F. Supp. 
971, 982 (S.D. Ohio 1987), aff’d, 849 F.2d 1012 (6th Cir. 1988). 
223 See, e.g., Custom Mfg. & Eng’g, Inc. v. Midway Servs., Inc., 508 F.3d 641, 650-51 
(11th Cir. 2007) (finding that although repair technicians and fire marshals might 
open water meters and mistake the origin of circuit boards’ manufacture, they were 
not likely consumers of the circuit boards and therefore their confusion was irrele-
vant); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., 746 F.2d 112, 118 (2d Cir. 1984) 
(concluding that current video game owners were not an acceptable population for a 
survey because they weren’t asked whether they were likely to make future purchases); 
Bracco Diagnostics, Inc. v. Amersham Health, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 2d 384, 447 (D.N.J. 
2009) (striking testimony and survey data because survey responses from those not re-
sponsible for purchasing decisions were not relevant). 
224 See Michael Grynberg, Things Are Worse Than We Think: Trademark Defenses in a 
“Formalist” Age, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 897, 964 (2009) (“We worry about whether ‘rea-
sonably prudent purchasers exercising ordinary care’ would be confused in part be-
cause theirs is the confusion that has a marketplace impact.” (footnote omitted)). 
225 See In re Budge Mfg. Co., 857 F.2d 773, 775 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (focusing on wheth-
er the misdescription is likely to affect the decision to purchase); see also In re Spirits 
Int’l, N.V., 563 F.3d 1347, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding that a “substantial portion” of 
the relevant consuming public must be likely to be deceived to bar registration). 
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false indications of geographic origin.226  In response, the Federal Cir-
cuit read the Lanham Act to contain a presumption favoring registra-
tion so strongly that the new statutory language ended up making it 
easier than it had been before the amendments to register geographi-
cally deceptively misdescriptive marks, such as “California Innova-
tions” for products not made or designed in California.227 
The only case in which materiality doesn’t matter in registration is 
when a trademark owner alleges that an applicant’s mark is likely to 
cause confusion with the trademark owner’s preexisting mark.  Trade-
marks misleading in this one respect cannot be registered at all, regard-
less of materiality.  The Federal Circuit’s solicitude for trademark own-
ers, though inconsistent with Congress’s intent in the particular 
instance of geographically deceptively misdescriptive trademarks, thus 
fits the overall theme:  trademarks are to be protected even if such 
protection doesn’t protect consumers. 
C.  Ending the Materiality Divide 
As Graeme Austin recently argued, “as a legal policy matter, equat-
ing trademark rights with what consumers might become confused 
about cannot be sufficient.  Trademark rights need to be shaped by 
other legal principles, values, and agendas.”228  A restored materiality 
requirement would require courts to consider why (or when) confu-
sion is harmful.  Even from the perspective of the trademark owner or 
competitor, materiality indicates when a falsehood creates the kind of 
harm targeted by the law, as opposed to merely insulting the competi-
tor or, in the case of trademark, free-riding on the trademark owner’s 
existence. 
 
226 North American Free Trade Agreement art. 1712, done Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 
605 (1993); North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 
103-182, § 333, 107 Stat. 2057, 2114 (1993) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052, 
1091 (2006)). 
227 See In re Cal. Innovations, Inc., 329 F.3d 1334, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding 
that the new absolute ban on the registration of geographically deceptively misdescrip-
tive marks, as opposed to the prior rule allowing registration upon a showing of sec-
ondary meaning, meant that the PTO would now have to show that the mark was ma-
terially deceptive to impose the heavy sanction of complete nonregistrability).  The 
decision has received compelling criticism.  See, e.g., Mary LaFrance, Innovations Palpi-
tations:  The Confusing Status of Geographically Misdescriptive Trademarks, 12 J. INTELL. 
PROP. L. 125, 141-47 (2004) (arguing that the court’s holding was inconsistent with 
both the text and the legislative history of the NAFTA registration amendments).  
228 Austin, supra note 126, at 175. 
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1.  The Difference Materiality Makes in Practice 
There are several clear examples of the powerful effect a materiality 
requirement has on trademark or trademark-like claims, limiting 
them to cases in which consumers are actually harmed.  This subsec-
tion discusses false credit, comparative advertising, and an unusual re-
cent case highlighting just how much more expansive trademark law 
has become compared to false advertising law. 
False credit claims, in which a plaintiff argues that credit for a 
product or service has been misallocated to the plaintiff’s detriment, 
provide a natural experiment illustrating the importance of materiali-
ty in cabining expansive trademark claims.  False advertising plaintiffs 
do badly with mere credit claims, which are rarely material to the pur-
chasing public.  For example, when an advertiser copied a picture of a 
competitor’s component and overlaid its own logo on the picture, the 
court found no likelihood of deception because the components were 
quite similar and the photo was insufficiently detailed to reveal the ac-
tual differences.229  When a creative plaintiff alleged that failure to 
credit him as the source of an idea constituted false advertising, 
another court found that the failure was immaterial because there was 
no evidence that customers cared at all about who originated the 
idea.230  Likewise, falsely marketing a product as patented has some-
times been immaterial to consumers.231 
Plaintiffs were therefore well advised to bring materiality-free 
trademark claims in such circumstances, and often did.232  As noted 
 
229 Compaq Computer Corp. v. Procom Tech, Inc., 908 F. Supp. 1409, 1426-27 
(S.D. Tex. 1995).  Under other circumstances, using a picture of a competitor’s prod-
uct to advertise one’s own product is usually prohibited as “passing off,” a trademark 
concept.  See, e.g., Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1216 (8th 
Cir. 1976) (finding a false designation of origin actionable under the Lanham Act). 
230 See Brown v. Armstrong, 957 F. Supp. 1293, 1303 (D. Mass. 1997) (“Plaintiffs 
have presented no evidence that customers cared at all who the originator was, let 
alone that anyone based or would base their purchasing decision on such belief.”). 
231 See Appliance Recycling Ctrs. of Am., Inc. v. JACO Envtl., Inc., 378 F. App’x 
652, 655 (9th Cir. 2010) (concluding that allegedly false statements about the defen-
dant’s claims to have patented a method were not material and thus could not have 
caused actionable injury to the plaintiff); Forest Grp., Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., No. 05-
4127, 2008 WL 2962206, at *7-8 (S.D. Tex. July 29, 2008) (holding that falsely market-
ing a product as patented without making comparisons to a competitor’s product does 
not warrant a presumption of harm), vacated in part on other grounds, 590 F.3d 1295 
(Fed. Cir. 2009). 
232 See, e.g., Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 606-07 (9th Cir. 1981) (focusing on 
the deprivation of the advertising value that would stem from public knowledge of the 
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above, however, the Supreme Court in the Dastar case largely cut off 
the trademark branch of Lanham Act liability for false attribution, 
holding that “origin” in the Lanham Act referred to physical origin, 
not to the origin of ideas or expression contained in a product or ser-
vice.233  The Supreme Court also held out the prospect that some false 
attributions could be successfully attacked as false advertising.234  None-
theless, lower courts have applied Dastar aggressively,235 even in cases 
that do not involve copyrighted works,236 precluding many types of 
false attribution claims.  In the end, very few plaintiffs have successfully 
maintained false attribution claims under the head of false advertis-
 
good instead of materiality); Gilliam v. ABC, 538 F.2d 14, 24-25 (2d Cir. 1976) (focus-
ing on the impairment of appellant’s work instead of materiality).  
233 When the Dastar Court reasoned that the origin of ideas or expression is not 
typically material to consumers of ordinary goods or services, it did so even though 
plaintiffs usually brought false attribution claims over expressive goods like movies and 
books, and even though it acknowledged that consumers are more likely to care about 
the intangible “source” of such goods.  Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film 
Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 32-37 (2003). 
234 See id. at 38 (“If, moreover, the producer of a video that substantially copied 
[the work] were, in advertising or promotion, to give purchasers the impression that 
[the work] was quite different from [that work], then one or more of the respondents 
might have a cause of action . . . for misrepresentation under . . . § 43(a)(1)(B).”). 
235 See Jane C. Ginsburg, The Right to Claim Authorship in U.S. Copyright and Trade-
marks Law, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 263, 268 n.17 (2004) (“Federal district court decisions 
subsequent to Dastar have declined to limit that decision’s impact to copyright-expired 
works.”); see also, e.g., Broughel v. Battery Conservancy, No. 07-7755, 2010 WL 1028171, 
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2010) (“[N]o claim for false advertising will stand where the 
statements of which a plaintiff complains is directed at the authorship of a work.”); La-
pine v. Seinfeld, No. 08-0128, 2009 WL 2902584, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2009) (bar-
ring a false advertising claim over misattribution of source as to the ideas and the ex-
pression in a cookbook), aff’d, 375 F. App’x 81 (2d Cir. 2010); Antidote Int’l Films, 
Inc. v. Bloomsbury Publ’g, PLC, 467 F. Supp. 2d 394, 398-99 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (rejecting 
a Lanham Act false advertising cause of action for false claims about who wrote a book 
and that person’s biographical background). 
236 See, e.g., Baden Sports, Inc. v. Molten USA, Inc., 556 F.3d 1300, 1306-08 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009) (barring claims based on representations that technology was “exclusive,” 
“proprietary,” and “innovative” because such claims relate to the nature of the prod-
ucts themselves and not their creators); Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., No. 08-
0542, 2009 WL 3366967, at *1 (D. Del. Oct. 19, 2009) (rejecting claims based on 
statements that defendant’s “expertise” was the source of “new and improved” tech-
nology, when in fact plaintiff developed the technology); Richardson v. Stanley Works, 
Inc., No. 08-1040, 2008 WL 4838708, at *2 (D. Ariz. Nov. 6, 2008) (refusing to enter-
tain claims for reverse passing off based on statements about ownership of patented 
product design because such claim is not one of bodily appropriation); Invista S.A.R.L. 
v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., No. 08-7270, 2008 WL 4865208, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 
3, 2008) (barring claims based on alleged origin of technical process because they do 
not relate to the qualities of the process itself); Thomas Publ’g Co. v. Tech. Evaluation 
Ctrs., Inc., No. 06-14212, 2007 WL 2193964, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2007) (dismissing 
claims based on alleged origin of services). 
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ing, and materiality is a significant barrier.237  It is often quite difficult 
to allege with any plausibility that the presence or absence of attribu-
tion to a particular, but usually not well-known, person would influ-
ence a consumer to purchase the product or service at issue. 
Materiality is also a vital factor in protecting comparative advertis-
ing.  Trademark doctrine channeled challenges to comparative adver-
tising—“this product is as good as Brand Name product”—into false 
advertising law long ago, refusing to allow trademark owners to argue 
infringement when the comparison between the parties’ products was 
clear.238  As long as the comparison is not materially false, it is legiti-
 
237 See, e.g., Forest Grp., Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., No. 05-4127, 2008 WL 2962206, at *7-
8 (S.D. Tex. July 29, 2008) (holding that plaintiff failed to establish materiality and 
granting judgment to defendant even though plaintiff had established that defen-
dant’s statements in advertising were false), vacated in part on other grounds, 590 F.3d 
1295 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Wilchcombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 2d 1297, 1306 
(N.D. Ga. 2007) (enumerating the deficiencies in plaintiff’s claim, including the lack 
of evidence of materiality), aff’d, 555 F.3d 949 (11th Cir. 2009).  The other barriers to 
successfully maintaining a false advertising claim are standing, discussed infra Part IV, 
and the statutory requirement that a false statement be made in “commercial advertising 
or promotion” in order to fall within section 43(a)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) 
(2006).  Even when a plaintiff might be able to show materiality, an attribution claim 
often fails on one of these other elements.  See, e.g., Ott v. Ingenix, Inc., No. 07-0201, 
2008 WL 4459411, at *1-2 (E.D. Wash. Sept. 30, 2008) (standing), aff’d, 333 F. App’x 
342 (9th Cir. 2009); Landrau v. Solis-Betancourt, 554 F. Supp. 2d 117, 123-24 (D.P.R. 
2008) (commercial advertising or promotion); Wilchcombe, 515 F. Supp. 2d at 1306-07 
(standing, commercial advertising or promotion, and damage, in addition to materi-
ality).  For a rare successful claim of false advertising in designating creative origin, see 
Societe Civile Succession Richard Guino v. Beseder Inc., No. 03-1310, 2007 WL 3238703, at 
*4-7 (D. Ariz. Oct. 31, 2007), aff’d sub nom. Societe Civile Succession Richard Guino v. 
Renoir, 305 F. App’x 334 (9th Cir. 2008), involving the works of a famous sculptor. 
238 See, e.g., Calvin Klein Cosmetics Corp. v. Lenox Labs., Inc., 815 F.2d 500, 503-04 
(8th Cir. 1987) (holding that an imitator may use an originator’s trademark as long as 
it is not likely to create confusion); Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 563 (9th Cir. 
1968) (holding that one can use the trademark of an unpatented product to identify 
her own copy of the unpatented product); Sykes Lab., Inc. v. Kalvin, 610 F. Supp. 849, 
854 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (reiterating the rule that one who duplicates an unpatented 
product sold under a trademark can use that trademark to advertise the copy).  See gen-
erally Mark P. McKenna, An Alternate Approach to Channeling?, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
873 (2009) (discussing the need to establish and police the boundaries between differ-
ent types of intellectual property claims).  Relatedly, attention to channeling, such that 
invocation of section 43(a)(1)(A) or section 43(a)(1)(B) would lead to the same re-
sult, might have helped the court in Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc.  In that case, the 
Second Circuit ruled that eBay couldn’t be held contributorily liable for encouraging 
trademark infringement by sellers of counterfeit Tiffany jewelry, but, in remanding the 
case, the court also ruled that eBay’s use of “Tiffany” in ads could be false advertising, 
even though eBay did offer authentic Tiffany jewelry.  600 F.3d 93, 109, 114 (2d Cir. 
2010).  Despite having a wholly legitimate business model, eBay still might not be able 
to advertise.  This confusing ruling likely added hundreds of thousands of dollars to 
the parties’ legal bills, but doesn’t seem to offer an extra benefit to consumers.  Tiffany 
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mate.  European law takes a different view.  Despite some liberaliza-
tion in continental Europe, courts still easily find that comparative ad-
vertising is an illegal exploitation of the value of a trademark.239  The 
United States, however, has generally taken the position that when a 
trademark’s scope reaches beyond deception to attention, consumers 
lose valuable and relevant information.240  The rule that comparisons 
are actionable only when they constitute materially false claims pre-
serves competition and helps prevent trademark rights from becom-
ing full-scale property rights in reputation. 
One recent case further demonstrates the power of materiality as 
applied to what might have been a standard trademark case.  In Green 
Bullion Financial Services, LLC v. Money4Gold Holdings, Inc., the plaintiff 
had built a substantial business as Cash4Gold.241  Money4Gold’s inter-
net ads took Cash4Gold’s advertising efforts and brand and attributed 
them to Money4Gold.242  For example, one Money4Gold ad on Google 
asked whether consumers had seen Money4Gold’s Super Bowl com-
mercial, failing to note that Cash4Gold had run that ad.243  The court 
explained that “other websites placed by Defendant’s sub-affiliates di-
rectly stole Plaintiff’s operating name and logo.  Clicking on these 
sites would direct consumers to Defendant’s website.”244 
Cash4Gold’s trademark claims failed because it couldn’t show that 
its trademark had acquired protectable secondary meaning at the time 
of Money4Gold’s ads.245  Cash4Gold tried to get around the trademark 
problem by pleading false advertising.246  The court easily held that the 
“See our Super Bowl Ad?” ads were literally false, as were the ads con-
taining Cash4Gold’s name, because they “impl[ied]” (necessarily) that 
plaintiff was the operator of the advertised sites.247  The court also 
 
(NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., No. 04-4607, 2010 WL 3733894, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2010) 
(finding that Tiffany failed to prove that eBay’s ads were false or misleading about the 
availability of authentic Tiffany jewelry on the site). 
239 See Charlotte J. Romano, Comparative Advertising in the United States and in France, 
25 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 371, 399-400 (2005) (discussing the extra caution necessary 
on behalf of advertisers in France because of strict rules regarding comparative adver-
tising campaigns). 
240 See id. (comparing U.S. and French law regarding trademark exploitation). 
241 639 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1359 (S.D. Fla. 2009). 
242 Id. 
243 Id. 
244 Id. 
245 See id. at 1364-65. 
246 Id. at 1365. 
247 Id. at 1366. 
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found that, because of the literal falsity, consumer deception could be 
presumed.248  The barrier was materiality.  The court apparently as-
sumed that materiality would have come only from secondary mean-
ing—a consumer’s expectation of doing business with the entity known 
as Cash4Gold—and thus concluded that failure to show secondary 
meaning left the plaintiff with no evidence of materiality.249 
2.  Restoring Materiality to Rationalize the Law 
It is time to return materiality to the role it played in trademark’s 
earlier development, when it was implicit in court holdings.  As a mat-
ter of doctrine, courts could revitalize materiality by relying on the 
Supreme Court’s statement in Dastar that the Lanham Act shouldn’t 
be stretched to cover matters of no consequence to consumers and by 
pulling together the other remaining strands of materiality (including 
the requirement that surveys look at the reactions of likely purchas-
ers) discussed in Section III.B above. 
Materiality has some advantages over other proposals that seek to 
cabin the irrational and anticompetitive expansion of trademark liabil-
ity.  For example, some scholars have appealed to a nascent doctrine of 
“trademark use” to limit anticompetitive and speech-suppressing 
claims.250  I generally support this endeavor as a practical matter.  But 
 
248 Id. 
249 Id.  This was probably a mistake, since consumers could well be harmed by the 
confusion.  Some courts have found “As Seen on TV” to be material, though in such 
cases secondary meaning was not separately litigated.  See, e.g., Telebrands Corp. v. Wil-
ton Indus., Inc., 983 F. Supp. 471, 475-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“It is television advertising 
that actually creates the desire for the product in the mind of the consumer.”); Project 
Strategies Corp. v. Nat’l Commc’ns Corp., No. 94-4925, 1995 WL 669655, at *4 
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 1995) (finding the statement in question to be material because it 
was likely to cause consumers to identify the defendant’s product with the plaintiff’s, 
which actually had been advertised on television).  “As Seen on TV” may be material in 
itself because it indicates a sort of reproductive fitness:  this company is successful 
enough to advertise on TV and thus is not a fly-by-night operation.  See, e.g., BeVier, 
supra note 19, at 10 (explaining the economic theory according to which advertisers 
use the high costs of advertising to signal to consumers that their products are good 
and successful); Jean Wegman Burns, Confused Jurisprudence:  False Advertising Under the 
Lanham Act, 79 B.U. L. REV. 807, 826 & n.88 (1999) (same).  Indeed, the Green Bullion 
court noted in its recitation of the facts how unusual it is for a new company to be able 
to afford a Super Bowl ad.  See Green Bullion, 639 F. Supp. 2d at 1360 (“In fact, Plaintiff 
was the only company of its kind to advertise in a nationally broadcast commercial in 
this year’s Super Bowl, an achievement recognized as stunning . . . .”).  
250 See generally Margreth Barrett, Finding Trademark Use:  The Historical Foundation 
for Limiting Infringement Liability to Uses “in the Manner of a Mark,” 43 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 893 (2008); Dogan & Lemley, supra note 32; Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, 
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as Mark McKenna has argued, asking whether a defendant is using a 
term “as a mark” can too readily be collapsed into a question of whether 
consumers are confused.251  If consumers think that a particular in-
stance of a mark is an indication of source or sponsorship, then, by 
definition, they think that the defendant is using a term as a mark—
even if the defendant is only using it as a reference point.252  Materiality 
offers a way to cut some of the loops of this Gordian knot by asking 
the separate question of whether consumers care whether a particular 
use of a trademark is made with the permission of the trademark 
owner.  Often, they do not.253 
Materiality already has a substantial history, as well as a current 
presence, in the jurisprudence of the Lanham Act, and there is no 
reason to confine it to false advertising.  The language of both section 
43(a)(1)(A) and section 43(a)(1)(B) speaks of confusion and decep-
tion, not materiality.  If courts imply a materiality requirement for 
false advertising, they should do so for trademark as well.254  Presump-
tions for and against materiality would be similar to other distinctions 
 
The Trademark Use Requirement in Dilution Cases, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH 
TECH. L.J. 541 (2008). 
251 See McKenna, supra note 198, at 775-76. 
252 Id. at 816-19.  Trademark plaintiffs have pushed this point too far:  believing that 
a defendant has permission from a trademark owner to use a mark is not the same as be-
lieving that the trademark owner endorses or sponsors the defendant, though courts 
have sometimes treated all these concepts as interchangeable. 
253 James Gibson agrees with this view of consumer preference as to sponsorship 
or affiliation: 
No one watches the Olympics simply because Xerox happens to be the spon-
sor.  And few people (if any) select the movies they see or television programs 
they watch based on what products appear in them, even if they assume that 
the appearances are licensed. . . . [F]ailure to emphasize the “official” nature 
of the endorsed products would suggest that the endorsement provides little 
market advantage. Likewise, when the endorsement is highlighted but sales 
nonetheless reflect no premium for “official” merchandise, the endorsement 
would seem immaterial to purchasing decisions. 
Gibson, supra note 191, at 949; see also Lunney, supra note 193, at 397-98 (“[C]onsumers 
will likely place little value on that information in making a decision whether to pur-
chase . . . .”); Gerald T. Tschura, Likelihood of Confusion and Expressive Functionality:  A 
Fresh Look at the Ornamental Use of Institutional Colors, Names and Emblems on Apparel and 
Other Goods, 53 WAYNE L. REV. 873, 885 (2007) (arguing that consumers’ opinions on 
whether permission is required are generally immaterial to purchases and should be 
disregarded unless material). 
254 See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 32, at 450 (“[C]ourts have already had to 
engage in similar legerdemain in interpreting subsection (B) but not (A) of the Act to 
require materiality; they could easily require it in some subsection (A) cases as well.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
TUSHNET REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/13/2011  1:30 PM 
2011] Running the Gamut from A to B 1367 
that courts—including the Supreme Court—have made on many oc-
casions when interpreting the Lanham Act.255  Such interpretive moves 
would fit well with the historical practice of adding common law 
glosses to other competition-related statutes, such as the Sherman 
Act.256  Requiring materiality would also conform trademark law with 
other regulations of deceptive conduct in the marketplace, most not-
ably securities law.257 
Deception over immaterial factual matter is simply not actionable 
under present case law unless that immaterial matter involves a trade-
mark.  This is illogical, inconsistent, and—not incidentally—damaging 
to free speech and free competition.  Asking courts to routinely con-
sider materiality using the common-sense heuristics and marketplace 
evidence on which they have regularly relied in false advertising cases 
would be a major step to rein in trademark claims that do not promote 
consumer welfare.  Among other things, materiality would provide 
courts with a gauge of when they ought to disregard consumer survey 
evidence or other evidence of confusion.  As noted above, courts in 
false advertising cases sometimes use materiality to determine when a 
claim is so baffling or irrelevant to consumers that, even if their res-
ponses indicate confusion, the only result if misunderstanding, with no 
effect on the external world.  In such cases, false advertising claims fail.  
We should treat trademark claims similarly.258 
 
255 See Margreth Barrett, A Cause of Action for “Passing Off/Associational Marketing,” 1 IP 
THEORY 1 (2010), http://scholarworks.iu.edu/journals/index.php/ipt/article/view/846 
(arguing that adding limits on trademark claims is consistent with case law and legisla-
tive history); Lemley & McKenna, supra note 32, at 449 (noting that courts have made 
similar distinctions not specifically set out in the Lanham Act, such as setting specific re-
quirements for trade dress and for misrepresentations about authorship).  
256 Cf. Daniel A. Farber & Brett H. McDonnell, “Is There a Text in This Class?”  The 
Conflict Between Textualism and Antitrust, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 619, 620-22, 624-27 
(2005) (describing how courts’ and economists’ policy concerns have largely driven anti-
trust law, rather than the text of the Sherman Act, Clayton Act, and other competition 
statutes); David McGowan, Innovation, Uncertainty, and Stability in Antitrust Law, 16 BERKE-
LEY TECH. L.J. 729, 739, 741-42, 753-55 (2001) (“Judges have long concluded that the 
Sherman Act gives them common-law authority to interpret the statute in a dynamic 
manner, taking changes in economic practices and understanding into account.”). 
257 See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (holding that a 
“fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would 
consider it important in deciding how to vote”).  
258 Though trademark theorists often speak in terms of “search costs,” the harm at 
issue in Lanham Act cases involves distorted decisions, not mere mistaken or distracted 
mental operations.  We lack any coherent idea of what harm consumers suffer from 
“thinking harder” about some decision if their ultimate actions remain the same or 
change because, having thought harder, they decide that they have different prefe-
rences.  See Tushnet, supra note 194, at 529 & n.106, 559-60. 
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Materiality would also allow courts to consider when sponsorships 
or licensing arrangements are important to consumers.  Franchising 
relationships offer an easy example:  though individual franchises—
like many fast food restaurants—may be separately owned, the brand 
is promoted as a unitary entity.  The trademark owner exercises quality 
control over the franchisees, and consumers want the food at a 
McDonald’s in Florida to be the same as the food at a McDonald’s in 
California.  The individual franchisee’s authorization to use the mark 
is therefore material to a purchasing decision, most obviously to a 
consumer’s decision whether to patronize a McDonald’s that she has 
never before visited.259  Unsurprisingly, “McDonald’s” is the primary 
and most prominent mark used at a given location, and a franchisee is 
unlikely to display its own name in any particularly obvious way (and 
the franchisor may even constrain its ability to do so in order to avoid 
sharing any of its goodwill with the franchisee).  But mere permissive 
or incidental uses of trademarks in many other litigated contexts have 
none of that logic supporting a materiality conclusion. 
3.  Details of Implementation 
Proof of materiality would differ from proof of likely confusion.  
From a marketing perspective, one might ask whether more consumers 
would buy, or would generally pay more for, a product or service based 
on the belief that there is an affiliation, endorsement, or source rela-
tionship with the trademark owner.260  A well-controlled analysis could 
capture effects of which consumers were unaware, testing marketers’ 
theories that branding provides their products with an advantage in the 
consumer’s subconscious.  Willingness to pay more for the product with 
the accused use of the mark than the product without such use would 
be strong evidence of materiality,261 as would the ability to capture 
greater market share.  The latter measure would be particularly helpful 
in cases where prices are fairly standardized but where it is still possible 
 
259 See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 32, at 428, 432 (arguing that confusion over 
sponsorship or affiliation is only significant to consumers under certain circumstances, 
such as the McDonald’s example); McKenna, supra note 198, at 827-28 (pointing out 
that broad definitions of “source” or “sponsorship” sometimes do comport with con-
sumer expectations). 
260 See, e.g., Christoph Breidert et al., A Review of Methods for Measuring Willingness-to-
Pay, 2 INNOVATIVE MARKETING, no. 4, 2006, at 8, 8-9 (discussing and evaluating the var-
ious methods for determining potential customers’ willingness to pay for any given 
product and noting the importance of such willingness in estimating “brand equity”). 
261 The test would have to use an acceptable control so that consumers would not be 
confronted with strange blank spaces in or on the product without the accused mark. 
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for one competitor to take market share from another, such as the 
market for soda.  In addition, sponsorship or affiliation cases should fo-
cus on the materiality of sponsorship or affiliation:  if the allegation is 
that consumers falsely believe that the Chicago Bulls authorized a  
T-shirt, then the proper materiality inquiry is not whether those con-
sumers would pay more for a Chicago Bulls T-shirt than for a blank  
T-shirt, but whether they would pay more for an authorized Chicago 
Bulls T-shirt than for an unauthorized one.  If almost all consumers 
were indifferent to the alleged affiliation, that would be good evi-
dence of immateriality. 
Courts should not require specific evidence of the materiality of a 
particular mark in every case.  The primary brand indicating the di-
rect source of a product or service should be presumed material, per-
haps irrebuttably so.262  This would, of course, require factfinders to 
determine what counted as the primary brand of a product or service, 
but that inquiry should be fairly straightforward in most cases.  Like-
wise, evidence of materiality can be reasonably general:  evidence that 
an explicit celebrity endorsement generally matters to consumers, for 
example, should suffice to satisfy a celebrity plaintiff’s burden even in 
the absence of evidence that her particular endorsement matters, 
 
262 The Restatement provides a reasonable rule, albeit one that courts have overge-
neralized with respect to all types of trademark claims.  Misrepresentations relating to 
source are inherently likely to lead to mistaken purchases and harm the plaintiff’s 
reputation, which means that “independent proof of likely commercial detri-
ment . . . is unnecessary in order to establish liability.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UN-
FAIR COMPETITION § 4 cmt. a (1995).  Where the primary trademark on a product is 
causing confusion over who stands behind the product, this logic makes sense.  In 
torts, however, the majority rule does not automatically find that licensing amounts to 
“standing behind” a product.  See Katya Assaf, Brand Fetishism, 43 CONN. L. REV. 83, 116-
18 (2010) (summarizing the majority view of basing a licensor’s tort liability on its in-
volvement in the manufacturing process).  Liability exists when a trademark licensor 
induces a consumer to believe that it controls the quality of the goods bearing the 
mark.  See Gizzi v. Texaco, Inc., 437 F.2d 308, 310 (3d Cir. 1971) (holding that evi-
dence of Texaco’s trademark instilling a sense of confidence in the consumer’s mind 
as to the quality of its products was enough to vacate a directed verdict); Kennedy v. 
Guess, Inc., 806 N.E.2d 776, 786 (Ind. 2004) (holding that licensors are liable for 
product defects only to the extent that they played a role in design, advertising, manu-
facture, and distribution); Assaf, supra, at 119 (“[T]ort liability is imposed on trade-
mark licensors . . . when the trademark licensor induces the consumer to believe that 
he approved the quality of the goods bearing his mark.”); cf. Brandimarti v. Caterpillar 
Tractor Co., 527 A.2d 134, 139-40 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (reasoning that the consumer 
buying a Caterpillar tractor relies on the Caterpillar brand’s reputation and skill, and 
thus Caterpillar is liable for defects). 
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though defendants should also be able to present general and specific 
evidence to the contrary.263 
Margreth Barrett suggests that materiality could be defined pre-
scriptively, using rules of thumb about what consumers should care 
about,264 just as false advertising cases use rules of thumb that consum-
ers care about health, safety, and prominent explicit claims.  In initial 
interest confusion cases, “materiality might be judged not by the sub-
stance of the misrepresentation (since the consumer knows the truth 
by the time any purchase is made), but by the effort the consumer 
must undergo” to correct an initial error—if all a consumer needs to 
do is click the “back” button, and the consumer doesn’t care enough 
to do so, then the initial mistake was unlikely to have been material.265 
The only caution, and a vital one, would be to distinguish endorse-
ment from affiliation or other less well-defined types of association.  If 
consumers aren’t receiving an endorsement message, but only a mes-
sage of some sort of relationship or affiliation, then that is the message 
whose materiality should be assessed.  Moreover, the empirical evidence 
that something weaker than endorsement matters to consumers is lack-
ing.  While the endorsement of a person, or even an expert institu-
tion, might routinely be relevant, trademarks are neither people nor 
institutions, and this difference points to the relevant issue:  whether 
consumer perceptions of a trademark’s presence, or even of a trademark 
 
263 See, e.g., Jagdish Agrawal & Wagner A. Kamakura, The Economic Worth of Celebrity 
Endorsers:  An Event Study Analysis, 59 J. MARKETING 56, 60 (1995) (reviewing empirical 
data and concluding that marketing managers and investors generally view celebrity 
endorsements as a worthwhile component of advertising strategies).  But see Celebrity 
Advertisements:  Exposing A Myth of Advertising Effectiveness, ACE METRIX, 1 (2010), 
http://mktg.acemetrix.com/acton/fs/blocks/showLandingPage/a/563/p/p-001d/t/ 
page/fm/0 (“Our study of more than 2,600 ads found that—contrary to popular wis-
dom—celebrity ads do not perform any better than non-celebrity ads, and in some cas-
es they perform much worse.  In our data, whether or not a celebrity endorses a prod-
uct was unimportant in determining whether an ad resonated with viewers.”).  The FTC 
guidelines recognize that endorsements can be so important that paid endorsers must 
adhere to the same substantiation and nondeception requirements that the advertisers 
backing them must follow.  See Guides Concerning Use of Endorsements and Testimo-
nials in Advertising, 16 C.F.R. §§ 255.0–.5 (2010) (providing rules and explanatory ex-
amples of endorsement guidelines). 
264 See Barrett, supra note 255, at 20 (suggesting that “quality” factors or a product 
endorsement by a particular person may be material, but “prestige” factors or only a 
bare association with the same person may not be material). 
265 Id.; see also Petty, supra note 200, at 779, 788 (arguing that courts applying ini-
tial interest confusion should follow the FTC’s approach of examining contextual fac-
tors, such as how hard it is for the consumer to retreat from the initial confusion and 
find the product she really wanted, and should only find actionable confusion when 
consumers are trapped into making a purchase). 
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owner’s permission, are equivalent to perceptions of endorsement.  Trade-
mark owners have provided no evidence that this is generally, regularly, 
or even occasionally true, and thus there is no justification for any pre-
sumption of materiality in permission-confusion-type cases. 
The challenge for courts will be to go beyond accepting the max-
imalist intuition:  marketers naturally want to believe that the power of 
their brands is such that any reference will affect purchases.  But given 
that, among other things, significant numbers of ads have no effect at 
all on consumers—they are not even processed at a level detectable by 
brain scans266—such assumptions of all-consuming power should not 
be our guide. 
If consumers do not think that the trademark owner controls or 
guarantees the quality of a product (such as when a trademarked 
product appears in a film), then there is no basis for infringement lia-
bility because the trademark owner’s reputation is not driving sales.267  
As Mark Lemley and Mark McKenna have suggested, confusion over 
actual source should therefore be presumed material, while confusion 
over sponsorship, affiliation, or—most crucially—permission should 
be presumed immaterial.268  So, for example, Insinkerator’s claim that 
the NBC show Heroes caused actionable confusion by showing Insinke-
rator’s garbage disposal in an important scene should be obviously 
wrong, so obviously that Insinkerator would risk an award of fees for 
proceeding on such a claim.269 
A trademark owner could respond that a false perception of con-
nection could damage the value of its brand, even if the perceived 
 
266 See Tushnet, supra note 194, at 547 (“[N]ew neuroscience studies provide evi-
dence for advertisers’ long-held belief that much advertising is completely useless.  In 
MRI studies, ‘a third to a half of commercials do not generate any brain reaction at 
all.’” (quoting Kenneth Chang, Enlisting Science’s Lessons to Entice More Shoppers to Spend 
More, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2006, at F3)). 
267 Cf. Bd. of Governors v. Helpingstine, 714 F. Supp. 167, 173 (M.D.N.C. 1989) 
(explaining that most consumers were indifferent to the existence of a license from 
the university trademark claimant and thus could not be relevantly confused about it). 
268 See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 32, at 445-46 (arguing that confusion over 
source should be presumed material, as should confusion over sponsorship or affilia-
tion, when and only when consumers believe that the trademark owner controls the 
quality of the product or service); McKenna, supra note 198, at 828 (suggesting an ap-
proach under which “confusion about anything other than actual source would be pre-
sumptively irrelevant”). 
269 See Cheerleader-Mangling Disposal Makers vs. ‘Heroes’:  Now with Pictures!, GAWKER 
(Oct. 5, 2006, 2:39 PM), http://gawker.com/#!205559/cheerleader-mangling-disposal-
makers-vs-heroes-now-with-pictures (noting that NBC claimed the suit had no merit but 
that the network planned to remove another scene from a future episode to insulate 
itself from “further frivolous lawsuits”). 
TUSHNET REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/13/2011  1:30 PM 
1372 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 159: 1305 
connection wouldn’t influence consumers’ decisions to purchase the 
defendant’s product in the first place.  This is essentially a tarnish-
ment rationale, but courts have long incorporated it into confusion 
doctrine.270  This position has a striking empirical weakness:  parties 
have never offered courts any evidence that consumers punish actual 
licensor brands in this way, and consumer research on brand exten-
sions suggests that it’s unlikely in most circumstances, especially the 
circumstances that lead to endorsement or permission cases.271 
If we forced trademark owners to make their harm stories con-
crete rather than allowing them to rest on doctrinal shibboleths, we 
would see just how badly this rationale for liability fits modern spon-
sorship and permission claims.  Consider an expensively litigated ex-
ample:  even if people believe that Google needs GEICO’s permission 
to run targeted ads for insurance in response to a search for “GEICO,” 
and even if those people become disillusioned with Google’s perfor-
mance as a search engine, it would be bizarre for them to conclude 
that there was something wrong with GEICO.272  Without materiality, 
there is no space in which to recognize the fallacies in the causal 
chain beginning with alleged confusion over permission. 
Courts nervous about the potential dilution harms of “sponsorship 
confusion” could minimize those harms, without unduly constraining 
competition or free speech, by awarding limited remedies.273  Plaintiffs 
would at most be entitled to a disclaimer remedy without proof of ma-
teriality as to a consumption decision about defendant’s product.  A 
 
270 See generally Gerard N. Magliocca, One and Inseparable:  Dilution and Infringement 
in Trademark Law, 85 MINN. L. REV. 949, 1008-16 (2001) (discussing the ways in which 
confusion doctrine has expanded to cover many things that previously would have 
been dealt with, if at all, as dilution).  This leads me to a cautionary note:  materiality 
would not provide a limit on dilution claims explicitly made as such. 
271 See McKenna, supra note 198, at 825-27 (noting the lack of certainty about what 
consumers consider to be material); Tushnet, supra note 194, at 543-44 (discussing 
tarnishment and concluding that “strong marks have little to fear from unauthorized 
tarnishment”). 
272 See Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., No. 04-0507, 2005 WL 1903128, at *7 
(E.D. Va. Aug. 8, 2005) (finding that GEICO failed to establish a likelihood of confu-
sion stemming from Google keywords but acknowledging possible confusion as to 
sponsored links); Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 703-04 
(E.D. Va. 2004) (framing the issue as whether keyword placement unfairly free rides 
on well-known marks’ fame).  
273 See McKenna, supra note 198, at 827 (“If . . . it appears in a particular case that 
consumers’ purchasing decisions are affected by confusion about actual source, but 
not by confusion regarding a potential licensing relationship, then courts could ade-
quately prevent material confusion in that case without enjoining the defendant’s use 
altogether—perhaps simply by requiring clear labeling of the actual source.”). 
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disclaimer would come closer to addressing the only harm that could 
exist in the absence of any effect on consumer decisions:  the false 
perception of connection that might somehow, someday, affect brand 
value.274 
A practical objection to this proposal is that materiality wouldn’t 
solve the in terrorem effects of trademark lawsuits, or threats to sue on 
legitimate uses, because materiality could often be alleged with suffi-
cient credibility to survive summary judgment.275  It’s true that suffi-
ciently aggressive trademark owners could continue to make threats 
under practically any trademark regime, but there’s something to be 
said for signaling.  Once judges get the message, trademark owners 
may follow along.  The results of cases after Dastar and Wal-Mart, for 
example, can’t tell us anything about threat letters but suggest that 
courts are vigorously enforcing limits on trademark law articulated by 
the Supreme Court and thus affecting any reasonable lawyer’s deci-
sion calculus.  The threat of fee awards to prevailing defendants—
which in cases involving speech-suppressing claims by the owners of 
Barney the purple dinosaur276 and the Barbie doll277 have been sub-
stantial—might also deter overreaching.  While America’s litigious 
culture is likely to remain aggressive, changing the outcomes of liti-
gated cases would be a significant improvement.278 
 
274 A disclaimer would deal with both the fear of an unwarranted advantage for 
the defendant as well as the fear of hitching the plaintiff’s reputation to the defen-
dant’s.  Evidence from the branding literature makes clear that even the smallest of 
distinctions is enough to keep a bad brand extension from harming the value of a core 
brand, and that is when consumers are flat-out told that the core brand is the source of 
the brand extension—in other words, when “confusion” is one hundred percent.  See 
supra note 271 and accompanying text. 
275 See Grynberg, supra note 224, at 968-69 (arguing that a materiality requirement 
would not allow defendants to dispose of many claims in the early stages of litigation, 
even if plaintiffs are ultimately unsuccessful). 
276 See Lyons P’ship v. Giannoulas, 179 F.3d 384, 388 n.5 (5th Cir. 1999) (affirming 
the district court’s award of attorneys’ fees to the defendant). 
277 See Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 816 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(affirming the district court’s award of attorneys’ fees); Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Moun-
tain Prods., No. 99-8543, 2004 WL 1454100, at *4 (C.D. Cal. June 21, 2004) (awarding 
defendants nearly $1.6 million in attorneys’ fees and nearly $250,000 in costs). 
278 Initial interest confusion might be another barrier to using materiality to move 
trademark law in a positive direction, but a type of materiality analysis could mitigate 
this problem.  See supra note 264 and accompanying text. 
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IV.  WHAT FALSE ADVERTISING SHOULD LEARN 
FROM TRADEMARK:  COMPETITION 
Although false advertising has a better grasp on the effects of impli-
cation and materiality than trademark law does, not all is well in section 
43(a)(1)(B).  The major problem is the increasing rigidity of a judi-
cially created standing doctrine borrowed from antitrust law, which  
deprives any plaintiff other than a market leader of the ability to chal-
lenge false advertising.  This has obvious consequences both for the 
amount of falsity in a market and for the risk of false advertising (and 
false advertising law) being used anticompetitively to squelch new en-
trants.  Standing in trademark is, characteristically, much more relaxed. 
A.  In Trademark 
Trademark law historically required competition in order to state 
a claim.  Under the classic formulation, if a man stamps a lion on iron, 
he is entitled to stop anyone else from stamping a lion on iron but not 
to stop anyone else from stamping a lion on linen.279  Confusion simply 
could not hurt the blacksmith, because no one in the market for iron 
would buy linen instead.280  As modern conglomerates began to pro-
duce more and more items and modern consumers became accus-
tomed to impersonal relationships with large companies with myste-
rious inner workings, courts slowly abandoned the competition 
requirement as obsolete.281  Confusion took its place:  if consumers 
were confused about who produced Aunt Jemima pancake flour, then 
the owners of Aunt Jemima pancake syrup had a remedy, even though 
sales of one were unlikely to substitute for sales of the other.282 
Consistent with this development, trademark also abandoned the 
presumption of fraudulent intent and confusion in cases of use of the 
same or confusingly similar marks on competing goods, substituting a 
multifactor test regardless of the degree of competition between the 
 
279 See, e.g., Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413-14 (1916) (recit-
ing the lion-linen formulation (quoting Ainsworth v. Walmsley, (1866) 1 L.R.Eq. 518, 
524 (M.R.))); Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1839, 1888-89 (2007) (same (quoting Hanover, 240 U.S. at 414)). 
280 See, e.g., Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden’s Condensed Milk Co., 201 F. 510, 513-
14 (7th Cir. 1912) (asserting that deception alone is not enough to create liability). 
281 See McKenna, supra note 279, at 1896-97, 1899-900 (describing the movement 
toward a confusion standard).  
282 See Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co., 247 F. 407, 409-10, 412 (2d Cir. 
1917) (ruling that the use of a trademark on a complementary product was still a 
wrongful taking and evidence of bad intentions). 
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parties.283  Requiring a finding of likely confusion in each case, while 
apparently limiting trademark in the core case of competitive prod-
ucts, actually promoted its expansion.284  Courts began to engage in 
confusion inquiries in any situation rather than relying on older rules 
focusing on the use of identical or similar marks on competing prod-
ucts.  Today, then, a maker of ice cream cones can halt the distribu-
tion of a movie on the basis of likely confusion.285 
B.  False Advertising’s Wrong Turn 
Lanham Act false advertising law, by contrast, has been significantly 
contracting under the rubric of standing.286  Despite the breadth of 
the language in the Lanham Act, which provides  a cause of action to 
“any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged”287 
by a violation of section 43(a), courts have never given those words a 
literal reading.  At first, courts simply excluded consumers from the 
class the law protected, allowing only competitors to sue.288 
More recently, the Conte Bros./Phoenix of Broward test289 has been 
gaining traction.290  Borrowing from antitrust precedents, this line of 
 
283 See Barrett, supra note 250, at 919 (noting that courts previously incorporated 
the presumptions of fraudulent intent and consumer confusion into technical trade-
mark infringement); Beebe, supra note 17, at 1587-90 (summarizing the history of the 
multifactor test for trademark infringement and explaining why the factors differ 
across every circuit). 
284 See McKenna, supra note 279, at 1902-04 (discussing the consequences of “un-
plugg[ing] trademark and unfair competition law from the requirement of competi-
tion”). 
285 See Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prods., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727, 732, 735 (D. 
Minn. 1998). 
286 See, e.g., Peter S. Massaro, III, Filtering Through a Mess:  A Proposal to Reduce the 
Confusion Surrounding the Requirements for Standing in False Advertising Claims Brought Un-
der Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1673, 1705 (2008) (describ-
ing standing jurisprudence as “in a state of disarray”); Gregory Apgar, Note, Prudential 
Standing Limitations on Lanham Act False Advertising Claims, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2389, 
2408-21 (2008) (surveying federal court treatment of standing under section 43(a)). 
287 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006). 
288 See, e.g., Barrus v. Sylvania, 55 F.3d 468, 470 (9th Cir. 1995) (affirming a dismis-
sal for failure to state a false advertising claim under the Lanham because the consumer 
plaintiffs lacked standing); 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 27:25 (noting that cases teach 
that consumer interests “must be invoked by a competitor of the defendant, not by a 
buyer from the defendant”). 
289 See Phoenix of Broward, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 489 F.3d 1156, 1163-64 
(11th Cir. 2007) (adopting the five-factor test articulated in Conte Bros. Automotive, Inc. 
v. Quaker State-Slick 50, Inc., 165 F.3d 221, 233 (3d Cir. 1998)). 
290 See, e.g., Furniture “R” Us, Inc. v. Leath Furniture, LLC, No. 07-23321, 2008 WL 
4444007, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 26, 2008) (adopting the test).  
TUSHNET REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/13/2011  1:30 PM 
1376 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 159: 1305 
cases evaluates prudential standing in Lanham Act false advertising 
cases by balancing five factors:  (1) Is the injury of a type that Congress 
sought to redress in providing a private remedy for violations of the 
Lanham Act?  (2) How direct or indirect is the asserted injury?  (3) Is 
the plaintiff proximate to or remote from the allegedly harmful con-
duct?  (4) How speculative is the damage claim?  (5) What are the risks 
of duplicative damages or complexity in apportioning damages?291 
Initially, it is worth noting that this borrowing from antitrust does 
not include intent to harm the plaintiff, which is part of the antitrust 
standing test articulated by the Supreme Court.292  Because the Lan-
ham Act does not require intent, this element is obviously inappro-
priate, which should have been a warning.  In order to get back up to 
five factors, the Conte Bros. test splits the Supreme Court’s fifth fac-
tor—whether the claim involves speculative harm, duplicative recov-
ery, or a complex apportionment of damages—into two different fac-
tors.  Not incidentally, this change makes it easier for courts to 
determine that multiple factors weigh against Lanham Act standing. 
Even more significantly, even if this test is appropriate for anti-
trust,293 antitrust does not have the same aim as false advertising law294:  
 
291 The Phoenix of Broward court reasoned that a multifactor test  
is designed to determine whether the injury alleged is the type of injury that 
the Lanham Act was designed to redress—harm to the plaintiff’s ‘ability to 
compete’ in the marketplace and erosion of the plaintiff’s ‘good will and rep-
utation’ that has been directly and proximately caused by the defendant’s 
false advertising.   
Phoenix of Broward, 489 F.3d at 1167.  The phrase, “directly and proximately caused,” is 
doing all the work here—that is, questions of materiality and effect on consumers that 
should be addressed at a stage at which evidence can be considered, rather than by 
judges’ hunches about what consumers think and do. 
292 See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 
459 U.S. 519, 537 (1983) (noting that improper motive “may support a plaintiff’s dam-
ages claim under § 4” of the Clayton Act). 
293 The antitrust standing test has been subjected to significant criticism.  See, e.g., 
Joseph P. Bauer, The Stealth Assault on Antitrust Enforcement:  Raising the Barriers for Anti-
trust Injury and Standing, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 437, 443 (2001) (arguing that the test is 
unduly restrictive and leads to suboptimal enforcement); Ronald W. Davis, Standing on 
Shaky Ground:  The Strangely Elusive Doctrine of Antitrust Injury, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 697, 
765 (2003) (criticizing the inconsistency of lower courts’ application of the Supreme 
Court’s antitrust standing jurisprudence); C. Douglas Floyd, Antitrust Victims Without 
Antitrust Remedies:  The Narrowing of Standing in Private Antitrust Actions, 82 MINN. L. REV. 
1, 71 (1997) (“A limitation on antitrust standing only to consumers and competitors in 
the market restricted by the defendant’s conduct . . . lacks any principled basis.”).  Ad-
ditionally, the unguided flexibility of the balancing test leads to “disguised decisions on 
the merits by courts hostile to certain types of antitrust claims or plaintiffs.”  See Floyd, 
supra, at 40.  Courts can use balancing to deny standing to plaintiffs who meet the in-
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while it is cliché to say that antitrust law protects competition, not 
competitors, the Lanham Act aims to protect both.  The statute itself 
lists both competitor and consumer interests as its object:  “The intent 
of this chapter is . . . to protect persons engaged in such commerce against 
unfair competition; [and] to prevent fraud and deception in such 
commerce . . . .”295  We let competitors sue, and not consumers, under 
section 43(a)(1)(B) because we think competitors have their own in-
terests to protect.  Thus, the Lanham Act is “primarily intended to pro-
tect commercial interests.  A competitor in a Lanham Act suit does not 
act as a ‘vicarious avenger of the public’s right to be protected against 
false advertising.’”296  This different aim makes wholesale borrowing of 
antitrust precedents inappropriate. 
Conte Bros. involved a noncompetitor plaintiff—a party in a differ-
ent position on the distribution and retail chain than the defendant—
and arguably should have been decided against the plaintiff on that 
ground, at least if identifiable direct competitors were in a position to 
sue.297  Instead, while saying that it was preserving the possibility of 
noncompetitor suits, the Third Circuit (via then-Judge Alito) fa-
shioned a test that, as applied, cuts off many competitors’ rights to sue. 
In fact, the application of Conte Bros. has enhanced the power of 
the largest firm in a field while weakening smaller competitors’ ability 
to fight false advertising.  Outside the Second Circuit, the only circuit 
to reject Conte Bros. explicitly,298 it is no longer enough to compete in 
order to bring a claim.  One may need to be a dominant competitor.  
In a multiplayer market, there will always be some uncertainty about 
the amount of damages and the extent to which business was diverted 
 
jury and directness requirements.  See Davis, supra, at 715 (citing Associated Gen. Contrac-
tors, 459 U.S. at 540). 
294 Cf. Christina Bohannan, IP Misuse as Foreclosure, 96 IOWA L. REV. 475, 476 
(2011) (criticizing untheorized borrowing from antitrust doctrine to define copyright 
misuse and finding that the antitrust standard “is less faithful to the core IP values of 
promoting innovation and protecting access to the public domain”). 
295 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (emphasis added). 
296 Sandoz Pharm. Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 902 F.2d 222, 230 (3d Cir. 
1990) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Am. Home 
Prods. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 672 F. Supp. 135, 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)). 
297 See Conte Bros. Auto., Inc. v. Quaker State-Slick 50, Inc., 165 F.3d 221, 234 (3d 
Cir. 1998) (concluding that while the plaintiffs “alleged a commercial interest, they 
have not alleged competitive harm”). 
298 See Famous Horse Inc. v. 5th Ave. Photo Inc., 624 F.3d 106, 113 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(applying the “reasonable interest” approach, which views “competition as a strong in-
dication of why the plaintiff has a reasonable basis for believing that its interest will be 
damaged by the alleged false ad”). 
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from the plaintiff instead of from other businesses.  Thus, in Phoenix of 
Broward, a McDonald’s subcontractor fraudulently diverted at least 
$20 million in large-ticket prizes for McDonald’s contests and that cus-
tomers did not in fact have an equal chance at winning them.299  
McDonald’s allegedly knew there were problems with the games but 
continued to advertise them as if all consumers had equal chances to 
win.300  The resulting consumer class actions were settled in 2002 for 
$15 million in new prizes.301  A group of Burger King franchisees sued 
for false advertising.302  The court held that the class of Burger King 
franchisees had an insufficient interest to maintain a Lanham Act claim 
against McDonald’s because they were only a subset of the fast food 
market; thus, it would be difficult to determine whether McDonald’s 
false advertising took business from the class instead of others and to 
apportion damages.303  In other words, because the market for fast 
food is unconcentrated—one might call it competitive—McDonald’s 
is essentially immune from competitors’ false advertising claims. 
Here, we see modern standing doctrine turning the Lanham Act’s 
false advertising provisions on their heads.  As noted in Part I, the 
Lanham Act originally was unquestionably understood to cover state-
ments about the advertiser’s own product.304  In some circuits, false 
statements about competitors were thought to be the proper province 
of state product disparagement law305 such that amendment was re-
quired to confirm the federal availability of that type of claim.  But un-
der this new interpretation of standing, it’s much harder to proceed 
against a false statement about the advertiser’s own product because the 
connection between the advertiser’s self-promotion and the plaintiff’s 
loss will almost always be less direct than the connection between an 
attack on the plaintiff and plaintiff’s loss.306  This is especially impor-
 
299 See Phoenix of Broward, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 489 F.3d 1156, 1160 (11th 
Cir. 2007). 
300 Id. 
301 Id. 
302 Id. 
303 See id. at 1173 (“[O]n balance, Phoenix does not have prudential standing to 
bring its claim against McDonald’s.”). 
304 See cases cited supra note 13. 
305 See cases cited supra note 14. 
306 Furniture “R” Us, for example, found indirectness because the defendant pro-
moted its own services and it was not possible to tell whether customers were diverted 
from the plaintiff or diverted from some other third party.  Furniture “R” Us, Inc. v. 
Leath Furniture, LLC, No. 07-23321, 2008 WL 4444007, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 26, 2008).  
In Phoenix of Broward, as well, the court found an attenuated causal relationship be-
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tant because prudential standing claims are evaluated on a motion to 
dismiss—before relevant evidence about harm, materiality, and other 
elements of a claim is available—even though courts then proceed to 
make decisions based on speculation about harm and materiality.307 
The court in Phoenix of Broward, for example, cautioned that its 
analysis might differ “if, for example, the facts were such that Mc-
Donald’s had falsely advertised the odds of winning all of its prizes 
(low-, mid-, and high-value), or if McDonald’s were only giving away a 
single prize and falsely represented the odds of winning.”308  These  
hypotheticals have little to do with the factors that supposedly coun-
seled against standing, especially the two damages factors.  The court 
was relying on its fact-free view of materiality, which notably conflicts 
with ordinary presumptions that claims central to an ad (here, the 
prospect of winning high-value prizes) are material to consumers. 
The problem is likely to worsen as courts apply the Supreme 
Court’s new interpretation of the pleading standard under Bell Atlantic 
Corp. v. Twombly309 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal.310  This standard encourages 
 
tween McDonald’s false advertising about the availability of high-value prizes and busi-
ness at Burger King.  The court broke down the causal chain as follows:   
(1) McDonald’s advertisements falsely represented that customers had a fair 
and equal chance to win one of the “rare” high-value prizes . . . ; (2) as a direct 
result of the misrepresentation regarding the high-value prizes, McDonald’s 
lured customers who would have eaten at Burger King (as opposed to one of 
numerous other fast food competitors), causing Burger King to lose sales; and 
(3) but for this misrepresentation, these customers would have eaten at Burger 
King, even though the chances of winning one of the “rare” high-value prizes 
would have been minute had there been no theft, even though only “certain” 
high-value prizes were stolen, and even though these customers still had a fair 
and equal opportunity to win all of the other prizes.  
Phoenix of Broward, 489 F.3d at 1169.  Note that (2) and (3) are the same thing, just res-
tated—that the falsehood diverted customers from Burger King to McDonald’s.  More-
over, (3) makes a number of questionable assumptions.  Consumers surely know that 
the chance of winning the big-ticket prizes is low (though they expect it’s fair), but as 
the lottery ads say, you can’t win if you don’t play.  Lotteries are good evidence that 
people are willing to incur costs for small chances at big payouts.  Finally, advertising law 
generally presumes that overt claims central to ads are material to consumers, and the 
ads here promoted the big-ticket prizes.  Nevertheless, the court concluded that “the 
causal chain linking McDonald’s alleged misrepresentations about one aspect of its 
promotional games to a decrease in Burger King’s sales is tenuous, to say the least.”  Id. 
307 See Furniture “R” Us, 2008 WL 4444007, at *3 (explicitly equating factor (2) with 
materiality). 
308 Phoenix of Broward, 489 F.3d at 1173.  For further discussion of the Eleventh 
Circuit’s analysis, see Apgar, supra note 286, at 2420 & n.310, 2426-27.  
309 550 U.S. 544, 557-58, 563 (2007). 
310 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009). 
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courts to assess pleadings for plausibility and dismiss claims when the 
facts alleged are more likely to be consistent with lawful conduct than 
with unlawful conduct.  The prudential standing test provides numer-
ous opportunities for courts to opine on the merits of a case in advance 
of factfinding,311 and courts are doing so.  In Vexcon Chemicals, Inc. v. 
CureCrete Chemical Co., for example, the parties sold concrete-curing 
products of different types.312  The court held that the plaintiff didn’t 
have standing because, among other things, it couldn’t show that the 
defendant’s statements were false.313  Thus, the plaintiff wasn’t harmed.  
Reasoning similarly, another court expressed doubt that the target of 
direct comparative advertising—specifically named in the ad as infe-
rior to the advertiser—had prudential standing.314  These cases show 
that recent developments in standing are fundamentally about dis-
missing cases before they get to a jury—or even to discovery.  The re-
sult is that false advertising law diverges even further from trademark, 
where plaintiffs get the benefit of the doubt and then some.315  In both 
cases, relaxation of a central focus on competition led to major changes 
in the law even as applied to competitors, but in trademark the result 
has been expansion, while in false advertising it has been contraction.316 
 
311 See Holy Cross Hosp., Inc. v. Baskot, No. 10-62133, 2010 WL 5418999, at *3 
(S.D. Fla. Dec. 23, 2010) (“[T]he merits nature of Defendants’ argument regarding 
lack of standing is due to the overlap between the test for prudential standing under 
Section 43(a) and the injury element of such Section 43(a) claims.”); cf. 2A PHILLIP E. 
AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 335f (3d ed. 2007) (noting that an increasing num-
ber of courts hold that there is no antitrust standing when they actually mean that no 
violation has occurred).  
312 No. 07-0943, 2008 WL 834392, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 2008). 
313 Id. at *5-6. 
314 Intertape Polymer Corp. v. Inspired Techs., Inc., 725 F. Supp. 2d 1319, 1332 
n.25 (M.D. Fla. 2010). 
315 Some courts, deepening the confusion, are beginning to apply Conte Bros. to 
trademark cases.  By their nature, trademark plaintiffs are more likely to survive the 
test than false advertising plaintiffs, albeit after some wheel spinning by the courts.  See 
Trump Plaza of the Palm Beaches Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Rosenthal, No. 08-80408, 2009 
WL 1812743, at *4-5 (S.D. Fla. June 24, 2009); AFL Phila. LLC v. Krause, 639 F. Supp. 
2d 512, 522 (E.D. Pa. 2009). 
316 A recent Second Circuit case, while appearing to construe section 43(a)(1)(B) 
standing broadly, actually demonstrates the greater scope given to trademark claims.  
The panel refused to adopt Conte Bros., though it suggested that its own test for standing 
operated similarly.  See Famous Horse Inc. v. 5th Ave. Photo Inc., 624 F.3d 106, 115 n.3 
(2d Cir. 2010) (reasoning that Conte Bros. “complicates the inquiry[] . . . without clarify-
ing the result,” but stating that the court’s own analysis produced the same result as Conte 
Bros.).  The majority held that allegations that the defendant engaged in trademark 
counterfeiting, which harmed the competitor’s reputation for cheap but genuine goods, 
were sufficient to provide standing to the competitor to sue for false advertising—even 
though the competitor was not the trademark owner.  See id. at 115.  Traditionally, only 
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The current trend in prudential standing is ill-advised, not just be-
cause it abandons the historical roots of the statute, but because false 
boasts can be very damaging to the market of information.317  The 
harms may be diffuse, affecting many competitors, but that means a 
competitor who challenges such claims confers a positive externality 
on other competitors and should not be discouraged from doing so.  
In fact, the competitor’s assessment that its interests are significant 
enough to make a false boast worth challenging most likely deserves 
some judicial deference, at least when competition is direct. 
Also, as a matter of internal doctrinal consistency, the new stand-
ing rules fall far short.  Section 43(a)(1)(B) regulates false statements 
in “commercial advertising or promotion.”  In part to make sure that 
the Lanham Act covers only commercial speech that can be regulated 
consistently with the First Amendment, courts have repeatedly defined 
“commercial advertising or promotion” to include a competition  
requirement.318  Under the Conte Bros./Phoenix of Broward approach, it 
appears that a plaintiff could have prudential standing while failing to 
challenge anything that counted as “commercial advertising or pro-
motion” with respect to that plaintiff.319 
One recent case from the Fifth Circuit recognized some of the ex-
cesses of the Conte Bros./Phoenix of Broward standard.  In Harold H. 
 
trademark owners have standing to sue for infringement.  See, e.g., Kam Lee Yuen Trad-
ing Co. v. Hocean, Inc., No. 10-0455, 2010 WL 3155812, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2010) 
(“‘To establish standing to sue for trademark infringement under the Lanham Act, a 
plaintiff must show that he or she is either (1) the owner of a federal mark registration, 
(2) the owner of an unregistered mark, or (3) a nonowner with a cognizable interest in 
the allegedly infringed trademark.’” (quoting Halicki Films, LLC v. Sanderson Sales & 
Mktg., 547 F.3d 1213, 1225 (9th Cir. 2008))). 
317 See GEORGE A. AKERLOF, The Market for ‘Lemons’:  Quality Uncertainty and the Mar-
ket Mechanism (“The cost of dishonesty . . . lies not only in the amount by which the 
purchaser is cheated; the cost also must include the loss incurred from driving legiti-
mate business out of existence.”), in EXPLORATIONS IN PRAGMATIC ECONOMICS 27, 33 
(2005); cf. Schering-Plough Healthcare Prods., Inc. v. Neutrogena Corp., No. 09-0642, 
2010 WL 2788240, at *3 (D. Del. July 15, 2010) (holding that, precisely because it 
would be “extremely difficult to prove monetary damages in the majority of cases 
where more than two competitors are locked in a struggle for consumers,” a presump-
tion of harm was appropriate in literal falsity cases). 
318 See, e.g., Gordon & Breach Sci. Publishers S.A. v. Am. Inst. of Physics, 859 F. 
Supp. 1521, 1533 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (“Suit may be brought only by a commercial plaintiff 
who can prove that its interests have been harmed by a competitor’s false advertising.”).  
319 See ZL Techs., Inc. v. Gartner, Inc., No. 09-02393, 2009 WL 3706821, at *4 & n.2 
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2009) (noting this inconsistency); cf. Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Con-
sumeraffairs.com, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 2d 544, 551, 554 (E.D. Va. 2008) (finding a lack of 
standing because the parties didn’t compete and so the defendant hadn’t engaged in 
actionable “advertising or promotion”), aff’d, 591 F.3d 250 (4th Cir. 2009). 
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Huggins Realty, Inc. v. FNC, Inc., the court found standing where de-
fendant made the allegedly false statements to the plaintiffs in their 
capacities as customers, who thus shared confidential information 
with the defendant, enabling it to begin directly competing with 
them.320  The court cautioned that this situation fell “just within the 
outer limits of the zone of interests protected by the Lanham Act,” but 
its reasoning also rejected extreme applications of standing limita-
tions.321  Among other things, the court acknowledged the internal  
redundancy of the Conte Bros. standard (which makes weighing mul-
tiple factors against plaintiffs too easy), rejected the district court’s me-
thod of taking into account at the motion to dismiss stage an assessment 
of whether plaintiff could prove liability at trial (a mistake the Phoenix of 
Broward court also made), and directly rejected Phoenix of Broward’s bias 
against competitive markets.322  Where Phoenix of Broward had denied 
standing in significant part because there were many competitors, 
Huggins held that the number of market participants in the same 
competitive position as the plaintiff is not important: 
This factor does not weigh against standing merely because the defen-
dant competes in a crowded market in which its false advertisements 
might cause injury to multiple—or even numerous—direct competitors.  
As long as each plaintiff has suffered a distinct economic injury, we need 
not inquire into how many other similarly situated persons might also 
have prudential standing.323 
False advertising law should go further than Huggins and recog-
nize standing where there is competition and a plausible case for 
harm.324  If courts are to use the Conte Bros./Phoenix of Broward test, it 
should only be used as supplemental test for the unusual case in 
which a noncompetitor brings a Lanham Act false advertising claim, 
rather than as a general test also applied to competitors. 
Whereas trademark has gone too far in hypothesizing harm, false 
advertising law has gone too far in ignoring it.  A standard that cuts off 
all false laudatory claims in a multicompetitor market and denies 
plaintiffs a chance to offer proof of deception is inappropriate.  
Courts in false advertising cases should turn away from Conte Bros. and 
Phoenix of Broward in favor of a focus on competitive harm. 
 
320 No. 09-60804, 2011 WL 651892, at *10 (5th Cir. Feb. 24, 2011). 
321 Id. 
322 Id. at *3, *6-8. 
323 Id. at *8. 
324 See Apgar, supra note 286, at 2425-27 (accepting the Phoenix of Broward test but 
arguing that harm to a direct competitor satisfies that test). 
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CONCLUSION 
Trademark has used too many shortcuts.  False advertising increa-
singly uses too few, or the wrong ones, detaching false advertising 
claims from their actual commercial context.  The playing field in 
Lanham Act cases thus tilts in favor of trademark plaintiffs and against 
false advertising plaintiffs.  This can even be seen in courts’ discussions 
of fee awards for prevailing defendants:  courts are less likely to see the 
pursuit of a losing trademark claim as extraordinary conduct justifying 
a fee award.  This is true because a trademark plaintiff can usually find 
some factors in the multifactor confusion balancing test that favor it, 
whereas a false advertising plaintiff must satisfy each of the “rigid” false 
advertising elements and therefore risks being deemed a bad-faith liti-
gant for failing to satisfy one of those elements.325 
By failing to consider the pragmatics of communication, Lanham 
Act doctrine has avoided any consistent theory about how messages 
are communicated and how consumers make decisions.  Additionally, 
the cases have not generally dealt with the inevitability of error, both 
in underprotecting consumers and in overprotecting them, and the 
costs of establishing a fact in court. 
The rationale behind the Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart 
was that because of the risks of harassing litigation and the unlikeli-
hood that product designs are distinctive to consumers such that copy-
ing them would mislead the public, special evidence of acquired dis-
tinctiveness would be required to proceed with such a lawsuit.  This 
type of practical reasoning needs further application and could be the 
foundation for restoring materiality and standing to their appropriate 
places in the law, as well as providing a guide to when courts should 
require consumer survey evidence of deception. 
Michael Grynberg has expressed skepticism that defenses devel-
oped through common law interpretive techniques can cabin the ex-
pansion of trademark law, because, he argues, courts are increasingly 
reluctant to make such moves with respect to statutes, including the 
Lanham Act.326  One key teaching of section 43(a)(1)(B), which sits 
 
325 See Atl. Nat’l Bank v. Atl. S. Bank, No. 208-147, 2010 WL 5067412, at *2 (S.D. 
Ga. Nov. 23, 2010) (contrasting the seven-factor trademark balancing test with the  
“rigid” five-element false advertising test by noting that the latter “measur[es] the like-
lihood of consumer confusion[] . . . [and] no single factor is necessarily dispositive”). 
326 Grynberg, surpa note 224, at 925-26.  But see id. at 963-64 (suggesting that mate-
riality might be an attractive implied limit on trademark liability); cf. Graeme B. Din-
woodie, The Common Law and Trade Marks in an Age of Statutes (“[D]espite substantial 
legislative intervention, both Congress and the Supreme Court appear content that the 
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right next to section 43(a)(1)(A), is that common law refinements and 
glosses remain vital to Lanham Act jurisprudence—more significant, in 
many cases, than any words actually present in the statute.  Some of the 
limits courts have imposed on false advertising plaintiffs are unjusti-
fied, as I have attempted to show.  But the interpretive process that 
produced these doctrines is not itself illegitimate, and it is a promising 
tactic for fixing some of what’s gone wrong with trademark. 
The topics this Article covers—implications, materiality, and com-
petition—are all vital components of advertising law regulation.  The 
Lanham Act was enacted to improve the quality of information availa-
ble to consumers and to protect the legitimate interests of competitors.  
It could do its job much better with renewed attention to those aims.  
Right now, courts make their best guesses about whether a challenged 
use is misleading in trademark cases, but they do not pay attention to 
whether any misleadingness matters to the supposedly deceived con-
sumers.  In false advertising, by contrast, courts have allowed doctrinal 
categories to override a context-sensitive evaluation of the best evi-
dence available on how consumers react to nontrademark claims and 
how competitors are affected.  The result is an overextension of 
trademark rights and underprotection of consumers against other 
kinds of deceptions. 
No fundamental change in the Lanham Act is necessary to fix 
these problems.  Each branch of section 43(a)(1), in fact, offers pre-
cisely the tools needed to bring the other one back on track.  Reopen-
ing the dialogue between these near twins would benefit both false 
advertising law and trademark law. 
 
 
development of trade mark and unfair competition law in the United States remain 
heavily dependent on common law law-making by the courts.”), in THE COMMON LAW 
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 331, 333 (Catherine W. Ng et al. eds., 2010); id. at 341 
(“[T]he approach of courts since the Lanham Act has suggested no radical revision of 
the proposition that courts were to continue developing the substantive principles of 
trade mark and unfair competition law.”). 
